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Propositions  
1. The superhero credo “with great power comes great responsibility” 
also holds for food and beverage companies that are confronted with 
public health problems which are associated with unhealthy diets. 
(this thesis)  
 
2. The marketing of unhealthy food and beverage products to children 
is a morally reprehensible practice.  
(this thesis) 
 
3. Interdisciplinary research on deliberative democratic systems can be 
the key to remedying political apathy.  
 
4. The pursuit of science should not be seen as “competitive sports” but 
as a “cooperative board game”. 
 
5. In order to train truly all-round academics, PhD programs should be 
as much focused on the development of educational skills as they are 
on research skills.  
 
6. Dystopias in literature, film and video games can foster the 
imagination that is necessary to reflect upon the ethical desirability 
of novel innovations. 
 
7. For young people to grow into resilient and open-minded citizens 
they need to be confronted with ideas that fall outside of their 
comfort zone.     
 
Propositions belonging to the thesis, entitled 
A Janus-faced food industry? Ethical reflections on corporate responsibility for 
health 
Tjidde Tempels 
Wageningen, 13 November 2019 
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Chapter 1 Introduction   
 
Every other Friday I stroll through the hallways of my local supermarket. I generally 
attempt to live a healthy life, and as such I try to eat and shop according to this goal. 
Therefore, my grocery list is frequently filled with ‘healthy’ products such as fresh 
vegetables, fruits, skimmed milk, and low-fat cookies. Nevertheless, after the check-
out my basket often ends up filled with far less healthy products. Often I wonder: 
how did those caramel-nut Oreos end up here?  
The most obvious answer is of course that I put them there: I choose to buy 
them and decide to actually eat them later on. Generally, we tend to argue that the 
food choices we make, and their consequences, are our own responsibility. Should I 
grow ill or become obese due to steady overconsumption of unhealthy products, 
then I am to blame. I could have constrained myself while shopping and I could have 
not eaten the whole pack of Oreos within one week. Also, I could have taken more 
care of my bodily energy balance. Why did I not go to the gym more? All these health 
affecting decisions are my own. And therefore – or so it seems – my health is my 
individual responsibility.  
At the same time there is an increased debate on governmental level on how 
to deal with the rise of the obesity epidemic and increased prevalence of food-related 
non-communicable diseases (NCDs), such as type 2 diabetes and cardiovascular 
disease. The times that we conceived obesity as something that was mainly prevalent 
in the United States have well passed. In 2018 the World Health Organization 
(WHO) reported that over 39% of the global adult population was overweight, and 
13% was obese (WHO, 2018). Also in the Netherlands the obesity epidemic is 
growing. In 1990 only one in three Dutch adults was either obese or overweight, but 
last year – in 2018 – the Dutch Ministry of Health reported that over 50% of adult 
population was overweight, and 15% was obese (Volksgezondheid.info, 2018).  
According to the WHO, food-related NCDs are mainly due to two things: 1) 
physical inactivity and 2) unhealthy diets. For those reasons the organisation 
advocates that policies and strategies are to be set out that foster change on 
individual consumer level while also making modifications in society to make 
healthier choices more accessible and preferable (WHO, n.d.).  
Concerned with the threat food-related NCDs pose for public health, many 
governments have started programs to mitigate the effects of unhealthy 
consumption, by informing the public about the risks of NCDs, making citizens 
more aware about how to eat healthily, while also stimulating adults and children 
to exercise more. There have been some efforts for stronger regulation of unhealthy 
food and beverage products1, such as the soft drink taxes in the United Kingdom and 
Mexico, the European Parliament’s proposals for a mandatory front-of-pack 
nutrition logo and New York City’s proposed ban on large sodas (Andrews, Burton, 
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& Kees, 2011; Mytton, Clarke, & Rayner, 2012; Triggle, 2018; Wiley, Berman, & Blanke, 
2013).  
Yet, is health merely the responsibility of citizens and governments? By 
framing the debate on responsibility for food-related health harms in terms of 
individual responsibility and governmental responsibility we fail to address the 
elephant in the room, namely the food and beverage industry. For what about 
businesses and firms that are on a day-to-day basis producing the products that 
enable the rise of the obesity epidemic? Naturally, consumers might be able to make 
more healthy choices concerning the food they consume, and governments can 
develop public health policies and regulate food markets, but that does not mean we 
should not consider whether food and beverage firms themselves should not also 
take action to address food-related public health problems.  
Over the past years the role of the industry has been actively put on the 
agenda by public health scholars, academics and social movements critical of the 
global food and beverage industry. For instance, public health scholars like Marion 
Nestle and David Stuckler are highly critical of the role of ‘Big Food’ and ‘Big Soda’ 
(McKee & Stuckler, 2018; Nestle, 2013, 2015, 2018; Stuckler, McKee, Shah, & Sanjay, 
2012). In their work the industry is characterised as only caring about the ‘bottom 
line’: by pursuing profit, they disregard the health of consumer. As journalist 
Michael Moss puts it on the cover of his book ‘Salt Sugar Fat’: “We are hooked on 
salt, sugar and fat. These three simple ingredients are used by the major food 
companies to achieve the greatest possible allure for the lowest possible costs” 
(Moss, 2013). It is further argued that, by putting potentially harmful products on 
the market and enticing consumers into buying them, food producers and food 
retailers contribute to the rise of NCDs.  
For this reason, these firms are said to engage in morally blameworthy 
behaviour. To adequately deal with the negative impact the industry has on health, 
strict governmental regulation in the form of bans and taxes are in order (Gilmore, 
Savell, & Collin, 2011; McKee & Stuckler, 2018; Stuckler et al., 2012; Yoon & Lam, 2013).  
There is an intuitive appeal to this story of the critics of Big Food and Big 
Soda. The rise of NCDs can be considered problematic from a public health 
perspective, and the food and beverage industry is part of a system that is connected 
to these problems. Yet, from a philosophical perspective one can wonder whether 
and why this behaviour gives reason for moral concern. After all, these firms operate 
in a free market in which it is generally accepted that realising higher sales and 
increasing market share are desirable practices. The industry is frequently perceived 
as ‘the big bad’, but do food firms actually have a responsibility for public health – a 
responsibility that would exceed their obligation to abide to food safety laws? What 
normative considerations can underlie such a responsibility? And, if such moral 
responsibility can be established, does that imply that many food and beverage firms 
currently act irresponsibly? Can and should we see many products they sell to be 
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potentially harmful? Are the marketing practices in some way deceitful or 
manipulative? Or can we find a moral wrong in the way these firms contribute to an 
unhealthy eating environment and an obesogenic society? 
In this dissertation I seek to answer these questions by unveiling whether and 
to what extent food and beverage companies have a responsibility for public health, 
and by reflecting on what taking this corporate responsibility can entail in practice. 
However, in order to understand the moral tensions in the practices in the food and 
beverage industry, it is first of importance to further clarify the relation between the 
industry and food-related public health problems.  
 
I. Understanding the food industry’s role in the rise of food-
related health problems   
The rise of non-communicable disease and unhealthy diets 
Over the past forty years the WHO has been ringing the alarm bells to raise 
awareness and stimulate action to counter the rise of malnutrition and NCDs. NCDs 
are chronic diseases that can last a long time and are killing over 41 million people a 
year. While they often occur as a result of genetic, physiological, environmental and 
behavioural factors, they are strongly associated with an unhealthy lifestyle. In 2011 
the then WHO chairman, Margaret Chan, addressed the United Nations stating 
that: “The worldwide increase of noncommunicable diseases is a slow-motion 
disaster, as most of these diseases develop over time. But unhealthy lifestyles that 
fuel these diseases are spreading with a stunning speed and sweep” (Chan, 2011). The 
notion of an unhealthy lifestyle is directly connected to our food consumption. 
Unhealthy diets foster high blood pressure, elevated blood lipids as well as obesity. 
These are metabolic risk factors for NCDs such as type 2 diabetes and cardiovascular 
disease (WHO, 2018).  
Our global food system plays a part in this, in a seemingly contradictory way. 
On the one hand the system is unable to meet the global demand, leading people to 
be underfed, while at the same time an increasing number of people are suffering 
from overweight and obesity (Stuckler et al., 2012; Stuckler & Nestle, 2012). While 
paradoxical at first glance, overnutrition and undernutrition are different sides of 
the same coin, namely that of malnutrition. People, especially those living in 
poverty, frequently have little choice to opt for the healthier food, as the choice 
might not be available, or when it is, it is too expensive. This leaves society’s poor 
with little choice: either they do not eat, or they opt for cheap high-processed food 
– that is usually high on salt, sugar and fat (Development Initiatives, 2018; Ratcliffe, 
2018; Stuckler & Nestle, 2012).  
Empirical studies also confirm that that the consumption of unhealthy food 
products like soft drinks, red meat and ultra-processed foods has increased over the 
past years (Afshin et al., 2019; Imamura et al., 2015; Micha et al., 2015). Stuckler and 
colleagues showed how the consumption of unhealthy commodities between 1997 
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and 2010 grew steadily in low-, middle-, and high-income countries. They projected 
that the consumption of soft drinks and pre-packed foods would increase even more 
in the future (Stuckler et al., 2012). In one of the most recent analyses of global food 
consumption Afshin et al. (2019) confirm this projected trend. They show that in 
2017 the daily intake of unhealthy foods far exceeded the recommended levels. 
Global consumption of for instance sugary beverages was 49 g per day, while the 
optimal intake is 0-5 g per day. Other unhealthy foods and ingredients also exceed 
the recommended levels: processed meat consumption was 90% greater, sodium 
intake was 86% greater, and the consumption of red meat was also 18% above the 
optimal intake level (Afshin et al., 2019).  
It is highly likely that the continuous rise of NCDs is connected to the 
commercial activities of food and beverage companies, as the products they develop 
and market to a large extent determine what our diets look like. Hastings (2012) and 
Gilmore et al. (2011) even refer to this rise of food-related diseases as ‘industrial 
epidemics’, which are understood as: “epidemics emerging from the 
commercialization of potentially health damaging products” (Gilmore et al., 2011, p. 
2). They argue that food and beverage multinationals like Nestlé, PepsiCo and 
Mondelēz have – through production, marketing and involvement in science and 
politics – become the driving force behind the global obesity epidemic (Dorfman, 
Cheyne, Friedman, Wadud, & Gottlieb, 2012; Stuckler & Nestle, 2012).  
To see whether this grim picture holds true, it is helpful to provide a concise 
overview of the kind of market and non-market activities food and beverage firms 
engage in. One can basically discern three ways in which firms can contribute to 
unhealthy consumption, namely through the design of specific products, marketing 
practices, as well as involvement in science and politics. In the following subsections 
I briefly outline how these practices work and in what way they impact public health.  
 
I. Design and production  
When it comes to product development, food and beverage producers frequently 
experiment with the quality and composition of products, quantity of the products, 
as well as the product sizing. Changes on these three variables have proven to affect 
people’s eating experience (palatability of products, sense of satiation) and as a result 
influence consumers’ decision-making processes (Chandon & Wansink, 2012).  
In terms of product quality and composition several trends can be observed. 
In the first place there is an increased use of salt, sugar and fat in many products. 
This often improves flavour and palatability of a product but does not increase the 
satiety. When a product is very tasty and people do not get the feeling that they have 
eaten enough, this results in people consuming more of these kinds of products. 
Adding these ingredients fits within the trend of the creation of calorie-dense 
products. Consumption of such products leads to a high energy uptake. This does 
not necessarily lead to health problems as long as people do not overconsume these 
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products. However, in practice, people tend to overconsume these products because 
of their high palpability (Chandon & Wansink, 2012; Moss, 2013) 
 Regarding product quantity and product size there has been a trend of 
companies increasing the size of their product packaging as well as the size of 
servings. For many companies this is interesting to do, as larger packages mean 
lower packaging costs, leaving room from lower unit prices and the opportunity to 
increase consumer value. The practice of ‘supersizing’ and ‘size relabelling’ (e.g. 
relabelling a large-sized product as medium-sized) fits within this trend. Both 
practices gained prominence in the market as larger servings result in greater 
absolute profit margins – as “the marginal costs of extra food for the company is 
minimal compared to the perceived value for the consumer” (Chandon & Wansink, 
2012, p. 582; Dobson & Gerstner, 2010). Research has shown that people are often 
unaware of the nutritional value of these resized products and tend to consume 
them like ‘normal’ portions, resulting in greater calorie intake (Chandon & Wansink, 
2012; Young & Nestle, 2002) 
 
II. Marketing 
While there is a wide variety of marketing techniques, three types of marketing 
practices are prominent in the food and beverage industry, namely pricing strategies, 
product communication and changes in the consumption environment.  
Research on pricing strategies reveals that low prices of retail food tend to 
increase the sales of numerous products. The short-term price drops yield similar 
results. The price reduction for instance mitigates the feelings of guilt more often 
when buying unhealthy products. However, apart from buying more of these 
products (e.g. stockpiling), people also are more inclined to consume more of these 
products. Pricing is shown to be one of the strongest factors determining increased 
energy intake and increased chances of developing obesity, and it mostly affects low-
income consumers (Chandon & Wansink, 2012).  
Food marketing practices in the form of product communication also 
significantly impact food consumption of both children and adults. For young 
consumers products are often promoted through character-branded products, the 
gamification of products, and by providing free gifts, enticing them to consume 
more of these (often not particularly healthy) products. Furthermore, there is the 
issue of the ‘health halo’, which can surround a product when specific health claims 
are made (like ‘immunity boosting’ Rice Krispies), or when a single healthy element 
of a product is highlighted (“Granola Bars! - Now with 0% fat”). The effect of the halo 
is that consumers tend to deem the entire product healthy, based on one single 
healthy feature, while the product as a whole might not be as healthy at all (it can 
be high on calories despite the immunity boost, or low on fat, while it is high on 
sugar) (Chandon & Wansink, 2012; Elliott, 2015).  
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Lastly, there is the eating environment itself, as product placement and the 
mere availability of product can steer consumptions patterns. For instance, the 
availability of food in what are traditionally considered to be non-food stores 
(drugstores, gas stations etc.) have shown to further drive food intake. Also the 
increased presence of food shops and stores have increased food consumption. The 
proximity and density of fast food chains in urban areas are a good indicator for 
population obesity rates. As such changes in the eating environment can directly 
affect access, salience and convenience, making increased food consumption easier, 
thus contributing to what has been labelled the obesogenic society (Currie, 
DellaVigna, Moretti, & Pathania, 2009). 
 
III. Involvement in science and politics  
Next to regular market activities many of the larger food and beverage companies 
are actively involved in non-market activities (Miller & Harkins, 2010; Nestle, 2013, 
2015). There have been numerous accounts of companies trying to influence and 
shape the political agenda, sometimes effectively lobbying against governmental 
programs that seek to improve public health. Examples of this are the lobby against 
proposed beverage regulation (e.g. the New York’s soda cap and the Mexican soda 
tax), the opposition to the Danish fat tax, as well as the lobby against the European 
Parliament’s proposal to include mandatory front-of-pack nutrition logos on 
prepacked foods (Bateman-House, Bayer, Colgrove, Fairchild, & McMahon, 2017; 
Bødker, Pisinger, Toft, & Jørgensen, 2015; Kurzer & Cooper, 2013). Industry partners 
are forwarding their position by engaging in a variety of tactics, ranging from 
threatening with lawsuits and astroturfing, to stressing possible welfare losses and 
casting doubt on scientific evidence (O’Connor, 2015, 2016). Sometimes these tactics 
pay off. In the cases of New York, Denmark and the EU for instance, the efforts of 
the industry contributed to either the abolishment of the proposed regulation, or to 
the introduction of a less stringent policy (Andrews et al., 2011; Bateman-House et 
al., 2017; Kurzer & Cooper, 2013; Mytton et al., 2012).  
Next to political lobbying many companies are involved in the funding and 
conduct of scientific research on food products. While public-private research on 
food has proven fruitful in several cases, it can also steer the direction and outcomes 
of public health research. Research released between 2011 and 2018 reveals how the 
outcomes of industry-funded research often narrowly fits with the funder’s 
economic interests (Bes-Rastrollo, Schulze, Ruiz-Canela, & Martinez-Gonzalez, 2013; 
O’Connor, 2015). 
 For example, scientists funded by Coca-Cola concluded in their research that 
obesity and NCDs are largely due to an imbalance between food intake and exercise, 
rather than the kind and amount of food consumed (Blair, Hand, & Hill, 2015; Nestle, 
2018). On the website of the Global Energy Balance Network (an NGO, affiliated with 
Coca-Cola) researchers even argued that the key to weight loss is not reducing food 
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consumption, but “maintaining an active lifestyle and eating more calories” 
(O’Connor, 2015). Several scientists considered these recommendations to be 
remarkable as it goes against the large body of evidence that is pointing the opposite 
direction, namely that the correlation between physical exercise and fat mass is 
either conflicting or absent, increased exercise also increases food intake, and that 
limiting intake of sugary products makes weight loss easier (Cook & Schoeller, 2011; 
Thomas et al., 2012; Wilks et al., 2011). Apart from impacting research results, there 
have been cases the industry kept quiet about found negative effects of their 
ingredients and products. For instance, the sugar industry in the United States has 
for years remained silent about research results that would reveal that sugar has 
potentially negative effects on consumer health (Kearns, Apollonio, & Glantz, 2017; 
Kearns, Schmidt, & Glantz, 2016) 
  
Corporate responsibility for public health 
This brief outline provides a cohesive overview of the kinds of corporate practices 
that are frequently deemed problematic as they either contribute to 
overconsumption or hamper the creation of effective public health policies. Yet, this 
grim picture is not the full picture. Many firms are at the same time engaging in 
various corporate social responsibility activities that seek to improve upon health. 
Producers are engaging in product innovations that lead to healthier and less 
unhealthy products (e.g. light products, vitamin-enriched biscuits), supermarkets 
are experimenting with pro-health nudging and healthy check-outs, while larger 
food multinationals are cooperating with governments and NGOs in public-private 
partnerships to support public health (like co-sponsoring sports events and 
educating people about healthy food) (Blok, Tempels, Pietersma, & Janssen, 2017; 
Hartmann, 2011; Knai et al., 2015). So, in terms of product development, marketing 
and scientific and political involvement, these very same firms are also engaging 
behaviour that could counter the global obesity epidemic and mitigate food-related 
NCDs.  
This provides us with a curious case, for it seems that in practice firms in the 
food and beverage industry are engaging in behaviour that contributes to food-
related public health problems, while simultaneously participating in activities that 
seek to prevent them. How should we evaluate these practices? Contrary to what is 
often implied by critical public health scholars the facts to do not speak for 
themselves. The empirical description of how these food and beverage companies 
operate as such does not tell us whether these companies are acting in a responsible 
or irresponsible fashion. To provide an answer to this question we first need to have 
a clearer grasp of whether firms have a responsibility to contribute to public health, 
what practices can be deemed responsible, and what kind of activities firms should 
not engage in. For this, we have to bring in a philosophical perspective and turn to 
the debates in business ethics and public health ethics.  
15
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II. Philosophical perspectives on responsibility and food-related 
health problems  
On business ethics and corporate responsibility 
Business ethics aims to articulate and explain the normative principles which can 
guide right action in business. Since firms and entrepreneurs are involved in many 
different affairs, the business ethics debate is very broad and focusses on various 
dimensions that relate to the conduct of business, ranging from the interactions 
between firms and consumers, between firms and employees, as well as between 
firms and society as a whole (Moriarty, 2017). General ethical theories like 
consequentialism, deontology or virtue ethics can be applied to explain how 
individuals should interact with each other in a business context. On the basis of 
these theories we can for instance think about whether deceptive marketing is 
morally permissible, how we should deal with discrimination on the work floor, or 
the kind of behaviour a virtuous manager ought to engage in (cf. Bowie, 1999; 
Brenkert, 2008; Solomon, 1992) 
Yet, thinking about corporate responsibility is not confined to interactions 
between employees and managers, or dealings with consumers in the market place. 
We can also think about what obligations firms have towards society in general, e.g. 
what kind of responsibilities do firms have for (global) societal issues like climate 
change, child labour or – like in the case of this dissertation – the spread of disease 
and public health.  
Corporate activities that focus on these kinds of problems are most often 
classified as falling under the scope of corporate social responsibility – or CSR for 
short. CSR activities are usually understood as actions that are not legally required 
and not primarily focussed on the benefit of the firm, but rather are of value to other 
actors the firm is associated with (Carroll, 2004; Garriga & Melé, 2004; Moriarty, 
2017). More prominent contemporary theories of business ethics also refer to this as 
corporate citizenship, which is understood as firms having certain rights and 
responsibilities just like individual citizens. As such, apart from having to take into 
account their private (economic) responsibilities, firms also have to take into 
account certain social and political responsibilities when operating in society, which 
can even entail taking up state-like responsibilities, for instance providing and 
regulating public goods (Assländer & Curbach, 2014; Logsdon & Wood, 2002; Matten 
& Crane, 2005; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Scherer, Palazzo, & Baumann, 2006;  
Steinmann & Löhr, 1996). 
While it is commonly acknowledged that firms at least have a minimal moral 
responsibility to refrain from causing harm and to respect consumer autonomy, and 
live up to their legal responsibilities, the normative basis for engaging in CSR 
activities are heavily debated among business ethicists (cf. Friedman, 2009; Garriga 
& Melé, 2004). While we usually agree that someone should do something to remedy 
societal harms and injustices, the crucial question is who should do what and why? 
16
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In the case of food-related public health problems the same question can be posed: 
why would firms have to take up this responsibility alongside governments, NGOs 
or individuals? (cf. Brenkert, 1998; Friedman, 2009; Hsieh, 2017)  
As Moriarty (2017) points out, those who argue that firms would also have a 
corporate responsibility to address these kinds of (global) problems of harm and 
injustice often employ at a consequentialist line of reasoning. These 
consequentialists hold that i) an actor that has sufficient resources, knowledge and 
opportunities necessary to address these problems has a moral responsibility to do 
so, provided that the costs are not too great, ii) many firms have the resources and 
knowledge to take on these problems without overburdening themselves, hence iii) 
firms have a responsibility to address these problems (Moriarty, 2017; O’Neill, 1996, 
2001; Wettstein, 2009). This line of argument is contested by non-consequentialists, 
as merely having knowledge and capacity does not provide sufficient reason for an 
actor to be attributed responsibility (cf. Couto, 2018; Miller, 2001).  
Whether firms have social and political responsibilities and on the basis of 
what normative grounds this can be argued, is at the heart of the current debate on 
responsibility in business ethics. Should we look at the contribution of a firm to the 
problem at stake? Consider the kinds of harms and injustices it is involved with? Or 
assess whether it benefits from the problems at hand? (Arnold, 2013; Butt, 2007; 
Couto, 2018; Huseby, 2015; Miller, 2001). Different arguments are put to the table, 
but the theoretical discussion is far from settled.  
In addition, even if the underlying moral arguments are made clear, the 
subsequent question is what this implies for corporate practice? Should firms be 
predominantly concerned about what happens in their supply chain? Or does it also 
require firms to partake in public and private governance to remedy social ills? What 
is the scope of corporate responsibility? And what would acting upon this 
responsibility look like? (Freeman, 2002; Hartmann, 2011; Heikkurinen & Forsman-
Hugg, 2011). 
 
In this thesis, these questions provide the starting point of the discussion on 
corporate responsibility for public health in the food and beverage industry.   
 
Contesting responsibility for food-related public health issues  
Food-related health problems are an illustrative case for the debate on corporate 
responsibility, as it is unclear how responsibility for these problems should be 
understood. This confusion mainly stems from the complexity of the question how 
to construct and understand food-related health harms. Food-related NCDs cannot 
be seen as situations of mere bad brute luck like floods, earthquakes or a 
spontaneous outbreak of a rare deadly infectious disease (cf. Dworkin, 2002). They 
do not ‘just’ occur, rather they are caused by multiple factors, persons and 
institutions interacting with each other. The practices of companies in the food and 
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beverage industry play a part in this, but so do other factors like the genetic make-
up of individuals, the food choices of consumers, as well as specific governmental 
regulations. Unlike classic consumption-related harms (e.g. when dealing with 
dangerous or defective products), the rise of obesity and type 2 diabetes cannot be 
traced back to a single identifiable cause rooted within the industry. It is through 
the combined behaviour of individual consumers, firms and governments that food-
related health harms occur. It is this plurality of actors contributing to food-related 
public health problems that makes the question about the scope of responsibility of 
food companies for public health much more complex than many critics may 
assume.  
On the one hand we can argue that firms have a responsibility for food-
related public health problems, as they provide the products that enable the spread 
of food-related disease. Yet, it is questionable whether the production and sales of 
potentially harmful products is sufficient ground to attribute firms responsibility for 
diseases that spring from the consumption of those products. For while it is 
frequently asserted that firms have the moral responsibility to live up the principles 
of non-maleficence and respect consumer autonomy, it is not self-evident that these 
principles are violated in for instance the sales of unhealthy food and beverage 
products (cf. Ebejer & Morden, 1988; Hasnas, 2009; Sher, 2011) 
First of all, it is not clear-cut that unhealthy products should also be 
considered to be harmful products. Many unhealthy products are not unsafe in the 
sense that they pose an immediate harm to health (they are not toxic, disease-
carrying or containing non-food substances). While unhealthy products increase the 
risk of food-related health harms – if consumed on a regular basis – they do not pose 
a direct harm to health. Whether it does, also depends on consumption patterns, 
food intake, exercise and genetic predispositions, which also sets it apart from other 
harmful – yet legally allowed – products like alcoholic beverages or tobacco. 
Furthermore, it is questionable whether health risks are always harmful. While 
health is essential for human flourishing and greatly valued by most people, that 
does not mean it cannot be weighed against other valuable life experiences. Some 
consumers might prefer the short-term hedonic pleasures provided by unhealthy 
products, and the social and cultural value of unhealthy food practices over health 
risks later in life. This is something consumers themselves should be allowed to 
decide (Barnhill, King, Kass, & Faden, 2014; Conly, 2013).  
This argument directly connects to the notion of respect for consumer 
autonomy. As long as firms are merely providing products and inform consumers 
about the kind of products they can buy, the decision ultimately lies with the 
consumer. Provided that people freely and knowingly decide on what they consume, 
there is nothing wrong in selling unhealthy food and beverage products. One could 
thus argue that we cannot expect much from the food and beverage industry. When 
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consumers decide to (over)consume unhealthy food and beverage products, that is 
their responsibility.  
Now, the public health scholar might agree that this is not the responsibility 
of the firm, but rather the responsibility of the state. Good health has always been 
fundamental to human existence and well-being, and hence to human societies. As 
such taking action on public health issues has long been perceived as a traditional 
governmental responsibility. As Rothstein states: “The key element in public health 
is the role of the government – its power and obligation to invoke mandatory or 
coercive measures to eliminate a threat to the public’s health” (Rothstein, 2002, p. 
146). Governmental programs that aim to protect the health of the public, such as 
sanitation programs, pollution control and control of communicable diseases are 
conceived as classic public policy issues (Childress et al., 2002; Gostin, 2008; 
Rothstein, 2002). If the government has a responsibility for public health, it makes 
sense for them to address the rise of non-communicable disease as these have a 
tremendous impact on public health. And, as pointed out in the previous section, 
many governments work on programs that inform people about healthy eating, 
while developing regulation that limits the sales of unhealthy products.  
Yet, the question whether the state should address food-related public health 
problems is contested as well. Obesity and type 2 diabetes are increasingly 
considered to be ‘life-style diseases’ that are the result of individual decisions. For 
that reason, several liberals and libertarians hold that these are not problems the 
government should address. As the libertarian scholar Epstein (2004) notes:  
“in the end only the individual can determine what counts as a 
healthy lifestyle for her. Preferences are too varied, science is too 
muddled to give a clear answer. Just follow your parent’s advice: eat 
a balanced diet, do some exercise, don’t smoke and don’t drink to 
excess.” (Epstein, 2004, p. 1386)  
It should be up to individual consumers to decide what they want to eat, how much 
they want to eat, and to what extent they want to exercise. For some liberals scholars 
governmental intervention in (un)healthy lifestyles is clearly paternalistic, as the 
intrusive ‘nanny-state’ strengthens its grip on the lives of individual citizens and 
limits their freedom. These considerations also fuel the debate on public health 
ethics, where governmental policies on eating patterns are predominantly framed in 
terms of a conflict between freedom and individual responsibility versus paternalism 
(cf. Conly, 2012; Fahlquist, 2006; Resnik, 2015; Verweij, 2014; Wiley et al., 2013) 
In both the debate in business ethics and the debate on public health there is 
a heavy emphasis on the responsibilities of citizens and consumers for their lifestyles 
and related health problems, but the very notion of individual responsibility for 
food-related health problems can be contested.  
19
Ch
ap
te
r 1
20 
 
Developments within the food market such as the development of addictive 
unhealthy food products, incomplete product information and misleading 
marketing can hamper autonomous decision-making in the choice for unhealthy 
food products (Barnhill, 2016; Sunstein, 2016). Furthermore, not all groups in society 
have similar options and chances to live a healthy life. There are many socio-
economic factors that influence the extent to which people are able to make the 
healthier choice. Here one can think of how: certain rural and urban areas have only 
limited access to healthy and fresh food products (so called food deserts), healthier 
food products are frequently too expensive for those less well-off, specific groups of 
consumers may have insufficient knowledge of dietary guidelines, or are constrained 
by the unhealthy eating norms within their community (Jarvis & Wardle, 1999; Muff 
et al., 2010; Shaw, 2014). These social structures can constrain the options of people 
to in engage in healthier behavior, while people in the upper socio-economic strata 
are generally less constrained. For instance, people in higher socio-economic groups 
are better educated and better equipped to access nutritional information, have 
greater opportunities to develop their food tastes and have the funds to buy more 
expensive healthier food products. This social economic divide occurs against the 
background of firms operating within the market, and (the absence of) state 
regulation and governmental policies, which in its turn raises the question of 
whether these issues should be considered  a corporate responsibility or a 
governmental responsibility.  
This brief overview shows that in the case of food-related public health 
problems individuals, firms and governmental actors all have a certain 
responsibility, yet the scope of this responsibility for health is contested (cf. 
Fahlquist, 2006; Schrempf, 2014; Verweij, 2014) 
Arguably, such contestation in part springs from a particular conception of 
responsibility. Frequently responsibility is considered backward-looking and framed 
in terms of who can be held accountable for a certain state of affairs. Based on this 
line of reasoning, one can then wonder whether the individual consumer is 
responsible for her suffering from obesity, or whether for instance Coca-Cola or 
McDonalds should be blamed for this. However, if we take a forward-looking 
perspective on responsibility, this creates a more action-oriented approach. It 
essentially puts forth the question: ‘In the light of a particular problem, who(m) 
should act?’ These type of questions allow us to consider what moral reasons there 
are for actors to address a certain state of affairs (Van de Poel, 2011; Verweij, 2001; 
Verweij & Dawson, 2019). This approach can be fruitful for addressing food-related 
public health problems. For each actor that operates in a society confronted with 
food-related public health problems – regardless of whether it is an individual, a 
school, local government or a firm – we can ask what moral reasons there could be 
for this specific actor to address the problem.  
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The moral reasons an actor might have to address a specific problem do not 
(necessarily) dissolve or lessen the responsibilities of another actors, as the 
considerations for acting in an ethical fashion, might be very different per actor. 
Moral reasons for individuals to take care of their own health can be because it 
furthers their own good, but also because it for instance can ensure an ability to be 
able to work, support a family and participate in society. For the state, on the other 
hand, there are other reasons to address these problems, for instance because not 
all socio-economic groups are equally vulnerable to health deprivation and it 
therefor has “reasons of justice to promote healthy nutrition as a means towards 
equal chances to a healthy life” (Verweij, 2014, p. 14). And indeed: if we can pose 
these questions for the state and individuals, we can also ask this for corporate actors 
that are operating in that very same obesogenic society. 
 
III. Research questions and research goals  
This analysis gives rise to the first central question of this thesis: what are the moral 
grounds for companies in the food and beverage industry to address food-related 
public health problems? If we can identify reasons for food firms to take action for 
public health, this subsequently raises further questions. For instance, are there 
corporate practices that are ethically unacceptable because of their negative impact 
on health? What does this imply for accepted business practices like child marketing 
or the development of unhealthy products? And are there other – more positive – 
actions firms should engage in? Should companies do more to inform the consumer 
about healthy and unhealthy products? Do they have a special obligation towards 
more vulnerable consumer populations? In short, this comes down to a second more 
practical question: what could taking responsibility for food-related public health 
problems in the context of the food and beverage industry look like? 
Answering these questions creates room to clear up the moral confusion that 
is currently at play in the food and beverage industry, while simultaneously engaging 
with key theoretical challenges in the debate on business ethics. Assessing why firms 
would have a responsibility for societal issues like food-related public health 
problems and think about what this implies in corporate practice, also allows to 
further the debate on the moral reasons to engage in CSR activities.  
 
Following the above-mentioned questions and theoretical challenges, in this PhD 
thesis I aim:   
 
1. To clarify whether and why firms have a wider social and political 
responsibility for the common good.  
2. To explore the possibility of corporate responsibility for public health 
within the context of the food and beverage industry.   
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3. To identify under what conditions the sales and marketing of unhealthy 
food and beverage products is irresponsible. 
4. To identify the possible injustices involved in food-related public health 
problems and assess whether food and beverage firms have a 
responsibility for this. 
 
IV. Thesis outline  
To properly embed this philosophical reflection it is important to first get a clear 
grip on the current debate on corporate social responsibility. For that reason, 
chapter 2 explores the more general question of why firms would have a wider 
responsibility for the common good. In the contemporary debate in business ethics 
there is increased attention to the role firms are playing in national and global 
governance, which is understood as political corporate social responsibility. Political 
CSR scholars like Scherer and Palazzo (2011; 2016) argue that firms are increasingly 
taking up political responsibilities. Regulation, the provision of public goods, and 
tackling public issues such as climate change and public health problems – tasks that 
in earlier days were organised by government – are now increasingly taken up by 
corporate actors as well. Firms are conceived as corporate citizens, that apart from 
their economic responsibilities, also have political responsibilities that they ought 
to discharge (Assländer, 2011; Assländer & Curbach, 2014, 2017; Matten & Crane, 2005; 
Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). The chapter explores several conceptual and empirical 
problems in the debate on corporate citizenship and stresses how the content and 
the scope of political corporate responsibility remain unclear. Drawing on the work 
of Iris Marion Young (2011) it is argued how political responsibility can be 
understood as a shared responsibility to tackle societal problems, and how this 
responsibility holds for both governmental actors and corporate actors. For 
corporate actors this not only entails engaging in private action or cooperating in 
public–private partnerships, but it also includes aiding governmental actors to 
remedy injustice or even create public institutions where they do not yet exist.  
  Having established that firms can have a responsibility for the common good 
and can play an integral part in addressing societal problems, I proceed to zoom in 
on the food and beverage industry. Chapter 3 provides a closer look at the practices 
food firms engage in and how these affect the spread of food-related public health 
problems. By looking at CSR and public health research conducted in the food 
industry, it becomes clear that the behaviour of several food companies reflects a 
split corporate personality. Firms contribute to public health problems through the 
sales of unhealthy products and lobbying against public health regulation, while 
they simultaneously engage in various corporate social responsibility programs to 
prevent food-related diseases. To find out what would be the right thing to do for 
firms, it is argued that a reconceptualization of responsibility for public health is 
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needed. Following Verweij (2014), Schrempf (2014) and Young (2011) it is proposed 
that responsibility for public health should be understood as a shared responsibility. 
It is in this light that the role and responsibility of actors in the food industry for 
public health is reassessed, and it is shown how a forward-looking perspective on 
responsibility provides guidance in what food and beverage firms can and should do 
to promote health. This brief exploration is the stepping stone for the following 
chapters in which corporate responsibility for public health in the context of the 
food industry is fleshed out in more detail.  
Chapter 4 addresses under what conditions the sales and marketing of 
unhealthy food and beverage products to adults, teenagers and children is morally 
problematic. Starting from the notion of ordinary morality (Gert, 2004; Hsieh, 2017) 
it is argued that firms have a duty to respect people’s autonomy and adhere to the 
principle of nonmaleficence in both market and non-market environments. These 
principles help to identify when sales and marketing of unhealthy food products is 
irresponsible. The chapter shows how the core moral problem lies with the potential 
manipulation of consumers into (over)consuming unhealthy products. On the basis 
of this it is argued that firms should take into account: whether consumers are able 
to identify manipulative marketing, the degree of manipulation, as well as the 
negative impact a product has on health. In order to act responsibly firms should re-
evaluate the marketing of unhealthy products to adults and refrain from marketing 
such products to children.  
Chapter 5 explores the injustices in food-related health harms and the 
implications for corporate responsibility. Starting from the work of Iris Marion 
Young on responsibility for justice (2006, 2011), it is argued how food-related public 
health problems can be understood as structural injustices. By exploring the 
practices of the food and beverage industry it is made clear how corporate actors are 
sustaining and reinforcing health injustices and that due to this connection, 
corporate actors share a responsibility for addressing these problems. Drawing on 
the work of David Miller (2001, 2012) and David Owen (2013) three criteria (capacity, 
benefit, and vulnerability) are discussed as criteria for attributing responsibility. 
These criteria allow for further specification of what taking (shared) responsibility 
for food-related health problems can entail in corporate practice.  
The final chapter, Chapter 6, presents answers to the research questions and 
sets out the main conclusions that can be drawn from this dissertation. This is 
followed by a discussion of the theoretical contributions of this research in which 
the implications for our thinking of individual, governmental and corporate 
responsibility for food-related health problems are highlighted. It also addresses 
various questions and issues that have come up during the process of writing the 
other chapters, but have remained unaddressed in the thesis. It briefly explores the 
value of healthy and unhealthy eating in relation to CSR and responsible innovation, 
discusses the moral desirability of corporate involvement in politics and science, 
23
Ch
ap
te
r 1
24 
 
touches upon the risk of corporate paternalism and highlights the importance of 
empirical research on corporate perception of responsibility for health. In line with 
this discussion directions for future research are proposed. This last chapter ends 
with recommendations for business professionals in the food and beverage industry 
and some conclusive remarks.  
 
Notes 
1. Although the idea of a clear distinction between healthy and unhealthy food 
and beverage products can be contested (Katan, 2017), there are varieties of 
products that when regularly consumed (like products with relatively high 
amounts of sugar, salt and fat) are likely to have a negative impact on health 
(Afshin et al., 2019; Garst, Blok, Jansen, & Omta, 2017; Swinburn et al., 2011). 
In this thesis I follow the definition of Barnhill and her colleagues who refer 
to unhealthy food and beverage products as “foods that significantly increase 
the risk of diet-related illness at current levels of consumption, but do not 
pose a risk of immediate harm, and whose risk-attributing components are 
themselves food substances (e.g., fat, sugar, or salt)” (Barnhill et al., 2014, p. 
192). Classic examples of these products are sugary drinks (e.g. regular Coca-
Cola), certain types of fast food (e.g. KFC’s chicken wings) and processed 
foods that are high in salt, sugar or fat (e.g. potato chips) (cf. Barnhill et al., 
2014; Nestle, 2013, 2015). 
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Chapter 2 Understanding political responsibility in 
corporate citizenship: towards a shared responsibility 
for the common good 
 
I. Introduction 
We live in a world where problems of harm and injustice are ever present. Whether 
these are problems related to climate change, disease or poor working conditions, 
there are many situations in which people are deprived or suffering and basic rights 
are either being violated or not sufficiently protected. In many cases of suffering and 
injustice we no longer find just governments and intergovernmental institutions 
which are making attempts to remedy these situations, but corporate actors are 
taking up these responsibilities as well. Especially multinational enterprises (MNEs), 
which often have great financial means (sometimes even greater than that of nation-
states) and operate all over the world, are increasingly involved in mitigating global 
injustices. 
These developments suggest that the scope of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR)1 is expanding. Firms are increasingly involved in the provision of public goods 
and the protection of human rights, while also engaging in governance initiatives 
like the UN Global Compact, participation in the implementation of the UN’s 
Sustainable Development Goals, as well as roundtable meetings and multi-
stakeholder alliances such as the Forest Stewardship Council and the Roundtable for 
Sustainable Palm Oil (Fuchs & Kalfagianni, 2010; Ruggie, 2008).  
For some scholars in the field of CSR and governance, this increased 
engagement in social and political affairs necessitates the development of an 
alternative theoretical approach to corporate responsibility. According to Matten 
and Crane (2005) corporations are taking up a state-like role when they address 
public issues, provide public goods and assist in the protection of human rights. This 
notion of a dual economic and political role can be traced back to the idea of 
corporate citizenship. Corporate citizenship entails that corporate actors have rights 
and responsibilities similar to those of ‘regular’ citizens. So, much like citizens, 
corporate actors have to take into account their private (economic) responsibilities 
as well as their social and political responsibilities when operating in society 
(Assländer & Curbach, 2014; Logsdon & Wood, 2002; Steinmann & Löhr, 1996).  
The current debate on corporate citizenship seems to diverge in roughly two 
directions. On one side of the debate we see a number of scholars who attribute a 
great amount of political responsibilities to corporate actors (Scherer & Palazzo, 
2007; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Schneider & Scherer, 2015). Corporate actors take up 
a political responsibility at the moment they contribute to public goods (e.g. health, 
education and social security), participate in the protection of human rights or 
engage in self-regulation to promote peace and stability in society. By assuming this 
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new political role next to their traditional economic role they are engaging in 
political corporate social responsibility (political CSR). However, in taking up this 
political responsibility, corporate actors influence public policy and affect the public 
interest. Therefore, it is argued that these actions should be democratically 
legitimated. A large part of the current debate on political CSR zooms in on how 
these activities can be legitimized, for instance by incorporating deliberative 
democratic practices in corporate governance (Scherer, Baumann-Pauly, & 
Schneider, 2013; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Schneider & Scherer, 2015) 
On the other side of the debate, scholars like Assländer and Curbach endorse 
the idea of corporate citizenship but are more restrictive when it comes to the scope 
of political responsibility of corporate actors. Positioned within the debates on 
multi-level governance and the dynamics of upward and downward devolution 
(Hooghe & Marks, 2001; Loughlin, Kincaid, & Swenden, 2013) they develop a 
subsidiarity-based approach to corporate responsibility. In this approach corporate 
actors are seen as intermediate actors who have certain political co-responsibilities 
in society, while governments retain major responsibilities such as guaranteeing 
freedom, justice and citizenship rights. It is up to governments to develop 
governance structures that allow corporations to take political responsibility 
(Assländer & Curbach, 2014, 2017). 
The debate on corporate citizenship gives rise to many questions surrounding 
the grounds for corporate political responsibility, the scope of responsibility within 
and beyond national borders, and the responsibilities of business next to the 
complex range of roles and responsibilities national governments take up and fulfil 
(cf. Frynas & Stephens, 2015; Mäkinen & Kasanen, 2014, 2015).  
In this article we aim to address two of these issues by taking a closer look at 
Iris Marion Young’s account of political responsibility. We reflect on how this 
approach can ground corporate political responsibility and what such a conception 
of political responsibility could imply for the responsibilities of business next to the 
diverse roles and functions performed by most contemporary governments (Young, 
2006, 2011). Based on Young’s account we understand political responsibility to be a 
shared responsibility, which requires both corporate actors and governmental actors 
to take responsibility in order to tackle societal problems and encourage or push 
each other to take responsibility. Moreover, the scope of political corporate 
responsibility can be narrowed down if we acknowledge that responsibilities that 
require coercive action befall (supra)national governmental institutions and 
therefore do not fall within the scope of political responsibility of corporate actors. 
Furthermore, we make clear that political responsibility also requires corporate 
actors to help or push governmental actors to remedy injustice or – when such 
institutions are absent – should help to create these institutions.  
By adding this perspective we work towards the development of a more 
sophisticated model on the political responsibilities of business. Apart from the 
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theoretical contribution, we also provide reasons to rethink what in practice can be 
expected of business in dealing with day-to-day situations of injustice and harm (e.g. 
climate change, global health problems and human rights violations). Committing 
to political corporate responsibility would necessitate corporate actors to take a 
more hands-on approach to remedying these problems and for many this will entail 
going beyond their present-day CSR practices. 
In this article, we first provide a short introduction to the debate by looking 
at Scherer and Palazzo’s and Assländer and Curbach’s opposing views on corporate 
citizenship. In the subsequent sections, we discuss several theoretical and practical 
problems in both approaches. In the third section we refer to Iris Marion Young's 
notion of political responsibility and show how this can address several problems in 
the corporate citizenship debate as it provides a ground for an extended corporate 
responsibility, while also providing a first indication of what this would imply for 
the scope of political responsibilities of corporate actors amongst the various 
responsibilities of national governments.  
 
II. Understanding corporate citizenship and the political 
responsibilities of business  
The current debates on corporate citizenship have especially developed in response 
to globalization processes in which the spatial organization of affairs among social, 
political and economic actors is being rewired. The power of the traditional 
Westphalian nation states is waning as social and economic activities are 
transcending the boundaries of the nation state. This becomes most clear when 
looking at global problems such as climate change, global poverty, pandemics and 
the economic and financial crises (Held, 1999). These problems cannot be solved by 
nation states alone. Hence governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
and international governmental organizations (IGOs) increasingly cooperate with 
the private sector in global governance networks to address these problems. By 
cooperating in cross-sector partnerships, multi-stakeholder alliances and public-
private partnerships, collective action is taken to fill these gaps in regulation and 
address problems with the provision of global public goods (Ruggie, 2008; Scherer 
& Palazzo, 2011; Van Huijstee, Francken, & Leroy, 2007; Wolf, 2005).  
As a result of globalization and the increasing complexity of societal 
problems, CSR is becoming entwined with governance and care for the common 
good, which suggests a deviation from the classical liberal conception that the 
sphere of the market and the political realm are fully separated (Matten & Crane, 
2005; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). While corporations have always played a political 
role, the meaning of ‘political’ in the CSR debate is changing. Earlier debates on the 
role of business in society revolved around the corporate political activities of a firm. 
These political activities are understood as corporate engagement with 
governmental institutions with the mere goal of improving the economic 
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performance of the firm. Lobbying at various governmental levels, supporting 
political candidates, and even bribing public officials in order to influence public 
policy to the benefit of the firm, all fall within this category (Alzola, 2013; Lawton, 
McGuire, & Rajwani, 2013). Many of today’s corporations are different in the sense 
that they often take-up a dual role as they engage in the political sphere not only for 
their economic interests, but also for the common good (Matten & Crane, 2005; 
Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). While Matten and Crane introduced the concept of 
corporate citizenship as a descriptive concept, other authors have tried to provide a 
normative foundation for why corporations would have these additional 
responsibilities (Assländer & Curbach, 2014, 2017; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007; Scherer 
& Palazzo, 2011). 
 
The normative foundation of corporate citizenship 
The notion that corporate actors have moral responsibilities in addition to economic 
responsibilities is far from new. In fact, business ethicists in general have defended 
this, drawing on various ethical theories, from virtue ethics to contractarian 
approaches (cf. Frederick 2008). Yet, corporate citizenship can be grounded in two 
different normative approaches, namely in republican business ethics and 
citizenship theories (Habermas, 2001; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007; Scherer et al., 2006; 
Steinmann & Löhr, 1996). Republican business ethics pictures the corporation as an 
actor that has both a private (economic) responsibility and a public (ethical) 
responsibility. Corporate actors have to take up both these roles when operating in 
society. Especially when there are no rules or solutions being provided by 
governments or international regimes, the public responsibilities of corporate actors 
become more stringent (Scherer et al., 2006).  
Assländer and Curbach (2014, 2017) discuss the dual conception of citizenship 
of corporate actors in a more elaborate fashion. Corporations are not citizens in the 
traditional sense of the word, but they can be considered to be the offspring of the 
classical liberal bourgeois society. The corporation is provided with the legal status 
of an economic citizen (bourgeois). Its core purpose is to make a profit for the ‘real’ 
economic citizens – the owners of the company (Assländer & Curbach, 2017). Hence, 
from a liberal perspective the corporate citizen should abide by the law, but does 
not have any additional social or political responsibilities.  
As noted above, according to the republican approach to citizenship, citizens 
are not only private – self-interested – citizens, but have a role as citizens of the 
community (citoyen). In this role, they are expected to play an active part in politics 
and contribute to the welfare of society as a whole. This notion is translated to the 
corporate citizen. As corporate citoyen, corporations have a social and political role 
to play in society as they “help to design rules that are of public interest and 
contribute to peaceful stabilization of society” (Scherer et al., 2006, p. 516). The 
corporate citizen will have to balance its roles as bourgeois and citoyen, finding a 
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middle-ground between its private interests and economic responsibilities on the 
one hand, and its public or political responsibilities on the other. 
While both Scherer and Palazzo as well as Assländer and Curbach draw on 
these notions of corporate citizenship, their interpretations of the scope of political 
responsibilities of business diverge.  
 
Political CSR: legitimizing expanding political responsibilities 
By combining Steinmann and Löhr’s work on republican business ethics with Iris 
Marion Young’s notion of social connection responsibility, Scherer and Palazzo 
greatly expand the scope of social and political responsibilities of corporate actors. 
Given the systemic social connectedness to instances of harm and injustice, 
corporate actors also have a political responsibility for global problems of injustice 
such as bad labor conditions and climate change, which in practice even can result 
in corporations taking over state-like functions (Scherer et al., 2013; Scherer & 
Palazzo, 2011). 
Assuming that an extended corporate responsibility is sufficiently grounded 
in Steinmann and Löhr's republican business ethics, Scherer and Palazzo’s approach 
of political CSR zooms in on the question of legitimacy. For while there might be 
sufficient moral reasons for corporations to engage in political CSR, these actions 
might not be necessarily legitimate. By influencing and affecting the public good, 
corporations take up a political role while they are not democratically sanctioned to 
do so. This democratic deficit is most prominent when public regulatory institutions 
(e.g. national government and/or international institutions) are absent, failing or 
ineffective (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007; Scherer et al., 2013; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). In 
order to address this problem they introduce a Habermasian approach to CSR, which 
entails a turn to deliberative democracy and democratic corporate governance. 
Through these deliberative mechanisms it should become possible to legitimize the 
political role of the corporation through the inclusion of all relevant stakeholders 
(ibid.). This democratic legitimation of governance can take place on multiple levels. 
As a macro level example reference is often made the Forest Stewardship Council, in 
which a variety of actors, ranging from corporate actors, NGOs, governments and 
IGOs, have come together to develop a set of criteria and principles to enable global 
sustainable forest management (Edward & Willmott, 2012; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). 
In more recent articles it is proposed to extend deliberative democracy to the 
level of the company itself (Scherer et al., 2013; Schneider & Scherer, 2015). In order 
to compensate for the democratic deficit in corporate engagement with the public 
good and public policy, it is argued that corporate actors should internalize 
democracy. This entails that the principles of deliberative democracy are to be 
transferred to the level of the firm and that all affected actors should be included in 
the corporate decision making process. Creating a deliberative stakeholder 
democracy ensures that stakeholders are no longer merely consulted, but are 
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integrated in the organizational decision making process. Through this inclusive 
procedure, corporate decision making will no longer be dominated by managers and 
shareholders, resulting in more fair and legitimate decision-making (Scherer et al., 
2013; Schneider & Scherer, 2015).  
 
Critical remarks on political CSR  
Scherer and Palazzo’s political conception of CSR and the corresponding call for 
democratization of the corporation has not remained free of critique. Several 
authors pointed out that the appeal for political CSR is largely grounded in empirical 
claims about the globalization process (Frynas & Stephens, 2015; Mäkinen & 
Kasanen, 2014, 2015). The fact that (weak) governments are failing their traditional 
tasks under the processes of globalization does not automatically justify the call for 
a larger political role for business. Mäkinen and Kasanen argue that in order to 
explain why corporations should be taking up these additional responsibilities (and 
challenge the division of responsibilities in classical liberal political economy) a 
'relatively robust normative political argument' is needed, and hold that this is 
lacking in the contemporary political CSR debate (Mäkinen & Kasanen, 2015, p. 5).  
We do not think such a normative argument is completely lacking, as 
reference is made to Steinmann and Löhr’s republican business ethics and the work 
of Young, yet several issues regarding the nature and scope of this responsibility are 
insufficiently elaborated upon. Two important problems that surface in the debate 
are that (1) the scope of political responsibility for corporations is insufficiently 
specified and (2) the grounds for democratization of corporate governance are 
ambiguous (Mäkinen & Kasanen, 2015). These two critical issues will be elaborated 
upon in the sections below and will be further addressed in section 3, as we look into 
Young’s approach to responsibility. 
 
Scope of political responsibility of corporate actors is indeterminate  
One of the central problems in the political CSR theory of Scherer and Palazzo is the 
indeterminacy of the scope of political responsibility of corporate actors (Scherer & 
Palazzo, 2011). It does not become clear to what extent corporate actors have a 
responsibility to remedy social and environmental harms and what can be 
reasonably expected of them. Due to this theoretical gap, it seems that corporate 
actors could potentially be attributed responsibility for nearly every situation of 
injustice or harm, requiring them to take political responsibility for a wide range of 
affairs. This even leaves open the possibility of the corporation taking up a near 
state-like role, potentially overburdening the corporation with political 
responsibilities (Mäkinen & Kasanen, 2015). 
Given that Scherer and Palazzo’s approach to political CSR partly builds on 
Iris Marion Young’s notion that multiple actors (governments, NGOs, individuals 
etc.) are connected to situations of global harm and injustice, it makes sense to also 
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think about the responsibilities of these actors and put them in relation to political 
responsibilities of business. In line with Mäkinen and Kasanen we think that the 
political responsibility of governments, or as they call it, the possibility of 
‘governmental social responsibility’ is insufficiently being explored in Scherer and 
Palazzo’s framework of political CSR. The fact that corporate actors and other non-
state actors are playing an increasing role in global governance does not imply that 
the responsibilities of national governments necessarily have to change; 
governments for instance still play a major part in facilitating economic 
globalization and supporting CSR initiatives (Mäkinen & Kasanen, 2015). 
Furthermore while some national and supranational governmental institutions are 
weak, this does not mean that corporate actors should not put effort in 
strengthening these institutions (Frynas & Stephens, 2015).  
Given this gap in political CSR theory, there is reason to more substantially 
reflect on the scope of the political responsibilities of corporate actors in relation to 
the responsibilities of governmental actors, which will be taken up in second part of 
this paper. 
 
Ambiguity in ‘affecting’ public interests and the necessity of democratic corporate 
governance 
Another element in the political CSR debate that can be put under scrutiny is the 
ambiguity with regard to the democratic legitimation of political corporate 
activities. Scherer and Palazzo put forth that there might be a lack of democratic 
legitimacy when corporations take up a state-like role or influence public policy as 
this affects the public interests (Scherer et al., 2013; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011).  
 While these authors touch upon an important issue, their position raises 
many questions. Does any business activity that affects the public interest require 
(democratic) legitimization? What is exactly meant with affecting the public 
interest? (cf. Fung, 2013). And, does this refer solely to negative impacts – say, that 
infringe upon human rights – or does it also include positive impacts such as the 
provision of global public goods, like education or public health? Schneider and 
Scherer argue that legitimacy issues arise when individuals might suffer a loss in 
individual welfare (Schneider & Scherer, 2015). Whether this is also the case when 
corporate actors engage in activities that aim to contribute to the common good 
remains an open question. For example, what if a large pharmaceutical company 
would voluntarily distribute vaccinations against infectious diseases in a failed state 
where the government is unable to provide for this service? We could argue that the 
corporation is taking up its political responsibility. This indeed affects the public 
interest, but it is not self-evident that this would be illegitimate. It seems that this 
can only be the case if we can argue that this contribution to public health can also 
be considered to be an action that contributes to the loss of welfare of some 
individuals. How can this be the case? One could argue that this could be a problem 
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from a perspective of fairness and access to healthcare, when the company would 
only provide medication to its employees and their families, or only provide health 
care services in one region of the failed state and not in the other regions. However, 
to assume this would require a more substantial argumentation.  
Furthermore, if this argument could be made, it would also call into question 
the legitimacy of the actions of many other non-state actors that impact public 
interests. It would be odd to single out corporate actors to be subjected to 
democratic legitimation mechanisms, while NGOs and wealthy philanthropic 
individuals also engage in activities that aim to positively affect the public interest. 
Hence, this ambiguity on what ‘being affected’ entails needs to be addressed before 
one turns to practices that provide legitimation mechanisms for affecting this public 
interest (such as democratic corporate governance).  
All-in-all the major framing of political CSR seems to entail a substantial 
deviation from business as usual and faces two central problems as (1) the debate is 
ambiguous on scope of the political responsibilities of corporate actors in relation to 
the responsibilities of governmental actors and (2) it does not become clear when 
corporate action creates legitimacy problems that necessitate a turn to democratic 
corporate governance.  
There are some scholars, most notably Assländer and Curbach, who have 
tried to address this first problem. In the next section we will explore what their 
approach entails and whether it provides a solution to the problem of governmental 
and corporate responsibilities. 
 
The subsidiarity approach: corporate-governmental task-sharing  
In their work on corporate citizenship Assländer and Curbach (2014; 2017) try to 
assess how corporate governmental task-sharing can be organized. In order to 
differentiate between governmental and corporate responsibilities they turn to the 
tenet of subsidiarity. 
The tenet of subsidiarity is used to differentiate between the responsibilities 
of three groups in society, namely governmental actors and communities; economic, 
clerical and social associations, and individuals and families. It describes “fair and 
just task-sharing among the different layers in society. It states that in society, no 
task should be assigned to a higher level of authority if it can be accomplished by a 
lesser and subordinate entity” (Assländer & Curbach, 2017, p. 12). Subsidiarity is a 
two-way principle, which works both bottom-up and top-down allowing upward 
and downward devolution only when an action cannot be reasonably accomplished 
at a lower intermediate level (when insufficient, inefficient or ineffective) then social 
tasks are moved up to national or supranational level. At the same time, when 
subsidiary entities fail their societal tasks, or cannot accomplish them in an efficient 
way, a higher entity (usually national government) must intervene and tasks are 
shifted to the next level. In the past years subsidiarity and devolution have mainly 
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been used to think about the relation between national governments and 
supranational institutions such as the EU, but according to Assländer and Curbach 
the principle of subsidiarity can also provide guidance on corporate governmental 
task-sharing (Assländer, 2011; Assländer & Curbach, 2017). 
Compared to the political CSR approach, the subsidiarity approach leaves the 
traditional role and responsibilities of national governments to a large extent intact. 
Governments play a central role in the distribution of responsibilities to 
intermediate actors, both on lower sub-state levels (families, social associations and 
municipalities) and on higher transnational levels (EU, WTO, UN etc.) (Brunkhorst, 
2005; Hirst, Thompson, & Bromley, 2009). Corporate actors, such as multinational 
enterprises, are seen as intermediate actors that operate on both these levels. For 
Assländer and Curbach the fact that there are increased corporate efforts that 
contribute to the common good (both social activities and private regulation) does 
not necessarily reduce the need for governmental regulation on national and 
supranational level. While corporate actors are taking over some traditional 
governmental activities, this does not guarantee that corporate actors will 
sufficiently compensate for “a lack of governmental services in all relevant areas on 
a sustainable basis” (Assländer & Curbach, 2017, p. 17, emphasis added). Government 
regulation remains crucial in the case of (1) democracy enhancing or freedom 
promoting activities, (2) when the assignment of responsibilities to lower entities 
causes friction with: justice, equal treatment of citizens or endangers fundamental 
citizenship rights (political participation), and (3) in instances that require strict 
coordination (for instance when facing epidemics) (Assländer & Curbach, 2017). 
Hence, subsidiarity can be understood as a “regulative idea which should 
guide considerations when assigning responsibilities to different layers in society” 
(Assländer & Curbach, 2017, p. 20). The corporate citizen is an intermediate actor 
who remains subjected to political and legal regulations. If the political 
responsibilities of corporations are to be taken in a successful way, national 
governments are to develop governance structures to allow this to take place. 
Political discourse in national and supranational organizations is to determine the 
scope and content of these corporate co-responsibilities (Assländer & Curbach, 
2017). 
In comparison to the approach of Scherer and Palazzo the subsidiarity 
approach narrows down the scope of political corporate responsibility considerably. 
By pointing out that there are core governmental tasks (coercion, guaranteeing 
freedom and justice), the corporation can take its economic responsibilities without 
being overburdened by political responsibilities. In addition, as governments are to 
play a central role in the creation of governance frameworks that regulate the 
political responsibilities of business, it seems that the need for democratic corporate 
governance (at the level of the corporation) is tuned down, as political CSR activities 
are in this case already legitimized by the government. As such, Assländer and 
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Curbach offer an approach that allows corporate actors to take up their political 
responsibilities, while at the same time paying heed to the role governments should 
play. 
 
Critical remarks on the subsidiarity approach  
Assländer and Curbach make an important contribution to the debate by 
introducing a guiding principle to distinguish between corporate and governmental 
responsibilities, but from a pragmatic perspective employing the principle of 
subsidiarity is not unproblematic. This is so for two reasons: (1) current global 
injustices and situations of global harm are unlikely to be tackled by states alone as 
the problem-solving ability of national governments is overestimated and (2) the 
principle of subsidiarity provides little guidance on what political corporate 
responsibility can entail, when national or supranational governmental institutions 
are unwilling to take their responsibilities, when they are failing or absent. 
The first problem is related to the conception of globalization and its effects. 
Following Robinson (2004) we understand globalization to be an essentially 
contested concept. The readings of Scherer and Palazzo and of Asslander and 
Curbach can be considered to be at two opposing sides of the spectrum when it 
comes to the effects of globalization. We agree with the latter that governments have 
an important part to play, for instance in creating the conditions for corporations to 
operate. At the same time though, many governmental institutions do not succeed 
in providing an adequate solution for the complex problems we are facing at both 
national and global level (Held, 1999; Scholte, 2005). We think that this element is 
insufficiently taken into account in the proposed application of the tenet of 
subsidiarity as guiding principle for corporate-governmental task-sharing.  
First of all, Assländer’s account of subsidiarity seems to imply a strict division 
of responsibilities between actors. While corporations as intermediate actors would 
have substantial responsibilities for society in providing public goods such as health, 
education and even guaranteeing fundamental human rights, at the same time it is 
argued that governmental organizations and higher public institutions are in the 
end responsible for legal security, freedom, justice and democracy. Hence, there is 
still a heavy emphasis on governmental responsibilities as it is made clear that 
corporate actors should not compensate for this (Assländer, 2011; Assländer & 
Curbach, 2017). In the light of complex wicked problems2 such as climate change or 
world-wide epidemics one can wonder whether subsidiarity is a viable concept to 
tackle these problems. According to Levin et al. (2012) one of the features of wicked 
problems is that there is no central authority to tackle these problems. When 
looking at the problem of climate change, we also see that in practice there is no 
higher authority to distribute responsibilities. There is global consensus on the need 
to reduce carbon emissions, but the attempts to realize this are not enforced or put 
to practice by a single authority, but rather through different mechanisms on various 
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levels in both the public and the private sphere (e.g. EU programs to cap CO2 
emissions, the Paris Agreement under the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, the Forest Stewardship Council). All those things together may be necessary 
to tackle wicked problems such as climate change (Levin et al., 2012). The status of 
national governments is therefore changing from central legislator to ‘partner’ or 
‘stakeholder’ within a wider system of governance (Lievens, 2015). Hence, it is 
unclear how a more government focused approach which follows from the principle 
of subsidiarity, can provide a solution for the global injustices the world is nowadays 
struggling with.  
Another problem with appealing to subsidiarity as guiding principle in the 
distribution of responsibilities is that it assumes the presence of a well-functioning 
higher authority (Assländer & Curbach, 2017). Some form of effective national or 
international authoritative political order should be present, to distribute 
responsibilities and to take up responsibilities from lower entities when they fail to 
effectively take their responsibilities. However, it is questionable whether the 
principle of subsidiarity really helps to solve these problems in task-sharing, as in 
many of the environments where corporations are operating higher authorities are 
often weak or unwilling to take political action. 
The case of a large MNE operating in the failed state of Somalia, where 
freedom and legal security are insufficiently provided for (Freedom House, 2016). 
On the one hand it can be argued that a corporate actor should take its political (co-
)responsibilities, yet at the same time the principle of subsidiarity also prescribes, 
that freedom and legal security should be provided by higher public institutions. We 
agree that both for economic reasons (the corporation has an economic function) 
and political reasons (fairness and inclusion) a government in essence is best suited 
to take up these tasks. However in Somalia there is no effective higher authority 
(neither national or regional). This is where a core problem with the principle of 
subsidiarity surfaces, as it does not say anything about a possible responsibility of 
intermediate actors to create or support the establishment of a functioning 
democratic regime (Assländer & Curbach, 2017). So it remains unclear what can be 
expected of corporate actors in these situations. 
Given the promises and shortcomings of the approaches of political CSR and 
subsidiarity, we aim to introduce a third approach, Youngian political corporate 
responsibility, to more carefully distinguish the political responsibilities of business. 
A closer reading of Iris Marion Young's work on responsibility for justice can help us 
work towards such a more sophisticated approach to assess the political 
responsibilities of business (Young, 2006, 2011). While her approach is already being 
used by Scherer and Palazzo to defend a wider range of responsibilities for corporate 
actors that are operating on a global scale, we argue that her approach can also 
provide guidance in delineating the responsibilities of corporate and governmental 
actors, even in settings where national governments are unwilling, unable or 
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ineffective in taking responsibility. In the next section, Young's concepts of 
structural injustice and political responsibility will be shortly discussed, after which 
we look into the implications for the responsibilities of corporate actors and 
governments. 
 
III. Youngian political corporate responsibility 
On structural injustices and social connection responsibility  
In her work on responsibility for justice, Iris Marion Young focuses on responsibility 
for structural injustices (Young, 2006, 2011). Structural injustices exist when:  
“social processes put large categories of persons under a systemic 
threat of domination or deprivation of the means to develop and 
exercise their capacities, at the same time as these processes enable 
others to dominate or have a wide range of opportunities for 
developing and exercising their capacities”. (Young, 2006, p. 114) 
Structural injustices are “harms that come to people as a result of structural 
processes in which people participate” (Young, 2003, p. 7) and can span a wide range 
of issues, from bad labor conditions to global health problems.  
Young argues that in order to think about who should take responsibility for 
these injustices, we need another conception of responsibility next to the traditional 
liability model of responsibility. In the liability model responsibility is attributed to 
those actors – either individual or collective – of whom it can be shown that they are 
“causally connected to circumstances for which responsibility is sought” (Young, 
2011, p. 97). It assumes that there is a rather direct interaction between the actor that 
is causing harm and the harmed party, and that responsibility can be attributed to 
an actor when its harmful actions were voluntarily and knowingly undertaken (for 
instance when company X dumps its chemical waste in the nearby river, poisoning 
the residents in the town further down the river) (Young, 2011).  
Young puts forth that in the case of structural injustices it is not possible to 
single out an actor as responsible, because it is a plurality of actors that interact in a 
network of processes of cooperation and competition that bring forth these 
injustices. Governments, civil society organizations, individuals and business, all can 
be directly or indirectly connected to specific injustices and, by virtue of this social 
connection, carry responsibility for these injustices (Young, 2006).  
Unlike the liability model of responsibility, the social connection model of 
responsibility does not allow actors to evade responsibility (Young, 2011). To 
understand this Young makes the example of the use of sweatshops in the global 
garment industry (which she considers to be a case of global injustice). Following 
the liability approach an MNE in the garment industry would be able to claim not 
to be responsible for the poor working conditions at one of its subcontractors. The 
MNE can argue that they are not in direct control of the subcontractor as they do 
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not own this company and therefore cannot be blamed. As a result the subcontractor 
is singled out as the actor that should be held responsible. In the social connection 
model this argument loses its force, as the MNE can at least be held partly 
responsible for its actions, for by doing business with the subcontractor, it enables 
the processes that produce these unjust outcomes. The same goes for a wide range 
of other connected actors: the government that allows the sweatshop owner to abuse 
its employees; the retailer that fails to check whether the t-shirts it is selling are 
produced under the right circumstances; and the consumer who is buying the t-
shirts from the retailer. Instead of looking back to find out who caused a particular 
wrong, to find out who is blameworthy or liable, Young’s approach to responsibility 
is more forward-looking: central to the approach is working towards a remedy for 
these injustices. All actors that operate within these global structures that cause 
injustices have a responsibility to remedy injustice. This makes social connection 
responsibility an essentially shared responsibility, that can only be discharged by 
joining with others in collective action (Young, 2011).  
 Given this collectiveness, the involvement of public discourse and the goal of 
changing social structure, Young classifies social connection responsibility as a 
political responsibility. Politics for Young is the “communicative engagement with 
others for the sake organizing our relationships and coordinating our relations 
justly” (Young, 2006, p. 123). Political responsibility therefore is morally and 
ontologically prior to political institutions. Referring to John Locke’s social contract 
theory she points out that the need and desire for political institutions only arises 
because “socially connected persons with multiple and sometimes conflicting 
institutional commitments recognize that their relationships are liable to conflict 
and inequalities of power that can lead to mistrust, violence, exploitation, and 
domination” (Young, 2006, p. 105). Political institutions and their corresponding 
roles arise out of the responsibilities of justice that are generated by social 
connection. The existence of current day structural injustices necessarily means that 
some of the background conditions of action – the accepted rules and conventions 
of our communities and political institutions – are not morally acceptable (Young, 
2006). Only through working together by engaging in collective action can 
connected actors change institutions and processes to provide less unjust outcomes.  
At the same time, shared responsibility does not mean that every actor bears 
responsibility to the same degree and in the same way. To determine who are best 
placed to take responsibility Young introduces four parameters of reasoning namely 
power, privilege, interest and collective ability (Young, 2006, 2011). Power refers to 
the capacity of an actor to change situations of injustice. For instance MNEs, such 
as Nike or Inditex (owner of ZARA, Pull and Bear) have more power to improve 
global labor justice than a local clothing retailer has. Privilege often goes hand-in-
hand with benefit. It means that those actors that benefit most from injustices have 
special moral obligations to change these injustices. For instance, affluent Western 
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consumers relatively benefit from sweatshops, but also have the capacity to change 
these circumstances without suffering serious deprivation (for instance, pay more 
for the product they are buying to improve the situation of the workers). Interest 
entails that those actors who suffer most from the injustice also have a responsibility 
to challenge this injustice (e.g. the workers in the sweatshop can speak up about 
their situation). Lastly, collective ability refers to groups of actors who together have 
the power to address these injustices; for instance, consumer groups and 
organizations such as universities and sport clubs when it comes to global labor 
justice, or schools and employers when looking at global health issues. The position 
of the actor in the system determines what kind of issues he can be held responsible 
for and what kind of action he should take (Young, 2006, 2011). 
Based on this short overview of Young's approach to responsibility, it 
becomes clear that all socially connected actors, both public and private, have a 
political responsibility to remedy structural injustices. Now we can take the next 
step and reflect on what this would imply for the responsibilities of corporate actors.  
 
Young and the political responsibilities of corporate actors 
In principle corporate actors have the responsibility to avoid causing harm or 
violating human rights (Bowie, 1999; Young, 2006). However, the problem is that 
corporate actors operate in a non-ideal world, where, even despite the possible best 
efforts to refrain from contributing to harm and injustice, they are structurally 
connected to instances of injustice through their economic activities. If the 
corporation is to take its economic responsibilities without violating its 
responsibilities towards others, the global structure has to change. Hence, by virtue 
of their social connection to global injustice and harm, corporations share 
responsibility to remedy these global injustices and harms. 
Some would argue that governments, not corporations or civil society actors, 
are best placed to take responsibility for problems of structural injustice in which 
freedom, justice and fairness are at stake. Young explicitly argues that this is not 
always the case. As explained in the previous section, governments should be seen 
as mediated instruments of those actors who share responsibility for structural 
justice. While governments and supranational institutions are important and 
(sometimes) powerful actors, they also often fail to effectively take responsibility. 
This is not only due to corruption, incompetence or weakness, it is also caused by 
the fact that some private actors can be very effective in influencing what 
governments can and cannot do (Young, 2011). To address structural problems the 
collective engagement of governmental and non-governmental actors is necessary, 
and we suggest that business therefore also has the responsibility to contribute to 
this.  
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Implications for corporate and governmental responsibility  
This closer look at the work of Young sheds new light on the issues we encountered 
in Scherer and Palazzo’s and Assländer and Curbach’s approaches to the political 
responsibilities of business.  
One of the main issues in Scherer and Palazzo’s approach was the 
indeterminacy of the scope of responsibilities and the risk of taking up a state-like 
role, but in reference to Young it is possible to give a first indication of the limits of 
this scope. Despite the fact that we cannot rely solely on governmental institutions 
to remedy injustice, this does not entail that taking political responsibility 
necessarily requires a corporate actor to take over a majority of traditional 
governmental responsibilities. In earlier work Young points out that the state 
engages in “activities and institutions of legal regulation, enforcement backed by 
coercion, legislative mandated coordination and public services, along with the 
managerial and technical apparatus to carry out these functions effectively” (Young, 
1999, p. 143). It is responsible for the regulation and coordination of economic life, 
facilitating social coordination of individuals and groups to achieve large-scale 
collective goals (Young, 1999). When confronted with structural injustice, actors 
that share responsibility for these harms often face coordination problems. In these 
cases national governments can be key because only they can legitimately exercise 
coercive power in solving such coordination problems. Other actors that share 
responsibility should not take up this coercive role, but rather should stimulate 
authoritative and coercive political institutions to take action against structural 
injustices (Young, 2011).  
It is at this point that it becomes clear how Young’s view of political 
responsibility helps to shed light on the problem of the scope of corporate 
responsibilities while at the same time restricting the problem of moral over-
demandingness of political CSR as Young’s interpretation of political responsibility 
excludes taking those responsibilities that would require coercive and authoritative 
action. This can be the case when it is necessary to force other actors to engage in 
certain behaviour, for instance to prevent human rights violations or to ensure that 
people are treated fairly. In these cases governments or higher public institutions 
should take up these tasks. As engaging in coercive action is not a permissible 
corporate activity, it by definition cannot fall within the scope of political corporate 
responsibility. Hence, this more strict reading of Young helps to narrow down the 
scope the political responsibilities of corporate actors. 
At the same time, Young offers a way out of the main problem we identified 
in Assländer and Curbach’s approach, namely that the application of the principle 
of subsidiarity provided no solution for situations in which governmental actors are 
absent or ineffective. Young’s approach offers a way out of this problem, for she puts 
forth that if government is not effective, is unwilling or is absent, then social 
connected actors still have a role to play, with political responsibility requiring them 
43
Ch
ap
te
r 2
44 
 
to “push authoritative and coercive political institutions in directions that remedy 
injustice, where they exist and bringing them into being where they do not” (Young, 
2011, p. 168, emphasis added). Taking political responsibility implies that non-state 
actors, including corporate actors, have the responsibility to create higher public 
institutions when necessary. 
 On the basis of Young we can argue that if corporate actors take political 
responsibility this can entail four forms of activity, namely: (1) lobby at state level to 
move the government to take action to remedy injustice; (2) deploy individual 
activities to directly remedy injustice; (3) engage in private or public-private 
initiatives with other actors (e.g. multi-stakeholder alliances) to collectively remedy 
injustice and (4) engage with other actors to create public institutions for situations 
of injustice and harm that require strict or coercive coordination. How this could 
translate to corporate practice we briefly discuss in the next section.  
 
Taking political corporate responsibility 
 To provide a first indication of what taking political responsibility might entail in 
daily corporate practice we provide two brief illustrations, considering the role 
business can play in taking responsibility for labor injustices in the electronics 
industry and its possible role in remedying global health issues like pandemics. 
To illustrate the first issue we consider the case of electronics producer Apple 
and its Taiwanese subcontractor, the supplier/manufacturer Pegatron. Apple works 
with Pegatron, which assembles its products in factories in the People’s Republic of 
China. Pegatron allegedly has bad labor conditions and is violating Chinese labor 
law (low safety, long working hours and child labor) (Barboza 2013; China Labor 
Watch 2013, 2015). On the basis of Young we can expect business to do at least three 
things. Firstly, Apple can lobby at the Chinese government level for additional 
regulation and stricter audits on the working conditions in the Pegatron factories. 
Secondly, Apple could increase its own efforts to directly influence the working 
conditions at the Pegatron factories. This could, for instance, be achieved through 
more regular audits by Apple at Pegatron’s sites, through renegotiation of contracts 
to demand better working conditions, or even through a financial contribution of 
Apple to help Pegatron improve these conditions. Lastly, Apple could further 
explore the possibilities of engaging with other actors in the industry to improve the 
labor conditions in the electronic industry. As major market leader in the industry 
Apple could, for instance, take the lead in a strengthening of the Code of Conduct 
of the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (an industry-wide coalition of 
electronic producers) to put labor conditions higher on the agenda, or it could seek 
to broaden the coalition by including workers in these deliberations in order to 
create a more inclusive organization to combat labor injustices.  
 In other instances we might even expect more of corporate actors, as political 
responsibility can also entail that corporate actors offer support to governments 
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facing difficulties in in creating and maintaining structures to effectively address 
injustice, albeit without taking up a coercive state-like role. This can be illustrated 
when considering problems where public health was under severe threat like during 
the 2013-2016 Ebola outbreak in Liberia, where the fragile national government 
struggled to provide quick quarantine and treatment (Messner, 2016; Onishi, 2014).  
During the outbreak the Liberian national government for instance employed 
both coercive and non-coercive measures to prevent and control the outbreak. They 
used coercion to quarantine groups of infected people to prevent further 
dissemination of the deadly disease, but at the same time engaged in non-coercive 
actions through information provision and education on how to prevent 
contamination (Nyenswah, et al., 2015). Now imagine that a large pharmaceutical 
multinational was also operating in these Ebola-struck regions: what would 
discharging political responsibility for public health entail? Arguably, following 
Young, such a company could engage in education and information activities and 
make drugs available, yet it should not itself use coercion to quarantine groups of 
persons. On the other hand, it might be appropriate to assist the government in 
creating and maintaining quarantine facilities, for example, by offering medical 
technologies, drugs or other goods that are necessary to ensure that the basic needs 
of quarantined groups are satisfied. This would be especially important if the 
government struggled with maintaining quarantine in an effective, fair and humane 
manner.  
 All-in-all, we hold that Young’s notion of political responsibility implies a 
mutual dependency between actors that have a social connection to structural 
injustice, and this particularly holds for corporate actors and governments. In the 
current globalized world they need each other to effectively take responsibility for 
justice. Taking political responsibility requires corporate actors to not only develop 
private initiatives, but also (1) to support government in developing governance 
schemes that would allow business to engage with its political responsibilities in an 
effective and fair way; (2) assist governments that lack the capacity to effectively take 
their governmental responsibilities and (3) lobby or push to change the policies of 
(unwilling) governments that take insufficient action to combat structural injustice 
and harm. Governments at the same time remain the primary responsible actors for 
actions that require coercion and for a fair allocation of public goods. This also 
prevents corporations from becoming burdened with inappropriate political 
responsibilities such as coercion at the costs of its economic responsibilities. In 
addition, governments should create guidelines to encourage, stimulate and push 
corporations to engage in corporate citizenship and develop legislation in order to 
organise political corporate responsibility in a democratic and efficient fashion. In 
doing so business and government can collectively address structural injustices.  
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IV. Discussion and conclusion 
The academic debate on corporate citizenship is ambiguous about the scope of 
political responsibility of corporate actors and the division of responsibilities 
between corporate and governmental actors. Iris Marion Young’s work on 
responsibility for justice sheds a new light on these problems. On the basis of her 
work we provide a more substantial normative foundation for corporate political 
responsibility and put forth that the scope of this political responsibility can be 
narrowed by recognizing that coercive actions that are necessary to ensure freedom 
and fairness remain a central governmental responsibility. At the same time a 
Youngian interpretation of political responsibility makes clear that corporations 
have a responsibility to help or push national governments or supranational 
institutions when they are unwilling or unable to take responsibility and even work 
towards the creation of public regulatory institutions when these are absent. These 
insights jointly present a third way between the more government focused 
subsidiarity approach of Assländer and Curbach, and the more corporate-centred 
theory of political CSR by Scherer and Palazzo.  
Although we believe this reading of Young provides helpful insights in the 
debate on corporate citizenship and the political responsibilities of business, it only 
is a first attempt to specify the scope of corporate responsibilities. While restricting 
the political responsibilities of business to non-coercive activities, one might wonder 
whether this is not still overburdening the corporation with additional tasks and 
responsibilities. Even though Young provides some indication of what can be 
reasonably expected of different actors concerning structural injustices – relative 
capacities and degree of connection to injustice seem to be key – these parameters 
of reasoning remain notoriously vague (Neuhäuser, 2014). In order to think about 
what can be expected of corporate actors operating in different sectors and in 
countries with various degrees of (in)effective government, it is imperative to further 
explore these parameters and corresponding grounds for responsibility. In doing so 
it will be possible to see how stringent political responsibilities of business are in 
specific situations of injustice and how they can be discharged (cf. Tempels, Verweij, 
& Blok, 2017) .  
While ample questions on the responsibilities of business in society remain, 
this Youngian interpretation of corporate political responsibility shows that taking 
political responsibility is neither just a matter of organizing political legitimacy 
within the corporation, nor one of fitting political responsibilities of corporate actors 
in a political hierarchy. Political responsibility for structural injustices expands the 
range of responsibilities of business, requiring corporate actors to deploy private 
actions to contribute to global justice, to cooperate within its own sector to address 
harms, but also to work together with and to lobby governments and international 
institutions to combat these injustices. Both governments and corporate actors 
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share responsibility for justice and will have to push each other to take action against 
injustice.  
 
Notes 
1. In this paper we approach the notion of corporate social responsibility from 
a normative perspective, seeking to provide a framework to define the 
responsibility of business for society and the environment. In practice taking 
this responsibility connects to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as 
business policy and instrument, as discharging this corporate responsibility 
will in business practice often take the shape of CSR programs. 
 
2. Wicked problems can be understood as complex, ill-structured public 
problems, that are hard to pin down and are unlikely to be solved in 
traditional ways (for instance through governmental intervention) (Blok, 
Gremmen, & Wesselink, 2016). 
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Chapter 3 Big Food’s ambivalence: seeking profit and 
responsibility for health 
 
I. Introduction 
Companies and corporate activities are often portrayed as major causes of health 
problems, and this is so for good reasons. The detrimental impact of the sale of 
tobacco products and alcoholic beverages on health is obvious, and nowadays the 
food sector is also criticized for contributing to disease and ill health. Many food and 
beverage companies produce and market products that contain large amounts of 
salt, sugar, and fat, which are important contributors to obesity, type 2 diabetes, and 
other so-called lifestyle diseases (Moss, 2013; Nestle, 2015; Stuckler & Nestle, 2012).  
At the same time, food companies are active in innovation and product 
development that aim to create healthier products or variants (e.g., by removing 
trans fats or reducing salt). Some also engage in social programs that encourage 
people to take up a healthy and active lifestyle (Aldwinckle & Knight, 2014; Nestlé, 
2014). Nevertheless, such activities may well cause skepticism because in a 
competitive market context the ultimate motivation of companies seems to be to 
make a profit, even at the expense of consumer health.  
Here we suggest that the situation is more complex and that the behavior of 
several companies reflects an ambivalence or even a split corporate personality, as 
they both contribute to population health problems and engage in activities to 
prevent such problems. Moreover, as far as population health involves collective 
action to promote and protect the health of the population and the food industry 
can play a major role in promoting healthy nutrition, it makes sense to see 
companies not merely as culprits that cause health problems but as sharing in 
societal responsibility for population health (cf. Rothstein, 2002; Verweij & Dawson, 
2009). This implies that in evaluating the moral role of the food industry, one should 
focus not only on backward-looking responsibility (involving questions of praise and 
blame) but on forward-looking responsibility as well: from an ethical perspective, 
what can and should food companies do to promote health?  
In this article, we suggest pathways for corporate responsibility and propose 
a research agenda in which governments, individuals, civil society, and businesses 
play a central role in taking on population health problems. 
 
II. Irresponsible practices of ‘Big Food’ 
The notion of corporations taking responsibility for health is heavily contested. 
Although there is a clear recognition in the public health debate that food and 
beverage multinationals play a crucial role in determining what a large part of the 
global population eats and drinks, corporate actors are frequently considered to be 
part of the problem rather than part of the solution (Hastings, 2012; Stuckler & 
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Nestle, 2012). Arguably, multinational food and beverage companies have been a 
driving force in the increase in the global consumption of processed foods that 
contain large amounts of salt, sugar, and fat, as well as in the growing consumption 
of soft drinks and other sweetened beverages (Moss, 2013; Nestle, 2015; Stuckler & 
Nestle, 2012). The industry is now being scrutinized in relation to the products it 
produces, the way certain products are being marketed, and the influence it has on 
political decision making regarding national public health policies and international 
public health guidelines. 
With regard to the products that are being produced, critics point to the 
development of ‘hyperpalatable’ food products, for instance. Hyperpalatable 
products are engineered to have more rewarding properties, which is achieved by 
increasing the levels of sugar, salt, fat, flavor, and so forth. These properties are 
present not only in fast-food products but also in products such as soft drinks, candy, 
and cured meats that are put on the market by multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
including Nestlé, Mondelēz, and PepsiCo (Gearhardt, Grilo, DiLeone, Brownell, & 
Potenza, 2011). Food science research has shown that these types of products can 
stimulate neural circuits similar to those that are stimulated in cases of drug 
addiction. Although such products have only a fraction of the addictive effects of 
recreational drugs, these findings have led some researchers to cast doubt on the 
notion that all food-related health choices and their effects are solely the result of 
autonomous individual choice and are therefore a personal responsibility 
(Blumenthal & Gold, 2010; Gearhardt et al., 2011). 
Today, the marketing practices of these food giants are criticized (Dorfman 
et al., 2012; Nestle, 2015; Smith, 2012). Food marketing practices aimed at children 
(e.g., character-branded products, gamification of products, and free gifts, such as 
toys that come with a product) are criticized given that kids are unable to distinguish 
between truth and fiction in advertising and that such advertisements stimulate 
them to eat high-calorie, low-nutrient food and beverage products (Elliott, 2015). 
Furthermore, increased attention is being given to how sugary drinks and fatty foods 
are promoted at sporting events, music festivals, and schools. At some universities, 
there is increasing opposition to granting ‘pouring rights’ to major beverage 
companies that predominantly sell sugary drinks because this practice would 
eliminate the possibility of opting for a more healthy beverage choice (Nestle, 2015). 
With respect to the political activities of food companies, several companies 
have been actively promoting research that undermines public health practices 
while simultaneously lobbying against certain programs that promote public health, 
such as the soda regulations in Mexico and New York City and the European 
Parliament’s proposal to include mandatory front-of-package nutrition logos on 
prepacked foods. Critics argue that, by engaging in these practices, the industry is 
shaping public policy to its own private interests rather than to the public interest 
(EurActiv, 2010; Rosenberg, 2015; Shelley, Ogedegbe, & Elbel, 2014). 
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Such activities allow the opponents of Big Food to argue that these companies 
are actively contributing to the rise of noncommunicable diseases such as obesity, 
heart failure, and type 2 diabetes (Dorfman et al., 2012; Nestle, 2015). 
 
III. Corporate social responsibility in the food industry  
With full recognition that these practices can be considered problematic, the reality 
of corporate behavior is more equivocal and complex, as many food companies are 
making concrete efforts to contribute to population health. There are numerous 
examples of corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities in which corporations 
engaging in social programs that encourage people to take up a healthy and active 
lifestyle also develop healthier or less unhealthy products (e.g., vitamin-enriched 
biscuits, light products) (Aldwinckle & Knight, 2014; Nestlé, 2014). Furthermore, 
food multinationals are cooperating with governments and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) in multistakeholder alliances that aim to contribute to 
population health (e.g., sponsoring sports events, educating people about healthy 
food). Taking into account these activities, one could argue that food corporations 
are in fact partially accepting their responsibility for population health (Hartmann, 
2011). 
However, those more critical of the industry point out that these programs 
have four major downsides, as CSR programs can be seen as (1) a means to draw 
attention away from health-undermining products, (2) a way to stave off 
governmental regulation, (3) an insincere way to burnish a company’s reputation 
(using health activities merely to strengthen the market position of the firm), and 
(4) a method to shift responsibility to the consumer (Mudd, 2013; Nestle, 2015; 
Stuckler & Nestle, 2012). To illustrate the last drawback just listed, a majority of 
programs are aimed at providing information to consumers, making them aware of 
the number of calories they consume and how many calories they burn. Rather than 
looking critically at the products they are putting on the market and how they are 
marketing them, food companies implicitly or explicitly see healthy nutrition as a 
responsibility of individuals themselves (Crawshaw, 2012). As a result, it is no 
surprise that several public health scholars view CSR activities as attempts by the 
industry to exculpate itself rather than to help solve public health problems 
(Hastings, 2012; Stuckler & Nestle, 2012). 
The social behavior of many food and beverage corporations is met with 
skepticism because the paradox of corporations actively marketing and selling 
products that are harmful to health on the one hand while engaging in health 
initiatives on the other hand is deemed insurmountable. This leads those critical of 
the role of corporate actors in the (global) food system to argue that, given these 
efforts, “food systems are not driven to deliver optimal human diets but to maximize 
profits” (Stuckler & Nestle, 2012, p. 1). This notion resonates with Joel Bakan’s work 
on the corporation; he considers it to be an entity that relentlessly seeks both power 
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and profit without paying heed to the harmful consequences of its behavior (Bakan, 
2012). 
Health-related corporate activities – whether new product developments, 
social initiatives, or engagement in private regulation for public health – are 
ultimately seen as efforts that contribute to the maximization of profit (Smith, 2012; 
Stuckler & Nestle, 2012). Therefore, instead of private and public–private 
governance, society is in need of additional governmental legislation and rule setting 
that can curb the negative corporate impact on population health (e.g., obligatory 
front-of-package labeling, additional taxes on unhealthy products, constraints on 
marketing, and regulation of the availability of specific products) (Bakan, 2012; 
Crawshaw, 2012; Dorfman et al., 2012; Panjwani & Caraher, 2014; Verweij & Dawson, 
2009; Yoon & Lam, 2013).   
 
IV. A split corporate personality  
Although the preceding analysis of corporate impact on health is compelling, it is 
not complete. It is clear that there are corporate activities that negatively affect 
population health. Certain practices such as marketing directed at children and 
extensive lobbying against governmental public health regulations are morally 
problematic. Yet what this analysis of the food industry overlooks is that – regardless 
of whether one considers them to be marginal or ill motivated – there are corporate 
efforts that aim to contribute to health, and it is plausible that they will have some 
success in improving public health. Within the grim storyline set out in the 
preceding section, we are looking for a silver lining and will provide a more nuanced 
perspective on the role the industry can play. 
This can be done by first recognizing that in the food sector there are various 
companies that explicitly endorse sustainability and social responsibility in their 
business strategies, positioning themselves as ‘the ethical players’ in the market. In 
the United States there has been the rise of Whole Foods Market, whereas in Europe 
supermarkets such as EkoPlaza (the Netherlands) and The Co-operative Food 
(United Kingdom) are gradually establishing a stronger position in the market. At 
the same time, there are corporations taking individual actions to improve 
population health. The research in the 1980s on alternative sweeteners and the 
development of low-sugar products can be considered steps toward healthier food 
products. However, this transition is likely to have been motivated by commercial 
rather than ethical considerations. For instance, Coca-Cola’s Diet Coke was 
specifically introduced for women “who then would not have to worry about 
calories,” (Coca-Cola, n.d.) thereby opening up a new segment in the market.  
Yet there are examples in which companies appear to be more strongly 
motivated by ethical considerations. For instance, in the early 1990s Unilever 
conducted research on trans fats despite the fact that at that time trans fats were 
considered to be safe and were used in the production of several food products. 
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When it was shown that trans fats did have a more negative impact on heart health 
than saturated fats and this finding was reported in the media, Unilever decided in 
1994 to remove trans fats from all of its margarines and spreads (Korver & Katan, 
2006). This is remarkable as, apart from the possible positive contribution of this 
research to consumer credibility in the future, there does not seem to have been a 
short-term market incentive to make such a decision (Unilever was unlikely to 
directly increase its profits by removing trans fats), nor was a change mandatory or 
enforced through national governmental regulations. 
Unilever was one of the first companies to eliminate trans-fat acids in certain 
products, thus voluntarily taking action to improve population health. In a similar 
fashion, the company is now actively reducing the amount of salt in its products. By 
2020, it aims to have 75% of its food portfolio meet the World Health Organization’s 
recommendation of a maximum intake of 5 g of salt per day (Unilever, n.d.). 
Apart from such individual activities, there are also public–private initiatives 
in which major food MNEs cooperate with governments to contribute to health. One 
of the foremost examples in Europe is the development of front-of-package nutrition 
logos for healthy food. A front-of-package logo informs consumers and can help 
them make healthier food choices; for example, the UK traffic light label employs 
red, amber, and green color coding to indicate the extent to which a product is 
healthy. Other programs, such as the Dutch Choices Program, do the same while 
also creating incentives for food companies to innovate and make their products 
healthier (Blok et al., 2017; Food Standards Agency, 2007; Vyth et al., 2010). 
Taking the developments just described into account shows how the picture 
is more nuanced than some authors in the public health debate paint it. It is clear 
that the companies engaging in CSR are not saints. They employ opposing strategies, 
promoting population health on the one hand while putting products on the market 
that can harm population health on the other. Although there are reasons to be 
skeptical about the efforts of some MNEs in the food system, the corporate activities 
discussed here that have a positive impact on health should not be ignored.  
Instead of viewing the majority of the food and beverage multinationals as 
unyielding profit seekers, we propose that these companies are behaving as if having 
a split personality. By neglecting the incongruity in corporate behavior, scholars in 
the public health debate seem to discard the opportunity of corporations taking 
responsibility for health seriously. As a result, the debate on food and public health 
predominantly focuses on the roles and responsibilities of the government as 
opposed to the responsibilities of citizens, fueling the debate on state paternalism 
(Conly, 2013; Mayes & Thompson, 2014). 
Yet, population health problems are complex in that there are many social 
determinants and societal actors that shape and influence them. Although 
governmental health promotion (e.g., regulation, education) is necessary to reduce 
malnutrition and overweight, it is not a panacea as governmental activities 
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frequently do not have the desired effect. Hence, it might in fact be crucial for 
corporations and other societal actors to also take responsibility for population 
health (Turoldo 2009; Van Huijstee, Francken, and Leroy 2007; Verweij 2014). 
Therefore, to work toward structural change in relation to local, national, and global 
health issues, our reflections on responsibility for health should venture beyond the 
concepts of governmental and personal responsibility and move toward a different 
conception of responsibility, namely that of shared responsibility. 
 
V. Towards a shared responsibility for health   
Rather than viewing responsibility for health and healthy nutrition as either a 
personal responsibility or a governmental responsibility, responsibility for 
population health can be seen as shared among multiple actors, including actors in 
the private sector (Turoldo 2009; Van Huijstee, Francken, and Leroy 2007; Verweij 
2014). 
The work of political philosopher Iris Marion Young gives more substance to 
this idea. According to Young, people carry responsibility for structural injustices 
(Young, 2011). These are harms that people incur as a result of structural processes 
in which a multitude of actors participate. Population health problems can be 
understood as such. When examining problems such as obesity, one can attempt to 
single out a group of actors as the main culprit, as would be the case when 
understanding responsibility as liability. One could point a finger at the food 
multinationals because they sell and market hyperpalatable fatty foods and soft 
drinks, blame consumers for eating too much and exercising too little, or hold 
governments responsible for not providing sufficient regulation to promote public 
health.  
Young subsequently moves away from this backward-looking idea of 
responsibility and considers these structural problems as emerging from networks 
of collaborating and interacting actors (Schrempf, 2014; Young, 2011). As such, each 
actor operating within these structures that cause injustices has a responsibility to 
remedy related problems. Population health problems then become shared 
problems that require collective action. Although governments have an important 
part to play in terms of regulation and enforcement, Young has pointed out that 
governments might not always be willing or able to take effective action in the area 
of population health. Hence, nongovernmental actors such as food multinationals, 
schools, NGOs, restaurants, employers, citizens, and families also have an important 
role to play (Turoldo, 2009; Verweij, 2014; Young, 2011). 
This allows for a more pragmatic position in the debate on responsibility for 
population health. Instead of solely asking ‘Who caused this?’ and blaming specific 
actors, it allows for a more constructive, forward-looking approach to responsibility, 
one that places remedying these problems in a central position and looks at which 
actors are best placed to take action (Young, 2011). Grounds for attributing this 
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responsibility are not only found in a causal connection (the role an actor had in 
creating a problem) but also determined by whether an actor benefited from a 
situation of harm, the actor’s capacity to change the undesirable situation, and the 
extent to which the actor is embedded in a specific community or society where 
these injustices occur (Miller, 2001). 
Taking this perspective also allows for a more positive role of the food and 
beverage industry. Although the contradictory practices of food MNEs can give 
reason to doubt their intentions, the focus should not merely be on blaming the 
industry for being a significant causal factor in the increased prevalence of 
noncommunicable diseases; it also has a responsibility to contribute to possible 
solutions. This gives rise to the question ‘What could taking responsibility be like in 
the day-to-day practices of various actors in the industry?’ 
Providing information on a product, such as Mars Food’s recent efforts to 
inform its consumers about which of its products can be consumed on a daily basis 
and which cannot, is prudent yet also a bare moral minimum (Mars, 2016). Forward-
looking responsibility for health entails more than informing consumers about the 
properties of a product. One can imagine, for instance, food and beverage MNEs 
conducting longitudinal research on how products with high levels of salt, sugar, 
and fat affect individual health when consumed on a daily basis; subsequently 
communicating this information to their consumers; and using their knowledge and 
research skills to make their products healthier. In addition, taking this 
responsibility could even entail step-by-step changes in the product catalog of a 
company, shifting from unhealthy products to healthier products, for instance Coca-
Cola deciding to eventually substitute its regular Coke for Coca-Cola Life, Light, and 
Zero.  
Apart from the multinationals, other players in the food chain such as 
supermarkets can also play a part, for instance by using their marketing expertise 
and power to nudge people in a more healthy direction (Verweij 2014). Furthermore, 
taking collective action for population health could entail that food companies 
cooperate with each other to develop healthier food products, collaborate to 
decrease the amount of unhealthy products (for instance, in the United Kingdom 
and Ireland inner-city supermarkets have proposed limiting the sale of cheap mixed 
drinks to combat binge drinking (Claassen & Gerbrandy, 2016)), support corporate 
taxes to fund independent national or international public institutions in 
conducting health research, or even lobby at the governmental level for increased 
regulation and new standards for healthy food to create a level playing field. There 
are in fact many ways in which food MNEs and retailers can take responsibility for 
population health. 
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VI. Conclusion  
Although the notion of shared responsibility does not provide a clear-cut solution 
to the role businesses should play in population health problems, it does show that 
the possibility of corporate responsibility for health should not be neglected. What 
the scope of this corporate responsibility should be and how it relates to the 
responsibilities of other actors (governments, NGOs, consumers) require further 
ethical reflection and debate. Connecting the debates on public health ethics, CSR, 
health sciences, and business ethics opens up room to work toward a more 
sophisticated and inclusive approach to responsibility for public health in the food 
industry.  
If one is serious about tackling population health problems, it is imperative 
to realize that these problems are multifaceted and connect many different actors 
who all have and should take responsibility. This naturally includes governments, 
which, given the ambivalent behavior of business with regard to population health, 
still have an ample role in ensuring compliance with legal standards and developing 
regulations that require businesses to be accountable for their moral responsibilities. 
At the same time, taking on these complex health problems requires us to rethink 
the responsibilities of citizens, societal organizations, and especially the food 
industry itself (Reich, 2008; Verweij, 2014; Young, 2011). Taking this shared 
responsibility seriously would require companies to go beyond current CSR practices 
and take a more proactive stance toward population health. 
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Chapter 4 Food vendor beware! On ordinary morality 
and unhealthy marketing  
 
I. Introduction  
In the debate on corporate responsibility there is ongoing discussion on the 
legitimate impact of businesses on public issues. One of the sectors where firms are 
increasingly attributed responsibility is in the food and beverage industry1, where 
firms are criticised and held responsible for the rise of non-communicable diseases 
(NCDs) such as obesity and type 2 diabetes (Stuckler & Nestle, 2012). Critics call out 
for a fundamental change within the industry, entailing both a change in the way 
products are developed and designed as well as a change in the means of marketing 
and product promotion. They are often pessimistic about the possibility of ‘Big Food’ 
changing their activities for the better. Rather than trusting firms’ abilities for self-
regulation, these critics put forth that stronger governmental regulation of the 
industry is a bare necessity (Marks, 2017; Moss, 2013; Nestle, 2015). Only through laws 
that enable the taxation of unhealthy products, limit corporate influence on public 
policy making and prohibit marketing to vulnerable populations, can the negative 
impact on public health be curbed (Gilmore et al., 2011; Stuckler et al., 2012; Yoon & 
Lam, 2013).  
On the other side of the aisle business scholars point out that the rise of NCDs 
cannot be fully attributed to Big Food as the increased prevalence of these diseases 
is the result of the interplay of decisions and behaviours of various private and public 
actors. Businesses can provide healthier options and inform people about what 
healthy consumption and behaviour would be, but in the end it is the consumer that 
makes the decision to eat (un)healthy or to engage in unhealthy behaviour (cf. 
Epstein, 2004; Iivonen, 2017).  
At the same time, this does not do away with the fact that these firms have 
an important role in sustaining the prevalence of NCDs. It is the interplay of 
practices of industry in the market and society at large that create, induce and enable 
specific patterns of unhealthy consumption that contribute to obesity and other 
NCDs. While governmental action is necessary to deal with this epidemic, this does 
not mean we should not think about industry’s responsibility and what they should 
and should not do to address these problems (Schrempf, 2014; Tempels, Verweij, et 
al., 2017). 
From a normative perspective it can be argued that firms in the food and 
beverage industry have a mediated causal connection to food-related public health 
problems, and because of this have a responsibility to address these controversies 
and should work towards addressing consumption-related NCDs. This responsibility 
is forward-looking, and is framed in terms of positive action: what can businesses do 
to turn the tide in the global obesity epidemic? And how they can strengthen healthy 
63
Ch
ap
te
r 4
64 
 
consumption? It provides guidance in what kind of affirmative actions would be 
morally desirable, e.g. businesses should develop more healthy products, encourage 
people to have a healthy energy balance, nudge people towards healthier decisions 
and maybe even encourage stricter public health regulation (Blok et al., 2017; 
Schrempf, 2014; Tempels, Verweij, et al., 2017). 
Yet, to fully understand what corporate responsibility for public health can 
entail for food firms, we should not only think of the kind of positive actions 
corporate actors can engage in. Firms are often keen to point out what kind of 
activities they are willing to take up in their long-term strategies, but find it harder 
to point out what kind of things they will no longer do. Still, in order to say 
something about responsible corporate behaviour, we should also assess what kind 
of activities are impermissible. To do this we assess what kind of behaviour in the 
food industry that impacts public health violates basic moral requirements, and thus 
are moral wrongs which firms should refrain from engaging in. In this article we 
explore under what conditions the sales and marketing of unhealthy food and 
beverage products is irresponsible.  
In order to provide a plausible answer to this problem we first briefly set out 
what these basic moral requirements are. In section two we draw from the 
contemporary debates on ordinary morality and corporate responsibility to 
highlight non-maleficence and the notion of respect for autonomy as central 
principles that need to be adhered to when engaging in market and non-market 
activities (cf. Brenkert, 2008; Gert, 2004; Hsieh, 2017). In the third section we discuss 
how the principle of non-maleficence and the notion of respect for autonomy are 
relevant when thinking about immoral behaviour in the food and beverage industry. 
We show how health harms are not a sufficient consideration for arguing that sales 
and marketing of unhealthy food products would be irresponsible, and hold that 
respecting autonomous choice is at the heart of this debate. In the fourth section we 
look at under what circumstances marketing to adults can be understood as 
wrongful and in the fifth section we assess the problems in marketing unhealthy 
food and beverages to children and teenagers. On the basis of this we find three 
conditions under which sales and marketing of unhealthy products is irresponsible, 
which are outlined in section six. In the final seventh section we reflect on what 
these findings imply for corporate practice and make recommendations for future 
research.  
 
II. Ordinary morality – a basic minimum for businesses 
In business ethics there is considerable discussion on what kind of moral principles 
should guide the behaviour of individuals and organisations. Several authors argue 
that there are basic or common principles of morality that regulate how we ought to 
behave. Bernard Gert (2004) provides such a theory. He understands morality as:  
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“an informal public system applying to all rational persons […] 
governing behaviour that affects others, and includes what are 
commonly known as the moral rules, ideals, and virtues and has the 
lessening of evil (harm) suffered by those protected by the system as 
its goal.” (Gert, 2004, p. 156) 
He argues that harm – here understood as death, pain, disability, loss of freedom 
and loss of pleasure – is something all rational actors try to avoid. Rational actors are 
to refrain from directly harming others, or engage in activities that would likely 
result in harms to others (deceive, break promises, cheat, break the law, not doing 
one’s role specific duties) (Gert, 2004).  
While Gert specifically talks about moral behaviour in society in general, 
Nien-hê Hsieh (2017) makes a comparable argument when discussing what kind of 
principles should guide the behaviour of corporate actors. Taking a stance counter 
to scholars such as Joseph Heath (2007) and Wayne Norman (2011) who argue in 
favour of a specific (adversarial) morality for the market, Hsieh argues that ordinary 
morality provides a solid framework for the responsibilities of firms and their 
managers in relation to their consumers and society at large. In reference to this 
ordinary morality Hsieh points out that negative duties such as the responsibility to 
refrain from harming others and undermining the autonomy of other actors, are 
well-established, and should be adhered to both in the market as well as in society 
(cf. Lichtenberg, 2010). These basic moral rules can help establish a more clear idea 
about what kind of activities are permissible and which are not, and provide 
guidance to how firms and people working in business ought to act (Hsieh, 2017). 
In an ideal world people and organisations would adhere to rules of ordinary 
morality, act upon these principles and regulate their own behaviour. Yet, there will 
always be unforeseen consequences of our actions and unexpected events to deal 
with. For that reason we need rules and regulation to provide a safety net, allowing 
us to not have to solely trust on the good intentions of others. We also see this in 
the food and beverage industry: most governments provide laws and regulations to 
structure the food market and for instance set safety standards for products.  
At the same time not everything can be regulated by the government. In the 
Netherlands for example communication about healthy food is not controlled by the 
government, but is left to the industry. It is expected to self-regulate and contribute 
to public health. Yet, in the wake of the rise of NCDs and the global obesity epidemic, 
numerous authors argue that we cannot expect much of corporate actors when it 
comes to taking responsibility for public health. They put forth that more 
governmental rules and legislation are the only way to deal with the spread of food-
related public health harms (McKee & Stuckler, 2018; Nestle, 2015).  
While state regulation is an absolute necessity in dealing with the surge of 
NCDs, we hold that by only focusing on regulation, there is a risk of reducing 
business ethics to obeying the law. Arguably ethics is about more than just adhering 
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to the moral minimum that is formalised in legislation. In our daily activities we are 
often confronted with situations that the law does not fully cover, yet we still hope 
actors would engage in moral behaviour – even if this is not specifically outlined in 
rules or legislation. Furthermore, laws might be ineffective, morally insufficient or 
even unethical. If we only refer to the law as the minimal moral standard, current 
injustices as well as new developments that might lead to harm might not be 
sufficiently addressed (Gert, 2004). In order to act responsible, corporate actors need 
to continually reflect on this in their daily activities. So rather than only asking ‘Is 
this product meeting the governmental safety standards?’ or, ‘Is this marketing tool 
deceptive according the new sector guidelines?’ in order to speak of corporate 
responsibility people in business would have to reflect on the acceptability of their 
actions based on central principles in ordinary morality. They ought to reflect upon 
whether their products and actions might unduly harm others, or infringe upon 
autonomy in some way – even in absence of legal rules.  
Following Gert and Hsieh we discern two overarching principles from 
ordinary morality that hold sway in thinking about what corporate practices are 
morally (un)acceptable, namely 1) the principle of non-maleficence (or the duty not 
to harm) and 2) respect for autonomy (Brenkert, 2008; Brockway, 1993; Crossley, 
1999; Gert, 2004; Hsieh, 2017). In the next section we will discuss these two principles 
and set out what this can imply in the industry’s provision of unhealthy foods and 
beverages.  
 
III. Health harms and respect for consumer autonomy in the 
food and beverage industry 
In this section we briefly set out the principles of non-maleficence and respect for 
autonomy, see what adhering to these principles can imply for food firms, and 
illustrate this by touching upon some health-related issues.  
 
Harm and non-maleficence in the food industry  
One of the primary principles in ordinary morality is the principle that one ought 
not to inflict harm upon others (cf. Beauchamp & Childress, 2009; Feinberg, 1989; 
Gert, 2004). What harm exactly consists of is up for debate, but as Beauchamp and 
Childress state: “although harm is a contested concept, everyone agrees that 
significant bodily harms and other setbacks to significant interests are paradigm 
instances of harm” (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, p. 152, emphasis added).  
There are instances under which harm might be legitimately inflicted upon 
others, namely when the harm is consensual. People often engage in activities that 
can bring about financial or bodily harm (e.g. they go base-jumping, consume 
alcohol and smoke cigarettes etc.). We commonly assert that such actions do not 
constitute a moral wrong, as long as the harm risked or incurred was done so 
knowingly and willingly by the persons involved in these activities. The notion that 
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this is morally permissible can be traced back to the ancient maxim of volenti non fit 
injuria (“To one who has consented no wrong is done”) (Brink, 2016). So, when a 
person consents to being harmed or is voluntarily exposed to the risk of harm – so 
there was no coercion, misinformation or undue influence – we cannot understand 
this as a moral wrong. Both this understanding of harm as well as the volenti 
principle have important implications for how to assess the (ir)responsibility of the 
food industry in selling unhealthy products.  
 
The regulated wrongs: non-consensual harms to health and unsafe food  
In the context of the food market the possibility of harm is most clear in the case of 
unsafe foods. A company is blameworthy when it knowingly and willingly engages 
in sales activities that it knows can harm its consumers. We can speak of 
blameworthy harm when a producer intentionally makes use of ingredients that have 
harmful effects, or knowingly distributes tainted food. The latter for instance 
happened at the Peanut Corporation of America. In 2008 and 2009 the company was 
responsible for Salmonella contamination of 714 people, of which nine eventually 
died. The management of the firm was considered blameworthy, because it 
knowingly sold the infected food across the country, and actively tried to conceal 
the issue at hand (Leighton, 2016; Marler, 2018) .  
 In absence of clear harmful intent, firms can still be held responsible for 
harms that occur because of negligence. Food producing companies might be 
considered negligent when they unknowingly put products on the market that do 
not meet the required food safety standards. In these cases it is argued that even 
though they were unaware, they could or should have known this. For instance in 
2012 the owners and operators of a melon farm had unknowingly introduced 
cantaloupe melons to the market that contained the harmful Listeria bacteria. The 
company failed to act, while there was a clear expectation that firm would care for 
this. As a result the owners of the farm faced up to six year in prison and a fine of 3 
million dollars (Marler, 2018). 
In these instances food firms can clearly be held morally responsible for 
harms to health – and appeals to the volenti principle will not do. Consumers are not 
in a position to discern safe from unsafe foods, and if they would have a real choice, 
few would voluntarily choose for unsafe food. Precisely because they are not in a 
position to choose for themselves, we expect the government to secure food safety. 
The core implications of the principle of non-maleficence are thus governed by often 
strict legal regulations and inspections. Legal obligations of food companies to 
maintain food safety standards are therefore much more prominent than the 
concurrent ethical principle of non-maleficence.  
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A less obvious case: negative health effects of unhealthy food products 
Following Barnhill (2014) we make the distinction between unsafe and unhealthy 
food. Unsafe food in her view refers to foods that pose a risk of immediate harm (for 
instance food mixed with arsenic), foods that pose a risk of harm at any level of 
consumption (such as disease-carrying food) or products where the risk is induced 
through non-food substances (e.g. foods containing mercury). Unhealthy food 
products on the other hand are those products that significantly increase the risk of 
food-related health harms (such as non-communicable diseases), but do not pose an 
immediate harm to health, and whose risk-attributing components are food 
substances (e.g., salt, sugar, fat) (Barnhill et al., 2014).  
Several public health professionals argue that unhealthy food products in 
themselves are a problem as frequent consumption negatively impacts people’s 
health, and therefore the sales of such products should be limited or even banned 
(cf. Nestle, 2013). The problem with such a position is that it overlooks non-health 
values and the importance of consumer choice While we do not dispute that health 
is essential and greatly valued by most people, that does not mean it cannot be 
weighed against other valuable experiences. Many consumers prefer the short-term 
hedonic pleasures provided by unhealthy products that are high on sugar, salt and 
fat, over avoiding elevated health risks later in life (Barnhill et al., 2014; Conly, 2013). 
Unhealthy food products and eating practices bring pleasure in terms of taste and 
can be of social and cultural value. Now, given the possibility of consumer choice in 
this context, appeals to the volenti principle do make sense. So as long as people are 
able to freely and knowingly decide on what they consume there is nothing wrong in 
selling unhealthy foods.  
This does not mean we cannot say anything about the moral impermissibility 
of promoting and selling unhealthy food products to consumers. The sales and 
marketing of unhealthy products would be harmful and thus morally wrong as a 
matter of non-maleficence if the volenti principle is not met – which is the case if 
there is insufficient room for autonomous decision-making. In the next subsection 
we explore in what ways consumer decision making can be unduly influenced in the 
sales of unhealthy products.  
 
Undue corporate influence on autonomy  
Apart from the duty not to inflict harm, the notion of respecting autonomy is central 
to our more basic understandings of morality. As Beauchamp & Childress state “to 
respect autonomous agents is to acknowledge their right to hold views, to make 
choices and to take action based on their personal values and beliefs”(Beauchamp & 
Childress, 2009, p. 103). It involves “the ability to deliberate, judge, choose and act 
upon different possible courses of action in both the private and public realm” (Held, 
2006, p. 263). This means that infringement of autonomy can take place both in the 
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private realm (for instance in the market) as well as in the public realm (for instance 
in politics). 
In business ethics the idea of respect for autonomy is often rephrased under 
the header of respect for consumer sovereignty2. This closely connects to one of the 
dominant assumptions in (classic) economics, namely that consumers are rational, 
autonomous actors that can make their own voluntary decisions. Corporations have 
to refrain from engaging in behaviour that would violate the autonomy of the 
consumers (Ebejer & Morden, 1988; Hasnas, 2009; Sher, 2011). In regular market 
activities this principle is connected to the idea of honest dealing, meaning that 
transactions are only permissible as long as both parties knowingly and voluntarily 
consent to a deal (so indeed the idea of respect for autonomy, and the conditions of 
the volenti principle do coincide). In practice this means that when engaging with 
consumers firms should – at the very least – disclose all relevant information about 
a product in order to allow for the other party to make a well-informed decision. In 
addition, they should also refrain from unduly intervening in the decision-making 
process of the consumer (Ebejer & Morden, 1988; Hasnas, 2009).  
  If firms want to engage in morally acceptable behaviour, this means that they 
have to respect the autonomy of persons. The question of course is what kind of 
corporate behaviour can be seen as violating autonomy in these senses? Respect for 
autonomy not only entails that people have to be free to make their choice, it also 
implies that people have to be provided with information and reasons to make their 
choices. In our societal interactions we often do not merely provide information, it 
also entails persuading and influencing people. Providing people with information 
and communicating this to them in a fair fashion enables them to make their 
autonomous decisions. To illustrate this: we generally consider it laudable when a 
company informs a customer about the properties and potential value of a product 
or when the local government warns cyclists about dangerous crossings (cf. 
Sunstein, 2016). Providing such information allows the individual to make a proper 
decision.  
Still in reality this process of decision making is not always respected. 
Although straightforward coercion would will hardly ever happen in normal market 
contexts, other forms of infringement on autonomy do occur often enough. People 
are deceived, lied to, kept in the dark and manipulated. We briefly discuss these 
ways of influencing people, point out why they are problematic and illustrate this 
with examples from the food industry.  
 
Deception, lying and keeping in the dark 
One way in which autonomous decision-making processes can be hampered is by 
intentionally controlling people’s information circumstances, leading to the creation 
of false or incomplete beliefs (Carsons, 2009). Following Carsons we make the 
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distinction between lying, deception, and keeping in the dark, as different ways in 
which informational circumstances can be impaired.  
Lying can be understood as the act of making statements which one does not 
belief to be true (or rather, one beliefs to be false) with the intention of causing 
others to have false beliefs (Carsons, 2009). This does take place in the food industry 
when firms make unsubstantiated claims about the nutritional value, health impact, 
or composition of their products. For instance the Dutch supermarket Jumbo 
advertised its ‘honest cornbread’, however – unlike the name suggested – the bread 
was not made of corn flour, but of regular wheat (Foodwatch, 2017).  
Deception is more subtle, but has the similar aim of causing another person 
to have false beliefs. A company deceives a consumer when it intentionally causes 
the consumer to believe something, while this something is false and the company 
also believes this to be false (cf. Carsons, 2009). Deception can take many forms and 
shapes. In the food industry we see packaging and marketing that suggests that a 
product is healthy or contains a large portion of healthy ingredients, while this is 
not the case. For instance Sourcy’s Raspberry Pomegranate Vitamin Water, contains 
no raspberry or pomegranate, but does consist of substantial amount of sugar. The 
fruit and vitamins are at the front of the pack, while the nutritional value is in very 
small cryptic text at the back of the bottle (Consumentenbond, 2017). By 
communicating these products in such a way people are tricked into believing that 
they are healthy, fruity etc.  
Keeping in the dark can be seen as a special way of with-holding relevant 
information for how we see and evaluate products3. Rather than actively lying or 
deceiving someone, a person can also refrain from telling the truth (cf. Carsons, 
2009). An example of this is how the American Sugar Research Foundation (SRF) 
operated in the 1960s and 1970s. At that time the general public was unaware of the 
dietary causes of coronary heart diseases, and the impact sugar consumption could 
have on health. While research in the early 1950s already revealed this connection, 
the SRF purposefully prevented this research from reaching the public, leading a 
majority of people to continue to have incorrect beliefs about the negative health 
effects of sugar (Kearns, Schmidt, Apollonio, & Glantz, 2018; Kearns et al., 2016). 
 
Manipulation 
While lying, deception and keeping in the dark are often seen as forms of 
manipulation, we propose that it can also be seen as covert interference with 
people’s decision making processes. Manipulation changes people’s behaviour, by 
sidestepping the normal process of persuasion and is in an underhand fashion 
changing the way people see their options (Groen-Reijman, 2018).  
Drawing on the work of Sunstein (Sunstein, 2016) and Barnhill (2016) we find 
two ways in which such manipulation can be understood, namely as subversion of 
people’s reflective deliberative capacities and as subversion of people’s proper 
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nondeliberative responses. Sunstein understands manipulation as actions that “do 
not sufficiently engage or appeal to their [people’s] capacity for reflection and 
deliberation” (Sunstein, 2016, p. 216). In the context of the market subliminal and 
subaudible advertising might be seen as a straight-forward examples of 
manipulation, while other practices such as redesigning a website in such a way that 
people become more inclined to buy the more expensive product could be seen a 
borderline cases. For Sunstein this type of influence is problematic as choosers did 
not have the fair opportunity to make a decision of their own, due to the interference 
of a (hidden) manipulator. Autonomy is infringed upon at the moment the 
manipulator is leading a person to make a choice without sufficiently weighing – on 
the chooser’s own terms – the benefits and costs of a particular decision. People are 
not being treated with respect at the moment that their deliberative capacities are 
subverted (Sunstein, 2016).  
However, there are many choices and decisions people make that do not 
necessarily involve rational deliberation and reflection. Often our responses and 
behaviours in the world are not the product of our deliberative capacities, but occur 
emotionally and viscerally. For example, I feel attracted to my partner, I appreciate 
a pop song on the radio, and I enjoy the smell of freshly baked bread. None of these 
things are rational decisions, they come to me and I like them. These are what 
Barnhill calls proper nondeliberative responses. These responses should not be 
necessarily be understood as manipulative, for a person can reflect on them 
(Barnhill, 2016).  
In the case of advertising and sales we might argue that deliberative reflection 
and non-deliberative responses go hand-in-hand: we form proper non-deliberative 
responses (I enjoy the smell freshly baked croissants), we gather information (I read 
the price and nutritional value of a product) and on the basis of the our non-
deliberative responses and the provided reasons and facts we engage in internal 
deliberation and reflection and come to a decision (I decide not to buy the delicious 
smelling croissant for I want to lose weight). Arguably, it would be impossible for us 
to navigate the world without relying on non-deliberative responses. Moreover, 
triggering these non-deliberative responses is of course a major and well-accepted 
element of common marketing strategies aiming to influence consumer choice.  
Yet, these nondeliberative responses might also be flawed or improper due to 
undue influence of other actors. This can for instance happen by drawing spurious 
relations between products and desirable things. The tobacco industry marketed the 
cigarette as the torch of freedom, appealing to a subconscious desire to be free. 
While it is consistent with Freudian motivation theory to appeal to these elements, 
it does create a spurious relation, as smoking in no way strengthens one’s freedom. 
That same thing happens when Coca-Cola in its commercials tries to make a 
connection between drinking Coca-Cola, happiness, and healthy beautiful people. 
As a result many people will first associate Coca-Cola with concepts as happy, 
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healthy, beautiful, rather than view it as the sugary, energizing drink that it really is. 
This in turn impacts the human affect heuristic. Advertisements or campaigns can 
create positive emotional responses to products, which pre-empt a careful rational 
decision making process. Playing on the affect heuristic leads people to make snap-
decisions, due to their association with desires like happiness or freedom, rather 
than making a well thought-through choice (Barnhill, 2016).  
 On this basis of the above considerations we argue that actions are 
manipulative when: 1) an actor intentionally thwarts a person’s rational deliberative 
capacities, and this person did not have sufficient opportunity to make a decision of 
his own due to this underhand interference of another actor; and 2) an actor 
intentionally triggers improper non-deliberative responses in a person that feed into 
his decision making process. Intentionally and covertly steering a consumer’s 
practical reasoning and practical engagement with the world can be seen as 
problematic, for by (partly) taking over the decision making process, the 
manipulator is treating this person as both a ‘tool and a fool’ (Wilkinson, 2013). In 
extreme cases this involves exercising power over that person – steering his life in a 
particular direction, rather than letting him determine his own desired path, 
infringing upon both autonomy and human dignity (Barnhill, 2016; Groen-Reijman, 
2018; Sunstein, 2016) 
Many marketing techniques involve at least some manipulation or deception 
– and most consumers will be aware of that. To assume that the principle of respect 
for autonomy must be upheld in the market as strict as it upheld in for instance 
medical ethics, is rather implausible. Yet we have not only invoked respect for 
autonomy as a self-standing principle, but it is also linked to the principle of non-
maleficence via the volenti principle. In the next section we argue that corporate 
actions that are in tension with both principles simultaneously can indeed be 
considered morally impermissible. We illustrate how these moral tensions are 
present in the sales and marketing of unhealthy foods and beverages.  
 
IV. Towards conditions for judging the moral permissibility of 
selling and marketing foods and beverages  
In section 3 we established that selling unhealthy food and beverage products does 
not have to be a problem, as long as the people have made a conscious and coercion-
free decision to be exposed to the health risks. Yet, current research in health 
psychology and food sciences reveal that autonomous decision-making is under 
pressure. Our food choices and consumption behaviour are heavily influenced by 
product composition, the retail and eating environment as well as particular ways of 
product communication (Currie et al., 2009; Dobson & Gerstner, 2010; Elliott, 2015; 
Young & Nestle, 2002). These persuasive practices are not necessarily problematic in 
a market context, although they can be considered to be in a moral grey zone. When 
you enter a shop or walk across the market place on a Saturday afternoon you will 
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likely know that entrepreneurs will try to persuade you by arguments, tap into 
certain biological or social desires, influence you through sounds and images, all to 
ultimately invite you to buy their product or make use of their services. Influence 
and persuasion are part and parcel of market practice, and the vast majority of 
people are well aware of this (Beauchamp, Hare, & Biederman, 1984; Nairn & Fine, 
2008; Sunstein, 2016).  
Sunstein (2016) points out that manipulations are a pervasive feature of 
human life – they happens in our daily personal interactions, in the market, and in 
politics. Some are egregious such as subliminal messaging, questionable like scaring 
people using pictures, while others are mild – playing on loss aversion, changing 
tone of voice or using facial expressions. Yet all aim to steer people to make certain 
decisions. While these practices can partially infringe upon autonomy and human 
dignity, some of them are so engrained in our societal interactions – and this is 
certainly so in the market place – that it is difficult to argue that that all manipulative 
instances are inherently morally problematic (Sunstein, 2016).  
Still, this does not mean that there are no limits to the kind of influence that 
food firms are allowed to exercise on their (potential) customers. Even though (mild) 
manipulation is always present in the marketplace, we hold it to be unacceptable 
when it steers people towards unhealthy choices, for in that case both the principle 
of non-maleficence and that of respect for autonomy are violated. More specifically: 
in such cases companies cannot rebut the charge of harmful activity by appealing to 
the volenti principle. Below we explore under what conditions selling unhealthy 
foods is morally impermissible. 
 
Expectation of being manipulated  
One of the elements relevant in assessing the moral wrongness of manipulation in 
market contexts is the extent to which a consumer can reasonably expect to be 
manipulated. Taking this expectation seriously, we have reason to consider 
manipulative or slightly deceptive influences to be wrong when they happen in 
contexts where consumers do not expect them to occur. Consider for example the 
following: my local baker is leaving his oven on all day not because this is necessary, 
but because he knows that the smell of fresh products entices consumers to buy his 
products. Now, suppose the baker also installs little emitters in the local park next 
to the store that recreate the smell of fresh pastries, with the intention to seduce 
people to visit the store and buy pastries. While there is nothing inherently wrong 
with ‘using’ the smell of the oven to promote sales where I can expect it, to do so in 
the park would be an instance of wrongful manipulation. In the park I’m not 
expecting to be influenced by covert commercial interventions or cues. In a similar 
vein, publishing sugar industry sponsored articles on the importance of eating sugar 
in a newspaper section that looks like the regular science section, can also be 
considered manipulative or deceptive (see Royal Cosun, 2017).  
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Consumers can furthermore reasonably expect to be influenced by the taste 
and look of a product. Yet, they will be less aware of specific cues in product 
formulation or product design, such as size relabelling. Keeping the consumer 
unaware of the fact that she is steered towards particular choices is morally 
problematic, and especially so if this stimulates unhealthy choices. In short: 
marketing strategies and product designs that are manipulative or otherwise 
undermine autonomous choice are morally wrong if used in contexts where a 
reasonable person would not expect them to occur.  
 
The degree of manipulation 
A second factor of moral (im)permissibility is the degree of manipulation. Minor 
manipulations are inevitable, but at some point they become morally wrong. In 
general one can argue that practices that subvert people’s reflective capacities are 
more problematic than subversions of proper nondeliberative responses. Subliminal 
advertisements or some strategic product placements are likely to disable rational 
reflection and autonomous decision making. Improper nondeliberative responses 
on the other hand do not necessarily infringe upon autonomy. Creating spurious 
associations between a product and very attractive features, or manufacturing 
pleasant experiences are common marketing techniques that can effectively steer 
choice – but reasonable people can still reflect on what is happening. Even though I 
might improperly associate Coca-Cola with world peace, or desire a product because 
there are attractive young people in the commercial, I can still assess these inputs 
next to the product information (facts), or taste (proper inputs) and make my own 
choices. Yet the more a practice undermines our reflective capacities, the more it is 
to be considered morally wrong. 
 
We started from the assumption that ordinary morality – notably the principles of 
non-maleficence and respect for autonomy – imposes restrictions on what can count 
as morally permissible corporate behaviour in the food industry. Due to the specific 
nature of the market context, such restrictions will be most obvious where the 
principles work in tandem, that is, where there is no ground for business to justify 
the sale of potentially harmful products by appeal to the volenti principle (i.e. 
arguing that consumers voluntary choose the products they buy). Unsafe products 
should not be marketed at all, which is (generally) governed by food law. In the case 
of unhealthy foods we have argued that it is morally impermissible to use 
manipulative strategies in contexts where consumers will not expect them at all, or 
where the strategies subvert reflective capacities to a high degree.  
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V. A special case: marketing unhealthy food and beverages to 
children  
Marketing to children is common practice in the food and beverage industry. From 
colourful food and packaging designs to advertisements featuring fun fictional 
characters and gamification, the range of marketing techniques is diverse and multi-
faceted. And, it works: not only do advertisements and branding successfully 
influence children’s beliefs and preferences about food and drinks, they also 
successfully affect parental purchasing (Cairns, Angus, Hastings, & Caraher, 2013; 
Henry & Borzekowski, 2011). Several scholars have highlighted these practices as 
irresponsible. What is held to be most problematic is the fact that food marketing 
aimed at children frequently promotes products that have a low nutritional value 
and are high in salt, sugar and fat. Over the past fifteen years the promotion of 
unhealthy products has rapidly increased compared to the promotion of healthy 
products (Dixon et al., 2017). Marketers tend to acknowledge that these practices are 
criticized for these effects, but in practice they show little willingness to refrain from 
engaging in child marketing (Adams, 2007; Bergadaà, 2007). Yet, the principles of 
ordinary morality give little reason to hold these practices to be morally permissible.  
We established in the previous section that (mild) manipulation of 
consumers can only take place when they are aware of the fact that they might be 
steered towards a particular direction or manipulated into making specific choices. 
Bearing this in mind, marketing to children provides a curious case. It is generally 
assumed that while children from a young age on are able to engage in goal-directed 
behaviour and have specific preferences, they only gradually develop the 
competence and capacities for reflective decision making (Matthews & Mullin, 2015). 
As such children do not have the capacity to identify, expect or reflect upon 
manipulation in sales and marketing.  
While this limited autonomy of children is clearly recognized in legal and 
medical debates (cf. Beauchamp & Childress, 2009), these considerations do not 
firmly hold sway in contemporary marketing practices. Marketing to children by 
now has a long tradition, not only in the sales of child specific products (toys, games) 
but also in the sales of food and beverage products. From a purely economic 
perspective it makes sense for firms to market to children: children can both be 
current customers as well as potential future consumers. However, taking the notion 
of consumer sovereignty seriously means acknowledging that children do not yet 
qualify as autonomous decision makers, as they do not have the reflective capacities 
to deal with all the tempting offers market players provide them with.  
Children are not yet able to (fully) discern and understand the consciously 
mediated persuasive information in marketing, let alone by able to identify the 
persuasive intent behind more covert marketing practices such as product 
placement in blogs and movies or gamification (this is already hard for many adult 
consumers) (Nairn & Fine, 2008; Rozendaal, Lapierre, Reijmersdal, & Buijzen, 2011). 
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As a result they are easily being steered through the non-reflective behavioural 
responses triggered by corporate actors. It is for this reason that marketing of 
unhealthy products to (young) children can be seen as immoral and irresponsible. 
Not, for that matter, because their autonomy is not respected – after all it is 
questionable what it means to respect a child’s autonomy if it is not considered 
sufficiently capable to make autonomous decisions at all. Yet for that reason, the 
volenti principle is not applicable either. Marketing unhealthy products can thus be 
considered as a case of harm that cannot be neutralised by appeal to the volenti 
principle.  
There are two clear counterarguments to our objection to marketing to 
children. The first holds that while children are not yet autonomous, marketing can 
enable children to become full-fledged autonomous consumers. For instance 
Bergadaà points out that negative effects of marketing should not be tackled by 
“banning advertising targeted at young children. The ultimate aim is to ensure that 
our youth become enlightened consumers […] it is the practice of consumerism that 
exposes children to the necessary socialization process for them to develop into 
aware adults.” (Bergadaà, 2007, p. 1). This implies that only by being confronted by 
child marketing children can learn how to become responsible consumers. However, 
this argument is flawed. While there might be reasons to argue that children living 
in a capitalist economic system should learn how to become critical consumers when 
they are adults, it seems questionable that in order to learn this, child marketing is 
important or necessary. Especially in the case of food and beverages there comes a 
moment that children simply are confronted with marketing of general food 
products. Marketing is so permeated in contemporary business practice, that we 
actually do not need child-focussed food products in order for them to learn about 
marketing practices. Simply by visiting a store, walking to school or by surfing online 
they are very likely to encounter Coca-Cola’s Happiness campaign or Mondelēz’s 
new Oreo advertisement. Even when one would hold that youth should learn to 
become sovereign consumers, they can do this through the encounters they will 
have with marketing of regular food and beverage products.  
A second argument that could be made is that in most households children 
are not the primary shoppers. It are the parents who ultimately decide whether 
certain products are bought or not – and they will normally be capable to resist the 
slightly manipulative forms of child marketing. This is only partially true. Older 
children and teenagers will frequently buy their own lunches at school. Here they 
are being influenced by specific marketing, despite them not being sufficiently 
autonomous decision makers (cf. Nestle, 2015). Yet even where parents make the 
decisions, child marketing is still problematic due to the nag-effect or so called 
pester-power. Children tend to start ask parents for the products that have been 
marketed to them, thereby pushing their parents to buy these specific products for 
them (Dixon et al., 2017; Henry & Borzekowski, 2011). Such marketing techniques are 
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not so much a problem because they would disrespect the autonomy of children or 
parents, but one can argue that deliberately marketing products towards children to 
make them influence their parents, involves using the children just as a means for 
corporate ends, which is a failure to respect the dignity of children. The notion of 
human dignity is a fundamental presupposition that precedes our consideration of 
respect for autonomy. It is generally assumed that human beings – adults and 
children – have moral status and as such deserve to be treated with respect, and are 
to be treated as end in themselves and not merely as means (cf. Düwell, 2011; Warren, 
1997). The practice of marketing unhealthy food to children violates this rule, as 
children are used as a tool to push parents to consume. Rather, parents should have 
a space in which they can educate their children to let them learn how to become 
autonomous actors, and this space should not interfered with for commercial 
reasons (cf. Paine, Brenkert, Weisskoff, & Kimmel, 1984) 
Taking the above into account we argue that marketing unhealthy food to 
children and teenagers is problematic for both reasons of harm and dignity. As 
children do not have sufficient capacity for reflecting upon marketing, marketing 
unhealthy products to them subjects them health harms and risks they could not 
perceive, expect or consent to. Furthermore, steering them to either consume or 
pushing to their parents to consume fails respect their dignity. For those reasons we 
argue that marketing of unhealthy food and beverages to children and youth is 
immoral and irresponsible.  
 
VI. Irresponsible sales and marketing of unhealthy food  
At the start of this article we set out to find under what conditions the sales and 
marketing of unhealthy food products can be seen as irresponsible. Following our 
analysis in the previous sections we can identify three conditions that determine 
whether marketing and sales of unhealthy food products are morally wrong:  
 
1. the degree to which consumers are expecting to be manipulated; 
2. the degree of manipulativeness of a product, design or marketing technique; 
3. the degree to which a food or beverage product is harmful to health.  
 
The first two conditions flow from our discussions of autonomy and the volenti 
principle, while the third is directly based on non-maleficence. Just like the first two 
conditions, the third can differ in degree: when you are unduly steered towards 
consuming a single ice cone, this would be less problematic than when you are 
manipulated into eating a 20,000 calorie burger at the Heart Attack Grill4.  
Despite all three conditions being on a sliding scale there are specific 
thresholds that should be met. Sales and marketing of harmful food products cannot 
take place, when: 1) it is aimed at actors who lack the capacity for reflection;  
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2) actions are highly manipulative; and 3) when products are legally deemed unsafe. 
This implies that the marketing of unhealthy food to children is a clear moral wrong, 
while marketing unhealthy products to adults might be permissible as long as the 
product is not unsafe, actions are not highly manipulative and consumers are made 
aware of the possibility of manipulation5.  
This has clear and arguably far reaching implications for corporate practice. 
If food firms want to adhere to these minimal moral standards and engage in 
responsible behaviour, various (radical) changes should be made to current business 
practice. In the next section we conclude the article and briefly discuss the practical 
implications of our findings.  
 
VII. Discussion and conclusion 
Adhering to the principles of ordinary morality theoretically broadens our notion of 
corporate (ir)responsibility in the food and beverage industry and it has clear 
implications for corporate practice. Living up the principles of respect for consumer 
autonomy and non-maleficence necessitates change in how firms operate within the 
market as well as in society at large.  
 
Towards responsible behaviour in the food market 
With regard to interaction within the market our findings in the first place have 
serious consequences for how these firms are to deal with children and teens. When 
firms market to children they use them as a tool for corporate gain, rather than as 
an end in themselves. The fact that many food products that are marketed to 
children are unhealthy food products, makes that the principle of non-maleficence 
is also infringed upon.  
In order to act responsibly companies should refrain from marketing 
unhealthy food products to children below the age of 12. This means that current 
practices such as promotion of products through character-branding, advergaming, 
commercials during TV-programs for children should be off the table. This by 
extension also implies that companies should rethink setting out marketing 
campaigns for their unhealthy products for adults from public spaces or institutions 
where there are a lot of children. Day cares, primary schools and sport associations 
would be credible candidates where such marketing would be off limits. 
Secondly, it also requires firms to be sensible in marketing to teenagers. As 
their capacity for decision-making is more developed, the objection on grounds of 
autonomy is not as straight-forward as is the case with marketing to young children. 
Nevertheless, the fact these groups are still less able to engage in critical reflection, 
firms should clearly weigh what the negative impact of selling specific product to 
teenagers might be. It could for instance mean that firms still decide not to market 
or even sell certain products to adolescents. A practical example of this would be the 
78
79 
 
decision of supermarkets to stop selling energy drinks to teenagers, because of the 
negative health effects (Kindelan, 2018; Pieters, 2018)  
Our findings also impact how unhealthy food products are to be sold and 
marketed to adults. We have shown that impairing the information circumstances 
is morally dubious and that manipulation is only permissible under specific 
conditions. This provides the basis for several recommendations for corporate 
practice.  
First and foremost firms should refrain from making health claims that are 
false. One cannot claim or suggest a product has certain healthy properties while 
this is not the case, like for instance Kellogg’s did when claiming that their Rice 
Krispies were enhancing the immune system (Young, 2010). In addition, firms can 
no longer keep people in the dark about what is in their products. They ought to 
make clear what the consequences of continued consumption can be when such 
knowledge is not publicly available. 
Second, firms have to closely monitor whether an advertisement or product 
design might be deceptive. They should refrain from providing information in such 
a way that it is likely to cause faulty beliefs about the product. This for instance holds 
for products labels or commercials that suggest that a particular kind of ingredient 
is the main component (e.g. fruit, wholegrains etc.) while this is only a fraction of 
the entire product. So rather than putting a strawberry on the packaging when the 
product itself contains only 1% strawberry, it would be more truthful to add the line 
‘with strawberry flavour’, doing more justice to actual content of the product - and 
reducing the odds of the consumer construing false beliefs.  
While the above two elements are also clear candidates for governmental 
regulation, our final recommendation focusses directly on the firm, as we hold that 
in marketing to adults firms ought to operate in a prudent manner. Given that not 
all adult consumers are alike and equally capable of the assessing corporate 
manipulation, the most responsible thing to do would be to resist from engaging in 
manipulative behaviour in the first place. This especially holds when there are also 
other actions available that trigger the consumer’s deliberative capacities and/or his 
proper nondeliberative responses. Should firms decide to engage in manipulation 
they should at the very least stay clear of highly manipulative tactics and make the 
consumer aware of the fact that they can be steered towards certain consumption 
patterns, both through the product, as well as by the consumption environment.  
 
Rethinking the food industry’s involvement in politics and scientific research 
Having addressed several issues in the market, important questions still remain on 
the (im)permissibility of activities of food firms that take place outside the sphere of 
the market. The food industry is often scrutinized for its impact on politics and 
scientific research, such as lobbying against public health regulation or disputing 
scientific consensus on the impact of unhealthy food (Bateman-House et al., 2017; 
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Bødker et al., 2015; Kurzer & Cooper, 2013; Oreskes & Conway, 2010; Tselengidis & 
Östergren, 2019).  
Whether these activities are irresponsible are up for debate, as there is no 
consensus on the role corporations allowed to play in politics or in the pursuit of 
science (cf. Claassen & Gerbrandy, 2018; Hussain & Moriarty, 2018; Tempels, Blok, et 
al., 2017; Wettstein & Baur, 2016). If we want a full and inclusive answer to the 
question what kind of behaviour of food firms in regard to public health is morally 
(un)acceptable, the food industry’s impact on politics and scientific research should 
be assessed.  
The notion of ordinary morality could well be a relevant starting point for 
such a reflection. If firms have the responsibility to respect people’s autonomy both 
in their capacity as consumer, as well as in their capacity as citizens, this means that 
interfering with processes that enable people to deliberate and determine the 
collective ends of their society could be seen as violating citizen autonomy (cf. 
Groen-Reijman, 2018; Held, 2006). Hence when food corporations engage in 
behaviour that obscures facts about healthy consumption and even try to sow doubt 
about scientific consensus, this has a negative impact on the way in which citizens 
are able to deliberate about public policies, and in turn has detrimental effects for 
public health.  
It goes beyond the scope of this particular article to discuss this in detail. 
Whether this behaviour is morally wrong and what the boundaries of political and 
social activities in the food industry could be, deserve to be addressed in future 
research.  
  
Concluding remarks  
At the start of this article we set out to discuss what corporate irresponsibility in the 
food industry with regard to public health could entail, and we wondered specifically 
what could be the moral challenges in the sales and marketing of unhealthy 
products. We have argued that basic principles from ordinary morality, namely non-
maleficence and respect for autonomy, provide moral guidance in how food firms 
ought to behave, both within the market as well as in society at large. 
Our subsequent analysis revealed that there are clear moral minimums firms 
need to adhere to when producing, marketing and selling unhealthy products. The 
food and beverage industry is to refrain from marketing unhealthy food products to 
children and should reconsider marketing unhealthy products to adults. They are to 
take into account a) the manipulativeness of their marketing techniques, b) the 
degree to which consumers are able to identify possible manipulation and c) the 
possible negative impact (over)consumption of their product will have on public 
health. Not taking into account these basic conditions results in actions that are 
morally wrong and irresponsible.  
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Our approach provides a basis for identifying what the food industry should 
no longer do in the sales of unhealthy products, shows what kind of behaviour would 
be more prudent, and points out that major changes in the industry are necessary. 
Only by adhering to ordinary morality can firms in the food and beverage industry 
move towards responsible behaviour, and contribute to a society in which freedom 
and well-being are respected.  
 
Notes 
1. We focus in this article on companies and firms that produce and sell food 
and beverage products. We use the terms food and beverage industry, food 
industry and beverage industry interchangeably.  
 
2. Marketers often start from a different perspective on mankind and buyer 
behaviour, which is one that not neatly fits with the perspective of the homo 
economicus. For instance Freudian motivation theory or Veblenian theory 
assert that people are also motivated by subconscious desires (freedom, sex) 
or by the need to conform to larger cultural group norms (Mason, 1984; 
Pincus, 2004). We assert that while such considerations feed into the decision 
making process of people and affect the way consumers make decisions, 
people should be able to – at least partly – reflect on these desires and needs, 
weighing them in their decision to engage in specific behaviour (Crisp, 1987). 
 
3. The duty to provide information has its limits within the context of the 
market (cf. Hasnas, 2009). Firms to not have to provide information on the 
exact production costs, but they have the responsibility to provide all 
relevants product information, for instance information that is not publicly 
available such as information on the nutritional make-up of a product or the 
negative effects this has on health. In order to engage in honest dealing firms 
should aim to make sure this information reaches the consumer. In interfirm 
interaction on the other hand withholding information can be permissible, 
or even necessary as it can be crucial for the survival firms to gain or maintain 
a competitive advantage. The duty to provide information seem to shift 
depending on whether one is dealing with consumers or other firms. This 
creates are paradox as firms on the one hand have to provide information, 
while at the same time have to keep it to themselves in order to survive in the 
market. For a more elaborate discussion on this information paradox see 
Blok (2018).  
 
4. What exactly counts as more or less unhealthy products and ingredients is 
not something we as philosophers aim to discuss in this paper. This is 
something that should be assessed by food scientists (Lobstein & Davies, 
2009). 
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5. Whether it permissible or even laudable to nudge children and adults 
towards a healthy choice remains a topic of discussion. Following Sunstein 
(2016) we hold that such manipulation might be permissible on the grounds 
of welfare, but this requires further elaboration which goes beyond the scope 
of this article. For a more elaborate discussion see Bovens (2009), Conly 
(2012), Grüne-Yanoff (2012) and Hausman and Welch (2010).  
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Chapter 5 Injustice in food-related public health 
problems: a matter of corporate responsibility 
 
I. Introduction  
In the public health debate, the food and beverage industry1 is often portrayed as 
one of the main causes of noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) such as obesity and 
type 2 diabetes. Authors critical of contemporary global food systems point out that 
this industry, through its products, marketing, and lobbying practices, sustains and 
furthers the prevalence and severity of NCDs. They argue that in order to halt these 
developments and ensure citizens have access to adequate diets, governments 
should curb the impact the industry has on food-related public health issues2 by 
means of additional regulation (Moss, 2013; Nestle, 2015; Stuckler & Nestle, 2012).  
Although the industry plays an important part in the constitution of public 
health problems, the central claim of those critical of the food and beverage industry 
– that businesses are the main culprits in the rise of obesity and type 2 diabetes – 
disregards the complexity of consumption-related harms. There are many social 
determinants and societal actors that shape and influence public health problems: 
people’s genetic makeup, the food choices of consumers, and social and cultural 
eating norms, as well as (the absence of) governmental regulation, all contribute to 
the rise of these diseases. Still, this does not mean that firms can be excused from 
responsibility for food-related public health problems, and that responsibility for 
public health should be understood as a mere personal or governmental 
responsibility (cf. Epstein 2004).  
The question of corporate responsibility for such mediated harms is 
something that is being actively discussed in the field of business ethics (Arnold, 
2013; Bowie, 1999; Freeman, 2002; Friedman, 2009). Often, however, these 
discussions focus on the kind of behavior food firms should not engage in (e.g. the 
sale of unsafe products, deception and manipulation of consumers to eat unhealthy, 
or the lobby against public health regulation, yet relatively little is said on the 
possible positive responsibilities food firms could have for public health (Nestle, 
2013, 2015; Tempels, Verweij, et al., 2017).  
In this article we argue that aside from negative moral responsibilities like 
not doing harm and respecting consumer autonomy, the food industry also has a 
responsibility for addressing the structural injustices involved in global food-related 
health problems (cf. Arnold 2013). We add to the debate on corporate responsibility 
by exploring what positive responsibilities food and beverage firms could have for 
addressing these kinds of problems, while also assessing what taking this 
responsibility could entail in corporate practice (cf. Brenkert 1998; Schrempf 2014).  
We first discuss how corporate responsibility for consumption-related harms 
are frequently understood in debates on business ethics. While liability and 
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governmental approaches to public health are viable when assessing what actions of 
food firms are morally and legally wrong, we hold that these approaches do not take 
into account how firms play a part in the construction of structural injustices in 
food-related health problems. Drawing on the work of Iris Marion Young, we argue 
that dealing with structural injustices necessitates a forward-looking guiltless 
responsibility that flows from what she calls a social connection model of 
responsibility (Young, 2011). On the basis of this approach, responsibility for the 
structural injustices in food-related health problems can be conceived as a shared 
responsibility between a plurality of connected actors. We show how actors in the 
food industry are connected to this problem and why this implies a responsibility to 
address these injustices.  
We subsequently discuss what discharging this responsibility could mean in 
corporate practice. Although Young’s theory is helpful in understanding structural 
injustices, her theory provides limited guidance on what taking this responsibility 
involves in practice. Simply stating that all actors have a shared responsibility will 
not help to mitigate structural injustice, for if all are responsible, then none are likely 
to feel accountable. Actors might leave other actors to take responsibility and shirk 
their own responsibilities. To see how responsibility for food-related public health 
issues might be attributed to different corporate actors, we propose additional 
normative criteria for assigning responsibility following Miller (2001, 2012) and 
Owen (2013).  
By showing that public health problems feature structural injustices, this 
article creates room for a more inclusive approach to alleviating food-related public 
health issues. By the virtue of being connected to structural health injustices, food 
firms have a shared responsibility to prevent and mitigate food-related public health 
issues. The degree of corporate responsibility attributed is context dependent: it 
matters what kind of consumer groups the industry is dealing with, what capacity 
the company has, and what benefits it derives from structural injustices. Although 
companies can do many things to take responsibility for public health (develop new, 
healthier products, lobby for stricter regulation), given that structural injustices 
predominantly concern the most vulnerable groups in society and the means of 
firms will necessary be limited compared to the demands of responsibility, 
prioritization is needed. This implies that we can, for instance, expect companies to 
develop new, more healthful products that low-income consumers are likely to 
purchase, use behavioral nudging in supermarkets to steer people toward healthier 
choices, give coupons for healthy food to people receiving public support, and 
sponsor athletic activities in vulnerable neighborhoods. 
The article is organized as follows: in section 2, we briefly sketch how 
corporate responsibility for health in the food industry can be understood, and how 
this misses out on the injustices involved in food-related public health issues. In 
section 3, Iris Marion Young’s conception of structural injustice is discussed to show 
88
89 
 
that food-related public health issues can be understood as structural injustices and 
it is made clear how the industry is connected to this (Young 2001, 2011; McKeown, 
2014). In section 4 we briefly set out the social connection model of responsibility 
and discuss why connection to structural injustice implies a responsibility to address 
these injustices. In addition, we introduce criteria for assigning corporate 
responsibility for food-related public health issues, which help to illustrate what 
kind of actions this could imply for different actors in the food industry (Butt, 2007; 
Miller, 2012). The theoretical and practical implications of corporate responsibility 
for structural injustices are set out in section 5 and we conclude the article in section 
6 by briefly discussing the key contributions of our approach to the fields of business 
ethics and public health ethics. 
 
II. On corporate responsibility and public health problems 
Taking action for public health issues has long been perceived as a traditional 
governmental responsibility. Programs that aimed to protect and promote the 
health of the population, like sanitation programs, pollution control, and 
vaccination, have generally been conceived as a public policy issue on which 
different types of governmental organizations would take action (Childress et al., 
2002; Gostin, 2008; Rothstein, 2002). Over the years, the focus on governmental 
responsibility has become contested in the wake of the increase in so-called lifestyle-
related health problems like obesity, type 2 diabetes, and cardiac diseases. The fact 
that these diseases are closely related to individual behavior and consumption leads 
to the question of whether the effects of these health-damaging practices should be 
understood as a personal responsibility rather than as a governmental responsibility. 
While libertarian scholars and politicians stress people’s personal responsibility for 
health deficiencies that are due to unhealthy nutrition, public health scholars point 
out how social conditions influence these choices and how the food and beverage 
industry is creating an obesogenic environment and is contributing to these diseases 
(Brownell & Warner, 2009; Nestle, 2013).  
Large players in the food industry are being criticized for both their business 
activities (development and marketing of unhealthy products, deceptive marketing) 
and their political activities (lobbying against public health regulations, pushing 
additional agricultural subsidies) which impact public health (cf. Dorfman et al., 
2012; Fields, 2004; Franck, Grandi, & Eisenberg, 2013; Nestle, 2015; Shelley et al., 2014; 
Smith, 2012; Walters, 2015). Some public health professionals even refer to obesity 
and type 2 diabetes as industrial epidemics that are “emerging from the 
commercialization of potentially health damaging products” (Gilmore et al., 2011, p. 
2). A majority of public health scholars therefore argue that the negative impact of 
‘Big Food’ should be curbed through governmental regulation of the industry, for 
instance through laws regulating lobbying and marketing, implementing product 
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bans, and increasing taxes on unhealthy food products (Gilmore et al., 2011; Nestle, 
2015; Stuckler et al., 2012; Yoon & Lam, 2013). 
 
Why public health is not just a governmental responsibility  
Although we agree that there is ample need for the government to regulate the food 
industry, there are empirical, pragmatic, and normative reasons to at least consider 
the possibility of what corporate responsibility for public health might entail. First 
of all, several businesses are already engaging in activities that can contribute to 
public health. Although one might argue that these efforts are poorly motivated or 
insufficient (Elliott, 2015; Stuckler et al., 2012), we should not turn a blind eye to the 
positive developments that are taking place. An increasing number of companies are 
developing healthier food products (products that contain less salt, sugar, and fat), 
voluntarily applying front-of-pack nutrition labels (such as the traffic light food label 
in the UK), participating in (public-) private partnerships that seek to stimulate 
healthier behavior (for instance aimed at sponsoring sport events or improving 
education about nutrition). The potentially positive impact of these efforts should 
not be overlooked (Tempels, Verweij, et al., 2017) 
Second, a focus on governmental action regarding public health fails to take 
into account the practical complexity of noncommunicable diseases. These diseases 
are embedded in social contexts that are influenced by many different determinants 
and actors, which governments cannot address on their own. While governmental 
intervention regarding public health (education, regulation) is crucial for reducing 
food-related health problems, it is unlikely to be the magic bullet required for 
dealing with these problems, as governments can be unable or unwilling to address 
these problems. Even when they do intervene, the public health gains remain 
limited. Ng et al. (2014) report that “not only is obesity increasing, but no national 
success stories have been reported in the past 33 years” (Ng et al., 2014, p. 766) and 
argue that coordinated action is crucial to reverse this trend. For that reason, some 
health ethicists suggest a pragmatic position – that responsibility for public health 
should not be seen as solely a governmental responsibility but as a collective action 
that is needed to promote and protect the health of the population and that also 
involves businesses (Verweij, 2014; Verweij & Dawson, 2009).  
Finally, having corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs for public 
health makes sense if we tie this in with the normative debate in business ethics on 
corporate social responsibility. The debate suggests that corporate actors have 
societal and environmental responsibilities in addition to their traditional economic 
responsibilities. In practice this can even entail doing those tasks that had 
traditionally been conceived to be classic governmental responsibilities, like 
managing environmental governance or addressing public health issues 
(Heikkurinen & Mäkinen, 2016; Scherer et al., 2016; Tempels, Blok, et al., 2017). Yet, 
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the question of course is what this responsibility consists of, and what it would entail 
within the context of the food and beverage industry in regard to public health.  
 
Ordinary morality and corporate (ir)responsibility  
Whether there are corporate responsibilities for individual and collective harms 
caused by firms, and what the scope of these kinds of responsibilities is at the heart 
of the debate in business ethics. According Hsieh (2017) firms should adhere to the 
principles of ordinary morality. This means that firms in both market and non-
market activities should live up to the principle of non-maleficence and that of 
respect for autonomy and that companies can be morally blameworthy at the 
moment they fail to live up those principles. This can refer both to moral wrongs, 
for instance when a firm knowingly and willingly harms a consumer, as well as to 
moral negligence such as when a firm is expected to inform a consumer about the 
relevant properties of a product, but fails to do so (Ebejer & Morden, 1988; Hasnas, 
2009; Sher, 2011).  
In discussions on corporate irresponsibility in sales and marketing in the food 
and beverage industry these principles of ordinary morality frequently return as key 
moral rules that firms need to live up to in their daily practices. While public health 
ethicists like Barnhill et al. (2014) put forth that there is no a-priori wrong in selling 
unhealthy food products, there are certain moral standards firms need to adhere to 
when producing, marketing and selling these products (cf. Barnhill, 2016; Barnhill et 
al., 2014; Sunstein, 2016). From this, it follows for instance that firms are to refrain 
from marketing unhealthy products to children and that there are reasons to 
reconsider the way such products are promoted to adults. Not living up to these 
rules to not cause harm and respect consumer autonomy can be understood as 
irresponsible and morally blameworthy behavior (see chapter 4).  
 
Governmental standard-setting and legal responsibilities  
In a well-ordered society several of these minimal moral rules that flow from 
ordinary morality are formalized in legal rules. Many governments set standards and 
provide rules that structure the market and regulate corporate behavior. As such, for 
the food and beverage industry there are for instance safety standards for food 
products, laws that ban the sales of certain products, and rules limit certain 
manipulative marketing practices (cf. Buzby & Frenzen, 1999).  
Within the legal framework the concepts of fault, negligence and strict 
liability are key (Honoré, 1999).When a company violates these legal rules it is a at 
fault, it can held legally accountable. A food firm is for instance liable when it 
knowingly and willingly puts products on the market that do not meet safety 
standards, or when it intentionally misinforms consumers.  
But even in absence of harmful intent firms can be held accountable for 
harms that occur because of legal negligence. As Hart (2008) points out, people can 
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be held legally responsible for things they explicitly did not do, for things they did 
by accident, and for actions of other people. An actor can be held responsible not 
because she intentionally created a specific situation involving harm, but because 
she failed to act while there was a clear expectation that she should have done so 
(for instance a lifeguard failing to rescue a swimmer in distress) (Hart, 2008). A food 
company can for instance be considered negligent if – albeit unintentionally – certain 
food safety standards are not met, or governmental marketing guidelines are not 
followed, while there was an obligation to do so.  
Lastly there is the case of strict liability. In this case an actor is held 
accountable for an outcome on the ground that it played a causal role in bring about 
a certain situation, irrespective of legal fault (Couto, 2018). In tort law, actors can be 
held accountable for the actions of other actors or objects, for example I can be liable 
when my dog, which I thought was properly tied up, manages to escape my well-
fenced garden and ravages my neighbor’s garden, or when people or objects get 
damaged when I’m using explosives to clear away rocks (Honoré, 2010). In 
consumption-related harms firms might be held strictly liable when a person was 
harmed due to the use or consumption of a product (Piker, 1998). Whether strict 
liability can also be successfully applied in the context of health harms caused by the 
consumption of unhealthy food products is up for debate4 (Adams, 2005; Wicker, 
2015).  
 
A corporate responsibility to prevent and mitigate public health harms?  
The above overview makes clear that food firms have various moral and legal 
responsibilities for public health. Firms have a legal responsibility to comply with 
food laws and governmental standard setting, and not produce and sell products 
that are unsafe, while simultaneously having the moral responsibility to strive not 
to harm their consumers (for instance by selling unsafe foods3) or by disrespecting 
consumer autonomy (for example by deceiving consumers into eating unhealthy 
products). If firms fail to adhere to these legal rules or live up to these basic 
principles of morality, they can be legitimately blamed or held (strictly) liable.  
Even though there are clear corporate responsibilities in regard to health 
harms, this remains a rather minimalist approach to corporate responsibility. It 
stipulates what firms should not do, but tells us little about what kind of positive 
actions might be required to prevent the local, national and global public health 
issues.  
Now, some libertarian scholars might argue this is not a problem, or at least 
not a problem food firms should be concerned with (cf. Epstein, 2004; Hasnas, 2009; 
Palmer & Hedberg, 2013). When corporate actors account for their legal obligations 
and respect ordinary morality then this is where the buck stops when it comes to 
corporate responsibility for health. In a free market, competition, supply, and 
demand are central. If there is a great demand for tasty food products among 
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consumers, food-producing businesses should provide such products, and 
consumers should be free to decide what they want to eat or drink (cf. Hasnas, 2009). 
If the product tastes so good that it entices the consumer to continue eating, it is 
questionable whether this is something the company should be blamed or held 
accountable for; instead, it seems to be doing exactly what the market expects it to 
do. Ultimately, the responsibility for eating specific unhealthy products lies with the 
consumer herself. Bearing this in mind it is problematic to hold a law-abiding candy 
store or fast-food chain responsible for taking action to prevent heart problems of 
their returning customers.  
This kind of reasoning also returns in legal suits against the food industry in 
regard to health harms, for instance in the well-known case of Pelman vs. 
McDonalds in the United States (Adams, 2005). In this case, Ashley Pelman and 
Jazlyn Bradley, who suffered from obesity and weight-related health complications, 
argued that their heavily fast-food-based diet contributed to their dire health 
situation and that McDonald’s should bear responsibility for this. The court however 
held that it was a well-known fact that fast-food products contained high levels of 
salt, sugar, and fat and that consumption of large quantities of these ingredients 
could have detrimental health effects. It went on to say that provided that consumers 
were sufficiently knowledgeable or were able to obtain the relevant knowledge, they 
could freely exercise their choice, and hence the producers should not be held liable 
(Adams, 2005; Wicker, 2015). Hence, if firms meet the legal standards for selling 
unhealthy products and respect consumer autonomy, then the possible negative 
results of unhealthy consumption cannot be the responsibility of the firm. In those 
cases it is the consumer who willingly and knowingly chooses the consume 
unhealthy, as such the consequences for this are also her responsibility (cf. Epstein, 
2004).  
Yet, we hold such a liberal interpretation of corporate responsibility to be 
limited, as it misses out on how social processes structure and constrain people’s 
lives and how this can lead to harms. In her work on responsibility for justice 
political philosopher Iris Marion Young put forth that these social processes can lead 
to injustices, and that – even though this is the result of a combination of societal 
processes and of different actors operating together – we should consider what 
responsibilities actors have for addressing these injustices (Young, 2001; 2004; 2011).  
While Young’s work does not focus on public health or corporate 
responsibility in particular, we think her idea of structural injustice is helpful in 
rethinking the food industry’s responsibility for the global obesity epidemic and 
other food-related public health issues. Young’s notions of social processes and 
structure are relevant in understanding the possible injustices in the spread of non-
communicable diseases, as social structures constrain people’s abilities to make 
healthier choices or live healthier lives (Haverkamp, Verweij, & Stronks, 2018; 
Mackenbach et al., 2016; Stronks, Mheen, Looman, & Mackenbach, 1996). Laying 
93
Ch
ap
te
r 5
94 
 
bare the structural injustices involved in the spread of NCDs, in turn allows us to 
assess how the food and beverage industry is connected to this and how this might 
ground a more positive corporate responsibility address these injustices.  
In the next section we will set out why food-related health harms involve 
structural injustices and how corporate actors in the food and beverage industry are 
connected to this.  
 
III. Structural injustice, health deprivation and the role of the 
food industry   
On the basis of Young’s work on social processes and structural injustice (2001; 2011) 
we illustrate how social structures shape and constrain lives of people and show how 
the (increasingly) unequal distribution of food-related public health harms can be 
conceived as structural injustices. This creates room to think about which groups 
are facing these injustices and, subsequently, how the food industry is connected to 
this. To start this reflection it is necessary to explain how Young understands 
structure and structural injustice before making the connection to food-related 
public health issues and the food industry.  
 
Young on social structures, structural inequality, and structural injustice  
Young uses the notion of social structures to discuss the institutional background 
that shapes individuals’ abilities to act and express themselves but over which they 
have little control. She understands social structures as the relation of basic social 
positions and processes that “fundamentally condition the opportunities and life 
prospects of the persons located in those positions” (Young, 2001, p. 14). This 
conditioning – which creates opportunities and constraints – takes place because 
actions and interactions in one situation that condition people in position X 
reinforce the rules and resources available for the different (inter)actions of people 
in positions Y and Z. The unintended consequences of this multitude of interactions 
often create more opportunities and constraints and also reinforce them, shaping 
the habits and expectations of actors as well as partly shaping the physical conditions 
needed for future actions (Young, 2001).  
Young gives the example of unskilled female workers in Southeast Asia who 
move from the countryside to the city and who stand in a specific structural relation 
to the small entrepreneurs who employ them in the garment industry. These 
entrepreneurs are in turn structurally positioned in relation to large multinationals 
and exporting firms. These different structured positions offer dissimilar and 
unequal opportunities to the actors who hold these positions (Young, 2011).  
Structural inequalities arise when certain groups of people are (relatively) 
constrained in their freedom and material well-being as the result of the possibilities 
available within their social positions; they can be compared with other groups of 
people who – given their social position – have more options available and/or have 
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easier access to certain benefits (Young, 2001, p. 15). This does not mean that this 
constraint fully determines the life plans of individuals or their possibility of gaining 
access to certain benefits. Some relatively constrained people are lucky, and some 
manage to overcome these constraints through hard work. However, less 
constrained people can be struck by bad luck or squander their bright future by 
making foolish decisions. Yet, Young argues, even if those more constrained people 
are able to overcome various material and cultural obstacles, they cannot be 
considered equal to those who faced fewer hurdles. These structural inequalities 
become structural injustices when  
“the combined operations of actions in institutions put large 
categories of persons under a systemic threat of domination or 
deprivation of the means to develop and exercise their capacities, at 
the same time as they enable others to dominate or give them access 
to an abundance of resources. Structural injustice is a kind of moral 
wrong distinct from the wrongful action of an individual agent or the 
willfully repressive policies of a state. Structural injustice occurs as a 
consequence of many individuals and institutions acting in pursuit of 
their particular goals and interests within given institutional rules 
and accepted norms.” (Young, 2007, p. 170) 
These processes can be seen as structural injustices when people are constrained to 
such an extent that they are put under a threat of deprivation while other actors 
derive significant advantages from these processes. These advantages can be 
understood, for instance, as a better socioeconomic position that brings with it more 
options and opportunities for action, as well as concrete benefits in the form of 
financial gain or access to resources (Young, 2011). 
This conception of structure and structural injustice can help us better 
understand how food-related health problems could constitute structural injustices, 
while also allowing us to think about how the industry is connected to this.  
 
Vulnerability to health deprivation as a structural injustice 
These social constraints also come into play in the context of food-related health 
issues. Although the health situation of individuals might appear to be the sole result 
of preferences, personal decisions, or accidents, if we zoom out and consider the 
relations between these various individuals and other actors in society, a ‘net’ of both 
restricting and reinforcing relationships is revealed (cf. Young, 2011). To illustrate 
this, let us first consider the hypothetical cases of Andrew, Brenda, and Catherine. 
These individual cases are not about inequalities per se, but rather help us to think 
about how different people are living under different social circumstances and 
processes that can affect their health differently compared with other groups.  
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Case 1: Andrew 
Andrew is an eighteen-year-old community college student who lives in New 
Orleans. His combined family income is below the national poverty line. In order to 
support his family, Andrew has taken a part-time job at a fast-food restaurant, where 
he can eat for $2 a meal. Due to his long working hours and college obligations, 
Andrew is unable to exercise often. Given the high prices of both fresh vegetables 
and healthier products at the local supermarket, he often consumes instant 
breakfasts and ready-made meals. Andrew weighs over 300 pounds; he suffers from 
diabetes and has trouble walking long distances.  
 
Case 2: Brenda  
Brenda is a fifty-two-year-old gastronomic journalist from Amsterdam. She has 
master’s degrees in nutritional science and journalism and works at a leading food 
magazine. Her job allows her to rent a spacious apartment in the upper-class part of 
the city. Brenda can eat what and whenever she likes. She has every opportunity to 
exercise, but cares little about sports. At her yearly health checkup her physician 
informs her that her health situation is dire: her BMI is over 32, she has high levels 
of cholesterol and equally high blood pressure, and she is suffering from angina 
pectoris.  
 
Case 3: Catherine 
Catherine is thirty-two years old and lives with her partner and two sons in 
Stellenbosch, South Africa. Both Catherine and her partner work in education and 
have an average income. During her youth Catherine was overweight and had little 
interests in sport, and her parents cared little about a balanced diet. Nowadays, she 
frequently exercises and enjoys cooking healthy meals. While her family cannot 
afford to always buy products that are low in salt, sugar, and fat, she tries to bear in 
mind the nutritional value of the products she buys. Catherine has no noteworthy 
health problems.  
 
How personal choice is constrained by structure  
In the three cases above it is possible to highlight various elements of personal 
responsibility for health. Catherine seems to be the ideal responsible, healthy 
consumer. She is aware of the (un)healthy choices she is making, and even though 
she does not always have enough money to spend on healthy food or sports, she tries 
to make the best of it and her choices seem to pay off. In the cases of Andrew and 
Brenda, individual choices also play a part. Andrew could have gone running or 
cycling – which are relatively low-cost ways to exercise – or he could have refrained 
from eating at his workplace, while Brenda could have gone to the gym and could 
have chosen to cook healthier food or eaten at Amsterdam’s many healthy food 
restaurants. Hence, given that decisions to eat healthily and exercise ultimately 
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depend on a personal choice, it would be possible to argue that Andrew, Brenda, and 
Catherine are equally responsible for their personal health situation.  
Yet such a position ignores the social context in which people make these 
choices. It fails to take into account how socioeconomic circumstances can have a 
negative impact on healthy dietary habits and food choices: 1) a lack of financial 
means restricts the opportunities to buy healthy food or to go to the gym, 2) certain 
rural and urban areas have limited access to fresh food, 3) specific groups of 
consumers have insufficient knowledge of dietary guidelines, and 4) unhealthy living 
habits within specific social groups can make it hard for individuals within these 
groups to deviate from these practices (Jarvis & Wardle, 1999; Muff et al., 2010).  
Although the health differences between the three are partly based on 
individual preferences and choices (e.g., choosing to eat fast food every day, 
(dis)liking going for a run) or situations involving luck or accident (e.g., genetic 
disposition for coronary diseases), these differences are also shaped by the way social 
institutions operate, what rules and norms are dominant, and how the decisions of 
other individuals and societal actors affect the lives of the people around them.  
Within these social structures, Catherine has been able to make the best of 
it, making wise decisions and working hard to sustain a healthy lifestyle, while 
Brenda’s health situation – who, given her socioeconomic position, is arguably less 
constrained – is more attributable to her personal choices and preferences. Although 
Catherine, Brenda, and Andrew all operate within social structures that enable them 
to and disable them from engaging in certain actions, in comparison with Brenda 
and Catherine, Andrew’s possibilities for action are more restricted by social 
processes and circumstances. For instance, they are restricted by government 
policies (e.g., government subsidizing of unhealthy school lunches), by a market in 
which many food and beverage companies’ main focus is on economic performance 
– which stimulates ever-increasing food consumption – and by socially cultivated 
food habits and practices that shape the consumption patterns of specific groups 
(Airhihenbuwa et al., 1996). This is not to say that the less healthy are not responsible 
for their choices, but the case of Andrew illustrates that while all actors in the three 
cases have the capacity to make autonomous choices, his possibilities of making the 
‘healthier’ choice are more constrained than those of Brenda or Catherine.  
 
Group level analysis – different degrees of vulnerability to health deprivation   
When we zoom out to a higher level of analysis, it is revealed that the examples of 
Andrew, Brenda, and Catherine do not stand on their own, but exemplify various 
groups within society. In the light of Young’s work, the empirical studies on the 
social determinants of health (Mackenbach et al., 2016; Stronks et al., 1996) reveal 
that the health inequalities between socio-economic groups can be understood as 
structural inequalities. While all groups are in some way constrained by social 
structural processes, groups of people like Brenda and Catherine are socially 
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positioned in such a way that it is easier to make healthier choices, and engaging in 
healthier behavior comes more naturally; for groups of people like Andrew, it is 
much harder to opt for the healthier choice or mode of behavior.  
Hence, for the latter groups it is much harder to argue that their relative 
health position amounts to getting what they ‘deserve’ on the basis of their own 
choices. The combination of policies, individual actions, and institutional 
organization in the context of unhealthy food makes groups of people like Andrew 
more vulnerable to health deprivation in comparison with groups of people like 
Brenda and Catherine. The situation of people like Andrew ultimately amounts to 
structural injustice. This is not only so because, as they are being put under a 
permanent threat to health deprivation that makes them less able to exercise their 
capacities, in comparison with other groups. It is an issue of structural injustice 
because others are in fact better off due to these circumstances: either because they 
are simply less vulnerable to, for example, the abundance of unhealthy food options, 
or because, as in the case of food companies, they directly benefit from the 
possibilities to market and sell such foods. 
These considerations allow us to challenge the liberal assumption that food-
related public health issues can be seen as lifestyle diseases for which mainly the 
individual herself is responsible. At the same time, they also show clearly how 
structural injustice can be understood as a gradual concept, because the degree to 
which various groups are (made) vulnerable to structural health deprivation differs 
for each group. This illustrates the point we started this article with, namely that 
food-related public health problems can be seen as structural injustices. Now that 
we have established this we can explore how the industry is connected to these 
problems.  
 
The food and beverage industry’s connection to food-related public health 
issues  
The above findings have important implications for the food industry, as they 
provide grounds to argue that corporate actors are playing an important role in 
increasing the vulnerability to health deprivation of specific groups in society.  
We can make the distinction between more direct ways in which the industry 
is sustaining and aggravating health disparities and more intricate modes of 
operation that contribute to structural injustice. Examples of the former are the sales 
of products that evidently exceed the daily recommended intake of calories, salt, 
sugar, or fat in a single serving, the marketing of such products to children, and 
lobbying against public health regulation (Nestle, 2015; Stuckler & Nestle, 2012). By 
stalling governmental policies that aim to reduce the vulnerability to health 
deprivation of the population and engaging in business practices that hamper 
healthy consumption, the industry is contributing to structural health injustices.  
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Apart from these more explicit morally questionable actions, there are several 
other business practices that do not seem to be morally problematic on the surface 
but do impact the vulnerability to health deprivation of those in society who are 
worse off. For instance, consider the fact that the industry is prone to selling cheap, 
highly processed food products. Given that consumers like Andrew often experience 
a lack of control over their lives and have less money to spend, they are less likely to 
resist buying these products than people like Brenda or Catherine (cf. Marmot & 
Wilkinson, 1999). Or take into account that in many places in the world there are 
so-called food deserts, urban areas and neighborhoods in which food stores that 
offer healthier consumption options are largely absent (Hilmers, Hilmers, & Dave, 
2012). These neighborhoods are commonly inhabited by groups of people with a 
lower socioeconomic status, who often lack the time or the opportunity to travel to 
a different kind of venue in another neighborhood. Even if they could travel, the 
healthier option might simply be too expensive. Moreover, dominant marketing 
practices in the industry disproportionally affect the less well-off consumers. While 
businesses have marketing tools that allow them to promote particular products to 
specific groups, they are often hesitant to market healthier products to less well-off 
consumers as these groups are less likely to buy these products (Chandon & 
Wansink, 2012; personal communication leading food retailer). Ultimately, these 
practices sustain social norms and societal processes that contribute to the health 
deprivation of already marginalized groups in society, and thus contribute to a 
greater vulnerability to food-related diseases.  
Finally, the fact that many people are vulnerable to consuming unhealthy 
food too often and too much, ultimately benefits the companies that produce and 
sell those foods. It might be too simple to just hold the food industry responsible for 
how modern societies have developed into obesogenic environments, but one 
cannot deny that the industry is benefiting from this.  
In this section we have argued that food-related health deprivations should 
not be reduced to a matter of individual (consumer) choice and responsibility, but 
that these involve, what Iris Marion Young calls, structural injustices, in which 
actions and practices of different parties lead to societal circumstances that result in 
systematic deprivation for some and benefits to others. The food industry is one of 
several key actors in this, being connected both in terms of its causal contributions 
to unhealthy practices as well how it benefits from them. How should we evaluate 
this role from an ethical perspective? What are the implications for corporate 
responsibility?  
 
IV. Social connection to structural injustice: expanding the scope of 
corporate responsibility for health in the food industry 
In her work on responsibility for justice Young (2011) develops a theory of 
responsibility for dealing with instances of structural injustice. As these injustices 
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do not come about because of some actor’s intentional or unintentional violation of 
moral or legal rules – but are the result of many individuals, organizations, firms and 
institutions who are (mostly) acting within accepted rules and norms – Young argues 
that blame and fault are not the appropriate terms to understand this particular 
responsibility. She suggests we need a different, guiltless, concept of responsibility 
to think about what we should do in regard to unjust structures (Young, 2011). 
She sets this out in her social connection model of responsibility (Young, 2011). 
The social connection model holds that actors  
“bear responsibility for structural injustice because they contribute 
by their actions to outcomes that produce unjust outcomes. Our 
responsibility derives from belonging together with others in a 
system of interdependent processes of cooperation and competition 
through which we seek benefits and aim to realise projects.” (Young, 
2011, p. 105)  
The idea is that actors that operate in (global) unjust political, social, and economic 
processes have a shared responsibility by virtue of participating in these structures. 
Structural injustices are not caused by a single actor but by a multitude of actors, 
and as such responsibility does not befall one actor but rather to all actors that are 
participating in these structures whom are directly and indirectly connected to harm 
and injustice. All connected actors – e.g. governments, consumers, families, schools, 
NGOs and firms – share a guiltless responsibility to address these harms. Rather than 
looking back in order to blame specific actors, the social connection approach puts 
forth the question ‘Who are best placed to address these injustices?’ This allows for 
a more forward-looking approach to responsibility that puts working toward a 
solution to these problems at its center (cf. Young 2006, 2011).  
We hold this shared responsibility should not be understood as a zero-sum 
game. It is not the case that if one actor decides to discharge its responsibility, this 
could absolve other actors from taking their share of responsibility. There is no 
‘responsibility pie’ that is to be divided among all connected actors, where if one 
actor takes a large chunk of the pie, this automatically leaves less responsibility for 
the remaining actors. So, when for instance the national government launches a new 
public health program to counter obesity, this does not lower the degree of 
responsibility of individual consumers or corporate actors, nor does governmental 
responsibility shrink the moment the industry takes greater responsibility for public 
health (Verweij, 2014). Ultimately, this responsibility should be understood as a 
political responsibility, for it can only be discharged by engaging in collective action 
with other connected actors (Young, 2011) 
Taking responsibility and addressing injustice in our case focusses on how 
health deprivations and inequalities among social groups can be prevented and how 
the situation of those vulnerable to health deprivation can be mitigated and 
100
101 
 
improved. In the previous section we established how the food industry is connected 
to the rise of NCDs and corresponding structural injustices, and as such the 
argument could be made that – following the social connection model of 
responsibility – actors in the food and beverage industry have a political 
responsibility to address this (cf. Schrempf, 2014). 
While intuitively plausible, we hold that an important theoretical argument 
is missing, for Young does not clearly substantiate the claim that a connection to 
structural injustice also implies a responsibility to take action. In her work she briefly 
touches upon three kinds of connection, namely an existential connection, which 
exists by virtue of belonging together in a social system, a causal connection, which 
entails a mediated causal contribution to structural injustice, and a dependent 
connection, which refers to how our actions are dependent on other actors 
(McKeown, 2014; Young, 2011)5. When looking at the case of the food industry this 
means that firms have a responsibility to address structural injustices because a) 
they are part of a social system in which food-related structural injustices exist, b) 
through their products and business practices are an enabling cause for food-related 
health injustices, c) and in their actions they depend on other actors (e.g. suppliers, 
but also vulnerable consumer groups)  
However, several scholars point out that the normative relevance of these 
connections is underspecified. Merely pointing out connection does not provide a 
full-fledged normative argumentation why this would also entail a political 
responsibility to address structural injustices (cf. Barry & Ferracioli, 2013; Owen, 
2013; Reiman, 2012). So, for our case this means we need to assess what moral 
principles can substantiate and explain how connection to nutrition-related 
structural injustices can ground food companies’ responsibility to address these 
injustices.  
Apart from the unclear normative force of connection, there is the question 
of the scope of political responsibility and what taking this responsibility would 
mean in practice. Young points out that even though having a responsibility because 
of social connection is a shared responsibility, it is not an equal responsibility. Those 
who share responsibility should take action but have to decide what is realistic based 
on their social position in the system, taking into account their particular abilities, 
circumstances, and (accrued) advantages. While she does touch upon certain 
parameters to guide our reasoning regarding attributing responsibilities for 
structural injustices (e.g., power, privilege, interest, and collective ability), these 
parameters are not clearly defined, nor do they say anything about what this would 
entail in corporate practice (cf. Neuhäuser 2014; Owen 2013).  
Hence, in order to identify what kind of corporate action would be required 
of food firms to address these injustices, we first need to know what counts as a 
normative significant connection that would ‘generate’ a responsibility for structural 
justice. In the next subsections we expand on Young’s theory and clarify how the 
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social connections at hand imply moral obligations, and what these could mean for 
the food industry. 
 
Why social connection implies a corporate responsibility to address 
structural injustices  
We have argued that food companies are socially connected to the growing 
prevalence of non-communicable diseases that are especially dominant under 
socioeconomically more vulnerable groups. Young claims that such social 
connections imply a responsibility to respond to structural injustice. In order to 
answer the question what can be reasonably expected of food companies we first 
need to explore how their connections to health problems support a moral 
obligation to address such problems.  
A first moral ground arises as we emphasize how people are in fact deprived 
or at risk of becoming deprived of health. The appropriate response to suffering, for 
any actor that is interacting, living or operating in a moral community, is beneficence 
– to relieve or prevent suffering. This is a basic responsibility present in most – if not 
all ethical theories – from utilitarianism and Kantian deontology, to virtue ethics and 
existentialist theories of ethics (cf. Singer 1972; Levinas 1969; Gert 2004). We believe 
that the extent to which one has an obligation of beneficence largely depends on the 
extent of suffering and one’s possibilities to take it away or prevent it. When it comes 
to food-related health deprivations such a duty of benefice also befalls actors in the 
food industry, and arguably the food and beverage industry is more in a position to 
contribute to the prevention of these diseases rather than to find a cure.  
Yet, this remains a very general responsibility that is derived from being part 
of a system and operating in it. When we look more closely at the social connections 
between a food producer or retailer and possible health deprivations there is reason 
to see obligations of beneficence to be more specific. For example, it may be that 
certain vulnerable groups are depending for their nutrition on specific corporate 
agents – think of a discount supermarket in a food desert. This relation of 
dependency offers support for various moral concerns. Relations of dependency are 
often seen as creating special moral bonds that go beyond general beneficence, 
either because they involve a specific caring role (as in the case of parents towards 
their children) or because the depending party is particularly vulnerable to possible 
negative consequences of what the other does or does not do. Strong dependencies 
also create possibilities of exploitation or domination – and precautions to avoid 
such exploitation could be justified as a matter of non-maleficence and justice (cf. 
Valdman 2008; Young 1990) . 
The another normative consideration that would ground a political 
responsibility in the light of connection to structural injustice, is fairness. This is 
specifically relevant where actors (for example food companies) are also linked to 
structural injustice in the sense that they directly or indirectly benefit from those 
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circumstances. If many share responsibility for such circumstances to occur and 
sustain, and some are reaping benefits of the situation, it is fair to assume that those 
have a special responsibility to contribute to prevention or resolution of those 
problems (cf. Butt 2007; Meyers 2004; Miller 2012). Fairness would also be a ground 
for arguing that those who have a greater causal role in the structural injustice, also 
have a greater responsibility to respond to it.  
Upon establishing that social connection implies a responsibility to address 
these injustices, we can hold that firms have a responsibility to address structural 
health injustices. But the question remains: what would this imply for different 
actors in the food industry in their daily practices?  
 
Implications for the scope of corporate responsibility in the food and 
beverage industry  
We propose three criteria – capacity, benefit, and vulnerability – in order to answer 
three questions: 1) What can different companies do? 2) Which companies should 
do more?, and 3) Which consumer groups should be given priority? Rather than 
focusing on one set of actors (for instance the fast-food industry), taking into 
account these three criteria enables differentiation of degrees of responsibility 
among the actors in the industry (from the multinational food producer to the 
supermarket and the local food kiosk) and the type of actions that could be required 
of them.  
 
Capacity: what can different companies do?  
When determining the kind of responsibility an actor has, a relevant consideration 
is whether it has the ability to address specific injustices. Whether the actor is well 
placed to take responsibility depends on the specific set of capacities it has (Miller, 
2012). In the context of business, there are certain corporate capacities that are the 
most relevant regarding influencing and reducing the impact of food-related public 
health issues. Corporate capacity is a broad concept, but we can think of different 
elements, such as financial performance, company size, and market position, and 
the type of business involved, to help determine the capacity of a corporate actor to 
affect structural health deprivation.  
The first element that is central to determining the capacity of the firm is the 
company’s financial performance. Because firms have an economic responsibility 
that they have to meet, next to their social responsibilities, corporate actors will 
always have to find a balance between having responsibility for the survival of the 
company and having a responsibility to society (Steinmann & Löhr, 1996). When a 
company is facing losses and is struggling to survive in the market, it will become 
harder to take some social responsibility than when it is making substantial profits. 
This does not mean that social considerations should fully fade into the background; 
one would always wonder, for instance, to what extent it is essential for the survival 
103
Ch
ap
te
r 5
104 
 
of the firm to pay the CEO over $14 million a year or to hire a famous film star to 
promote its product; the same money could be diverted to societal goals. 
Nevertheless, in general it can be argued that the greater the revenues and profit of 
a company, the more likely it is that it will be able to divert money to addressing 
situations of health deprivation the company is connected to.  
Related to this are the market position and the size of the company. The 
market position of the company codetermines the extent to which it is constrained 
when taking action. It might be easier for the market leaders in the food and 
beverage industry (e.g., Unilever, Nestlé, Heinz, Mondelēz, or PepsiCo) to develop 
pro-health activities and engage in more risky market behavior (introducing new, 
healthier products, changing certain popular, unhealthy products) than smaller 
companies that have recently entered the market, which face higher start-up costs 
and greater economic risks. Consider, for instance, Ahold Delhaize, which occupies 
a leading position in the global retail market. Combining the high financial 
performance of the firm with the fact that it has many stores spread over three 
continents creates room to experiment with the sales of new, healthier food products 
and to try out novel marketing and nudging strategies to reduce the risks of health 
deprivation. Furthermore, the market frontrunners have the capacity to realize 
societal change, as they can urge public and private actors to take collective action. 
They can take the lead in shaping the discourse on public and private food and 
health governance, for instance by creating sector-wide (public)-private cooperation 
on healthy food (similar to the creation of the Forest Stewardship Council and the 
Round Table for Sustainable Palm Oil) or even by lobbying the government and 
supranational organizations for stronger health regulations (rather than lobbying 
against it).  
Finally, the type of business is relevant in determining the capacity of a firm 
to take responsibility. The specific kind of skills and tools of a particular firm largely 
determines what it can do to remedy health deprivation. It therefore makes sense 
that food producers mainly focus on the product level, such as the reformulation of 
existing products (e.g., improving nutritional value, increasing satiety, decreasing 
energy availability), the development of new healthy products, and enhancing 
transparency concerning the nutritional value of certain products (e.g., labeling, 
front-of-pack nutrition information). Other types of businesses, such as kiosks, 
cafeterias, and supermarkets are better placed to take responsibility by steering 
consumer behavior (e.g., experimenting with nudging, developing more responsible 
marketing practices). The top food multinationals can take action at multiple levels 
– marketing and the development of products, for example – but can also conduct 
long-term research on the effect of their products, develop new marketing strategies, 
and monitor consumer behavior as well as foster private and public-private 
cooperation to reduce vulnerability to health deprivation (Astrup, Bovy, 
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Nackenhorst, & Popova, 2006; Tempels, Verweij, et al., 2017) .   
 
Benefit: which companies should do more? 
As pointed out in the previous section, structural injustice is not only a matter of the 
presence of inequalities in the social position of groups; it also involves how other 
actors benefit from the dire situation others are in. In the context of health 
deprivation, groups of persons might not necessarily reap financial benefits from the 
health deprivation of other groups in society, yet many corporate actors in the food 
and beverage industry do. As Miller (2012) and Butt (2007) point out, benefitting 
from such injustices creates a responsibility to address these injustices.  
 Given that we are trying to determine which companies could do more, it 
makes sense to assess the extent to which specific firms are benefitting from these 
injustices. It would be a simplification of reality to merely assess the revenues of each 
food and beverage company, as firms offer different products and employ different 
strategies to promote their products. We argue that firms that mainly sell unhealthy 
products are more likely to derive the majority of their revenue from structurally 
disadvantaged consumer groups, in comparison with firms that have a healthier or 
more balanced product portfolio, as people from lower socioeconomic groups are 
more likely to consume cheap, unhealthy food and beverage products (cf. Whittle et 
al. 2015).  
The kind of product market a company is deriving its revenues from therefore 
becomes relevant. It matters whether a company is mainly selling fries fried in lard 
or sugar-laden energy drinks, or whether it is producing seaweed burgers or snacks 
that are low on salt, sugar, and fat. Although there are firms that produce only one 
type of unhealthy products, there are also many companies that offer a wide variety 
of products – some of which are more likely to have a negative impact on health than 
others. In order to say something about the degree to which these firms benefit from 
structural health injustice, it is relevant to assess the product portfolio of these firms, 
the way in which these products find their way to the market, and to whom they are 
being sold.  
Companies should assess a) to what extent they are selling unhealthy 
products, b) to what extent these types of products make up a large part of their 
product catalogue, c) whether the sale of these products is being actively promoted, 
and d) to what extent these products are specifically consumed by more vulnerable 
groups. The more a company is selling and promoting the sale of products that have 
a greater potency in terms of contributing to the health deprivation of groups that 
are already vulnerable, the greater the likelihood that the company is benefitting 
from injustice. This illustrates that benefitting from the vulnerable creates a stronger 
responsibility to take action, and the vulnerable need to be prioritized when this 
action is taken, as we will discuss next.   
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Vulnerability: which consumer groups should be given priority?  
Taking the criterion of vulnerability into account means that a firm’s responsibility 
for food-related public health issues is more stringent at the moment it is dealing 
with consumer groups that are more constrained due to their lower socioeconomic 
status. In line with the argument about benefitting, it is also the case that if a 
company’s revenues are mainly derived from products sold to those groups that are 
vulnerable to health deprivation, this gives the company stronger reasons to 
contribute to strengthening the health situation of these groups.  
Note that this does not imply that firms would have to engage in group-
specific paternalistic behavior, such as taking away Andrew’s soda, while allowing 
the wealthier, like Brenda and Catherine, to keep drinking their equally sugar-laden 
drinks. To understand what taking into account this vulnerability to health 
deprivation does entail, let us consider the case of the fictional food multinational 
‘Food Giant.’ The Food Giant is aware of socioeconomic health differences between 
its consumer groups and aims to effectuate its responsibility for health by developing 
new policies and practices to address the food-related health diseases its consumers 
are dealing with. Given that the firm’s CSR possibilities are always constrained by 
economic considerations, the criterion of vulnerability can help prioritize the 
various options the company has regarding taking responsibility for health. 
Corporate policies that aim to improve public health should in the first place target 
those groups that are most vulnerable to health deprivation. This could, for example, 
mean that Food Giant would 1) start healthy innovation on products that are 
generally bought by people in groups like Andrew’s, 2) give coupons for healthier 
food products to people who receive social benefits, 3) prioritize sponsoring sport 
activities in neighborhoods where people with a lower socioeconomic status live, 
and 4) start experimenting with pro-health nudging and pro-health marketing in 
these neighborhoods.6  
Now, one could argue that the most effective solution might be to limit the 
sales of unhealthy products in neighborhoods with high concentrations of 
consumers with a lower socioeconomic status in general, or simply to limit the sales 
of these products in particular. However, we hold that such approaches would 
disproportionally and negatively affect consumer equality as well as leave little room 
for consumer preference. In order to avoid possible corporate paternalism, the 
strategies discussed above create a more positive, equal, and inclusive approach to 
corporate responsibility for health. They take into account the vulnerability of 
certain groups but also reward people like Andrew with a healthier product rather 
than punishing them by removing choice.  
The brief elaboration of these criteria reveals how corporate responsibility for 
food-related public health issues can take shape. The above examples are not all-
encompassing, but they can help guide our intuition concerning which actors in the 
food industry can do what, which of them should do more, and which consumer 
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groups should be given priority. In what way this can viably take shape in daily 
corporate practice should be further explored in empirical research, but this 
exploration reveals what the pathways for taking corporate responsibility for food-
related public health issues could look like.  
 
V. Theoretical and practical implications  
The above discussions show how taking into account structural injustices has 
important implications for our understanding of corporate responsibility. Our 
approach expands the notion of corporate responsibility: we point out how 
corporate responsibility should go beyond living up the law and adhering to 
principles of ordinary morality such as non-maleficence and respect for (consumer) 
autonomy by showing how firms also have a forward-looking political responsibility 
for the structural injustices that arise out of the social processes in the global system 
in which they operate. 
Political responsibility for justice complements the basic moral and legal 
responsibilities of corporate actors. All corporate actors that are connected to 
nutrition-related structural injustices – implying both the fully law-abiding 
supermarket chain, as well as a blameworthy fast-food company – have to take 
action to change the social structures that facilitate and perpetuate structural health 
deprivation. This means that this political responsibility might be conceived as a 
virtue, as it requires firms to assess what operating as a responsible actor in the 
global system entails and how they can practice this while balancing other moral 
considerations (cf. McKeown 2014). This makes discharging this responsibility actor 
specific and more open-ended. Note that taking political responsibility can involve 
supporting stricter legal regulation (for instance companies lobbying governments 
for stricter food safety laws). This could put certain undesirable business practices 
within a legal framework, allowing these food practices to be more strictly controlled 
though governmental rule-setting and regulation.  
This conceptualization of political responsibility is not only relevant for the 
food industry, it also applies to responsibilities that firms have for other structural 
problems, such as the structural harms of gun violence or the exploitation of 
minorities in marketing campaigns (Brenkert, 1998, 2000). 
While social connection to structural injustice implies an ongoing 
responsibility to contribute to a more just society, the criteria of vulnerability, 
benefit, and capacity help to focus CSR practices in specific sectors and contexts. 
Even though in a globalized business environment firms are connected to many 
instances of injustice, it is possible to assess what particular injustices firms have a 
closer connection to. For instance, although it is morally laudable that Coca-Cola 
focusses part of its CSR actions on the dire labor conditions of construction workers 
in Dubai (Vara, 2014), it might be more appropriate to focus on the negative impacts 
its own products and core business activities have on global public health. In a 
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similar fashion, the connection between a supermarket and health deprivation is 
more stringent when it is operating in a food desert with vulnerable low-income 
residents (making it more likely that the supermarket will benefit from the health 
deprivation of its consumers) compared to when this same firm is operating in a 
healthy and wealthy neighborhood. In addition, depending on the capacities and 
position of their firm in the market, every entrepreneur, CSR manager, or CEO can 
make an assessment of what kind of actions would be more suitable. A local 
entrepreneur can assess whether it is possible to switch to healthier products, while 
the CEO of a large food multinational can take the lead in lobbying against child 
marketing.  
These criteria can also be applied to different kinds of industries, such as the 
garment industry or the weapons industry. In the case of the latter, it might be 
morally laudable if these firms funded public playgrounds, but given their social 
connection to gun violence, it might be more fitting to see how changes in the 
design, advertising, and distribution of their core product can curb this impact 
(Brenkert, 2000).  
 
VI. Conclusion 
The responsibility of the food and beverage industry for the rise of 
noncommunicable diseases remains a controversial topic. Yet by drawing on the 
work of Iris Marion Young, we show that corporate actors in the food and beverage 
industry have a responsibility to address the structural injustices in food-related 
NCDs, and we provide additional criteria to help clarify the scope and content of 
corporate action regarding public health for different corporate actors in the sector.  
This article has three key contributions. First, we show that the unequal 
distribution of food-related public health problems among social groups in society 
can be understood as a structural injustice. We explain how groups with a lower 
socioeconomic status can be structurally constrained concerning their opportunities 
to make healthy decisions, which makes them more vulnerable to health deprivation 
in the form of food-related diseases in comparison with groups in the upper strata 
of society. Structural injustice is a gradual concept, depending on the extent to which 
different groups of people are more or less vulnerable to deprivation. Food-related 
public health problems are a structural injustice for those groups that are most 
limited in their actions opportunities, but other social groups may well be free from 
such constraints.  
Second, our study contributes to the debate on the grounds and scope of 
corporate responsibility by showing how corporations can also have guiltless 
political responsibility for structural injustices. Furthermore, the criteria of capacity, 
benefit, and vulnerability provide guidance regarding what taking this responsibility 
can involve for different types of firms working with different consumer groups. 
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These criteria are not only useful when talking about public health issues, but can 
also help to guide corporate action in other situations involving structural injustice 
(e.g., sweatshop labor and racial and gender discrimination).  
Finally, this study contributes to connecting the debates on business ethics 
and public health ethics by providing a justification why corporate actors in the food 
and beverage industry have a broader positive responsibility for addressing food-
related public health issues. We show how the food and beverage industry through 
its business activities is sustaining and enhancing the vulnerability to health 
deprivation of specific groups in society. Taking responsibility for food-related 
public health issues should ideally take into account to what extent a company is 
dealing with consumer groups that are more structurally constrained. This has 
implications for CSR programs in the food and beverage sector, as it can be seen as 
a call for more tailor-made approaches that are specific to the context a company is 
operating in and the kind of consumers it is dealing with.  
The food and beverage industry plays a role in structural health injustices and 
this expands the scope of corporate responsibility for health, beyond merely living 
up the law and adhering to basic moral principles such as non-maleficence and 
respect for consumer autonomy. In practice this means food firms have a 
responsibility to go beyond providing information on a healthy lifestyle and 
providing healthy food options. Justly and earnestly engaging in corporate 
responsibility for health entails that businesses should work toward limiting their 
impact on the health deprivation of vulnerable groups in society and – together with 
governments, IGOs, NGOs, and consumers – should work toward remedying food-
related public health issues. 
 
Notes  
1. We assess the responsibility of corporate actors in the food and beverage 
industry, but the terms ‘food industry’ and ‘food and beverage industry’ will 
be used interchangeably.   
 
2. In this article we focus specifically on public health issues that are often 
associated with food and beverage consumption (e.g., noncommunicable 
diseases such as type 2 diabetes, obesity, and heart failure). Henceforth we 
will refer to these as food-related public health issues.  
 
3. In reference to Barnhill et al. (2014) we make a distinction between unsafe 
and unhealthy foods products. Unhealthy food products significantly increase 
the risk of food-related health harms (non-communicable diseases), but do 
not pose an immediate harm to health, and whose risk-attributing 
components are food substances (e.g., salt, sugar, fat). This can be contrasted 
with unsafe food products, namely foods that poses a risk of direct harm 
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(poisonous foods), poses a risk of harm at any level of consumption (disease-
carrying food) or where the risk is induced through non-food substances (e.g. 
foods containing mercury) (Barnhill et al., 2014, pp. 192–193).  
 
4. The notion of strict liability is not uncontroversial in moral philosophy 
(Couto, 2018; Duff, 2009; Gardner, 2005; Kramer, 2005). In her discussion of 
the notion of strict liability Couto points out that while it is tolerated in tort, 
there is a lot of philosophical opposition to the notion as it “attributes 
remedial duties to agents on the mere ground that they played a causal role 
in bringing up a certain state of affairs, irrespective of fault. This […] goes 
against goes against some deeply entrenched views in moral philosophy” 
(Couto, 2018, p. 2174).  
 
5. While it might be worthwhile to explore Young’s different and sometimes 
conflicting understandings of connection in more detail, it goes beyond the 
scope this particular article. For a more elaborate exploration of Young’s 
different understandings of existential, causal and dependent connection and 
their conceptual (in)compatibility see McKeown (2014).   
 
6. There is ample discussion on the possible problematic aspects of nudging in 
regard to autonomy and freedom of choice in the public sector (Grüne-
Yanoff, 2012; Sunstein, 2014), but whether this is problematic within the 
context of the private sector has yet to be explored. Although this topic 
requires further reflection, it goes beyond the scope of this particular article. 
  
110
111 
 
  
111
Ch
ap
te
r 5
112 
 
 
  
113 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
chapter 6
Discussion 
and 
conclusions
114 
 
  
114
115 
 
Chapter 6 Discussion and conclusions  
 
This last chapter brings together the main findings from the different chapters of 
this dissertation. It briefly recaps the central research questions and research goals, 
which is followed by a summary of the central findings of each chapter. After 
providing an answer to the central research questions the implications of this 
research are discussed. I discuss the theoretical contributions of this dissertation, 
reflect on broader questions that this thesis raises, provide directions for future 
research and make several practical recommendations for firms in the food and 
beverage industry. This chapter concludes with some final remarks.  
 
I. A recap of the research goals and research questions  
In the introduction of this thesis I made clear how the responsibility of food and 
beverage companies for food-related health harms such as obesity and type 2 
diabetes is essentially contested. By setting out the debates that are currently taking 
place in public health ethics and business ethics, it is made clear that the 
responsibilities of firms, governments, individuals and other societal actors for food-
related health problems seem to be intertwined. This in turn provides reasons to 
rethink the responsibilities food firms have for the health problems that flow from 
the consumption of unhealthy food and beverage products. This paved the way to 
the central research questions of this dissertation, namely: what are the moral 
grounds for companies in the food and beverage industry to address food-related 
public health problems? And the derivative more practical question: what could 
taking responsibility for food-related public health problems in the context of the food 
and beverage industry look like?  
 
On the basis of these overarching research questions four research goals were 
formulated:  
 
1. To clarify whether and why firms have a wider social and political 
responsibility for the common good.  
2. To explore the possibility of corporate responsibility for public health 
within the context of the food and beverage industry.   
3. To identify under what conditions the sales and marketing of unhealthy 
food and beverage products is irresponsible. 
4. To identify the possible injustices involved in food-related public health 
problems and assess whether food and beverage firms have a 
responsibility for this.  
 
Every chapter of the thesis addressed one of these goals. The section below briefly 
recaps the central findings of each chapter.  
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II. Summary of findings  
The first goal was to explore whether and why firms would have wider social and 
political responsibilities for the common good. To do so, chapter 2 explored the 
notion of political responsibility within the context of the debate in business ethics 
on corporate citizenship. In this debate it is held that firms not only have economic 
responsibilities, but also have wider social and political responsibilities. Two 
different approaches to corporate political responsibility are discussed, namely the 
political corporate social responsibility approach (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Scherer et 
al., 2006) and the subsidiarity approach (Assländer & Curbach, 2014, 2017). The 
chapter highlights various problems in both approaches and makes clear how the 
work of political philosopher Iris Marion Young on responsibility for justice can 
provide a novel perspective on what political responsibility entails for firms (Young, 
2011). Drawing on the work of Young it is argued how political responsibility can be 
seen as a shared responsibility to tackle societal problems – specifically structural 
injustices – and how this responsibility holds for both governmental actors and 
corporate actors.  
Chapter 3 discusses how responsibility for public health can be understood 
within the context of the food and beverage industry. It argued that many food firms 
are engaging in morally ambivalent behavior as they engage in various activities that 
negatively impact public health, while simultaneously taking action to remedy food-
related public health problems. On the basis of the work of Verweij (2014), Schermpf 
(2014) and Young (2011) it is put forth that public health should be reconceptualized 
as a shared responsibility. This perspective provides a forward-looking approach to 
responsibility for public health and creates room to reflect upon what corporate 
responsibility for food-related public health problems might entail.  
In chapter 4 the conditions under which the sales and marketing of unhealthy 
food products is irresponsible are identified. The notion of ordinary morality is used 
as a starting point for this reflection. On the basis of this normative framework firms 
have the responsibility to respect consumer autonomy and adhere to the principle 
of non-maleficence (cf. Gert 2004; Hsieh 2017). On the assumption that unhealthy 
food and beverage products are not necessarily harmful, it is argued that the core 
moral concerns in the sales of unhealthy products lies with the problem of 
manipulation in marketing and sales. To what extent this is problematic depends on 
whether consumers are expecting potential manipulation, the degree of 
manipulation and whether the product is likely to have a negative impact on health. 
Subsequently recommendations are made with regard to what firms could do to 
prevent the possible manipulation of consumers into unhealthy consumption, 
namely a) not marketing unhealthy food and beverage products to children and b) 
be more prudent in marketing unhealthy products to adults.  
Chapter 5 addresses corporate responsibility for the injustices in food-related 
public health problems. It is analyzed how food-related health problems can be 
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understood as structural injustices, and it is illustrated how through their economic 
and political activities food firms are sustaining and reinforcing these problems (cf. 
Young 2001, 2011). This creates a social connection that provides the basis for a 
political responsibility to address these injustices. Three criteria (capacity, benefit 
and vulnerability) are introduced to guide what taking corporate responsibility for 
food-related public health problems can entail. In doing so, the chapter provides a 
new theoretical lens to assess what taking responsibility for these kinds of problems 
might entail for various corporate actors in the food and beverage industry.  
 
III. Main conclusions  
By meeting the four research goals of this thesis it now becomes possible to answer 
the central research question: what are the moral grounds for companies in the food 
and beverage industry to address food-related public health problems? On the basis of 
the above chapters it can be concluded that corporate responsibility for food-related 
public health problems can be grounded in two ways. 
Firstly, food firms have several responsibilities that spring from the notion of 
ordinary morality. Within a market setting there are two moral principles that stand 
out as ones that need to be foremost adhered to. Firms have the responsibility not 
to unduly harm others and live up to the principle of non-maleficence, while 
simultaneously having the responsibility to respect their autonomy (cf. Gert 2004; 
Hsieh 2017).  
Secondly, it is made clear how considerations of justice are also a ground on 
which corporate responsibility for food-related health harms can be based. On the 
basis of Young (2011) it is put forth how food-related health problems can be 
conceived as structural injustices. Food-related health harms disproportionally 
affect the less well-off groups in society, and food and beverage firms play a part in 
creating and sustaining these injustices. Due to this social connection firms have a 
political responsibility to address these injustices.  
On these bases it can be concluded that corporate responsibility for 
companies in the food and beverage industry to address food-related health 
problems is grounded in considerations of non-maleficence, respect for autonomy 
and justice.  
  
These findings help to answer  the second research question: what could taking 
responsibility for food-related health problems in the context of the food and beverage 
industry look like? Living up to the standards of ordinary morality means that food 
firms are to refrain from marketing unhealthy food products to children and should 
reconsider the sales and marketing of unhealthy products to adults. It provides 
guidance on what kind of activities firms should no longer engage in. In addition, 
the responsibilities that flow from social connection involve more than refraining 
from certain actions, they also include positive action. Taking this responsibility can 
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take shape through activities within the market such as innovation of healthy food 
and beverage products and pro-health marketing, but also through (political) CSR 
activities such as sponsoring of sports events, cooperating in public-private 
partnerships for health, or lobbying in favour of governmental regulation that would 
address market failures that negatively impact public health. While this overview is 
by no means exhaustive, it provides first suggestions of what taking responsibility 
for food-related health problems could entail in daily corporate practice. 
  
IV. Theoretical contributions 
The findings in this thesis contribute to both the theoretical fields of public health 
ethics and business ethics. In this section I will briefly discuss how this dissertation 
helps expand and deepen these philosophical debates.   
 
Contributions to public health ethics  
The theoretical starting point of this thesis was the suggestion of Verweij (2014) that 
responsibility for public health could be understood as (forward-looking) shared 
responsibility. This means that different societal actors (individuals, governments, 
public and private organisations) have different compelling ethical reasons to 
promote and protect health (cf. Verweij 2014; Verweij & Dawson 2019). Yet, as 
pointed out in chapter 1, it remained unclear on the basis of what normative 
considerations it could be argued that firms would also share in this responsibility 
for health, nor was it clear and what taking this responsibility could consist of in a 
market context.  
By exploring the moral grounds for corporate responsibility for food-related 
health harms this thesis has been able to show that the idea of shared responsibility 
for public health can hold sway. The elucidation of the food industry’s impact on 
structural injustices in food-related health harms and the subsequent discussion of 
social connection and political responsibility in chapter 5, particularly strengthens 
the theoretical idea that multiple actors can share responsibility for public health.  
These findings not only expand the idea of Verweij (2014), but it also allows 
the debate in public health ethics to move beyond the dichotomy of individual 
responsibility for health – as often propagated by libertarian scholars – and 
governmental responsibility for public health – which is often stressed by public 
health scholars (cf. Epstein, 2004; Marks, 2017; Rothstein, 2002; Stuckler et al., 2012). 
This thesis makes an important step in exploring what shared responsibility for 
public health can entail in the context of the food and beverage industry. The 
theoretical body developed in chapter 5 can also be used to explore other public 
health problems and assess whether and how different kinds of industries and 
corporate actors are connected to them. One can for instance think of the social 
connection of firearm manufactures to gun violence or how the pharmaceutical 
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industry is connected to health problems that occur due to the unavailability of 
certain medicine (cf. Brenkert, 2000; Feldman & Frondorf, 2017).   
 
Moreover, this dissertation creates room for a more nuanced reading of the role the 
food and beverage industry can and should play in countering the global obesity 
epidemic and the rise of other NCDs. As pointed out in the introduction, critical 
public health scholars put forth two particular positions in the debate on ‘Big Food’ 
and ‘Big Soda’, namely that i) firms only take serious their economic responsibilities 
and ii) that firms are engaging in morally blameworthy behaviour when they are 
selling products that are unhealthy and potentially harmful.  
 This thesis shows how both the empirical and the normative picture is more 
nuanced. In chapter 2 and 3 it made clear that firms are in fact engaging in several 
initiatives that contribute to the common good, and seek to improve public health 
in particular. In addition chapter 4 shows that the assumption that selling unhealthy 
products is morally problematic does not do justice to the complexity of the debate 
in business ethics on the sales of potentially harmful products and the tensions with 
consumer sovereignty.  
However, this does not mean that these critical public health scholars do not 
raise an important point. They do. Many firms are engaging in dubious moral 
behaviour and have a negative impact on public health. But, to make a convincing 
argument for both governments and firms, it is important to make explicit what their 
obligations are. It needs to be clear when companies fail to do what they should do, 
or in fact do what they actually should refrain from doing. And that is what this 
thesis has specified. In chapter 4 and chapter 5 it becomes clear that food and 
beverage firms need to respect consumer autonomy, not manipulate people into 
unhealthy consumption, and have a forward-looking responsibility to address 
structural health injustices. Critical public health scholars can make use of these 
normative arguments to appeal to firms, show possible pathways to take 
responsibility, and – when firms do not act – turn to governments to demand stricter 
regulation. 
Furthermore, by unveiling what moral principles are at stake when food firms 
affect public health, this thesis not only offers normative guidelines for firms, but 
can also provide guidance on when governmental intervention and regulation of the 
industry might be desirable. While firms can make considerable efforts to combat 
food-related health harms, there are developments that have a negative impact on 
public health that cannot be addressed by firms alone, as all companies are 
confronted with the constraints and dynamics of the market environment, such as 
competition and the occurrence of business opportunities.  
For even though individual companies can innovate and develop more 
healthy food products, that does not stop other firms from entering the market who 
see a business opportunity in the sales of cheaper and possibly more attractive 
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unhealthier versions of those products. When competitors are free to put tasty yet 
unhealthier products on the market, or branch out into neighbourhoods that are 
turning into food deserts, this creates a competitive disadvantage for the ethical 
front-runners in the industry and ultimately undermines their contribution to 
public health (cf. Iacobucci 2016; Morrison 2019). Government regulation may 
therefore be necessary to enable firms to take their responsibility, e.g. by creating 
industry-wide level-playing fields, by providing regulation on how much salt, sugar 
and fat certain products may contain, by introducing mandatory front-of-pack 
nutrition labels, and by regulating the number of fast food outlets in specific areas. 
Hence, showing what might be reasonably expected of firms in dealing with 
food-related public health harms, also reveals the limits of corporate responsibility, 
and highlights the necessity for government intervention to promote and protect 
corporate responsibility.   
  
Contributions to business ethics  
Apart from the contributions to the debates in public health ethics this thesis also 
provides new insights in the field of business ethics. 
 
In the first place this dissertation contributes to the debates in business ethics, as, 
to the best of my knowledge, this is one the first attempts to provide a 
comprehensive philosophical investigation of what corporate responsibility for 
health can entail in the food and beverage industry. As made clear in chapter 1 there 
is an ongoing discussion on CSR in the food industry, yet the majority of these 
studies are predominantly empirical and focus on issues such as different kinds of 
CSR practices in the food industry, how corporate responsibility strategies are 
communicated, and consumer perception of CSR (Hartmann, 2011; Iivonen, 2017; 
Souza-Monteiro & Hooker, 2017). This thesis provides a deeper understanding of 
corporate responsibility in the food industry by assessing the normative reasons why 
firms should engage in CSR. It lays bare the moral arguments why food firms have 
to be concerned with their impact on public health, while simultaneously pointing 
out what are possible pathways to do this. In doing so, it can help food and beverage 
firms that sell unhealthy products to deal with the paradoxical tension between their 
social goals and their core business, and find ways to address the moral ambivalence 
in their behaviour.  
 
Secondly, the theoretical contributions in this thesis are not only of importance for 
reflection on the responsibilities of the food industry for health. They can also 
provide new perspectives on what corporate responsibility and irresponsibility can 
entail in different sectors.  
Chapter 4 for instance argues that the principles of ordinary morality have 
clear moral implications for firms that operate within the market. Economic 
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considerations do not trump these basic moral requirements. This has implications 
not only for how food firms ought to operate, but for all firms operating in the 
market. For example, the analysis of manipulation in marketing and advertising can 
also be relevant in other sectors where different kind of products are sold. It provides 
a basis for analyzing the ethics of advergaming, online marketing, and marketing to 
children in any market context (cf. Brenkert 2008; Crisp 1987; Moraes and 
Michaelidou 2017). 
 
Thirdly, this thesis also provides new insights into how political corporate 
responsibility can be understood and how this responsibility relates to structural 
injustices. In the debate on political CSR the normative considerations seem to have 
been pushed to the background. Reference is made to the work of Iris Marion Young 
when talking about social connection responsibility, yet the nature of why firms 
would have a responsibility to address societal problems in the first place remained 
unclear (see chapter 2). 
In chapter 2 and chapter 5 it is shown that many societal problems do not 
‘just’ randomly occur. There are specific problems that come to be, due to the 
intentional and unintentional actions of multiple actors operating in one global 
social structure. In reference to the work of Young I show how food-related health 
harms can be understood as structural injustices. These situations of structural 
injustice are not brute bad luck, as they are most often constructed by the actions 
and interactions of a plurality of actors, who consequently shared a political 
responsibility to address these issues.  
While this thesis has pointed out how connection to the injustices in food-
related health harms offers grounds for a political responsibility for food and 
beverage firms, there are several other societal problems that may well be 
understood in terms of structural injustice. Global labour exploitation, 
discrimination and some of the social effects of climate change are just a couple of 
the problems that could be assessed through this lens (Eckersley, 2016; Hayward, 
2017; Young, 2011).  
The discourse on structural injustice and social connection thus provides a 
new lens by which we can reassess corporate responsibility for mitigating or 
preventing various kinds of social ills. The theoretical approach put forth in this 
thesis brings together the debates on business ethics and political philosophy and in 
doing so allows us to further conceptualize the notion of political responsibility in 
different corporate contexts. The normative framework provided in this thesis can 
serve as a stepping stone for reflection upon corporate responsibility for other 
situations of harm and injustice.   
 
Finally, the findings in this dissertation contribute to the debate on the scope of 
corporate responsibility. As pointed out in chapter 1, the question whether and to 
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what extent firms have a responsibility to address harm and injustice is something 
that is at the heart of the debate in business ethics.  
As mentioned in the previous section, social connection to structural 
injustices can ground the responsibility for firms to address these injustices. Yet, in 
addition to showing that firms have this responsibility, I also argue that corporate 
responsibility for injustices as well as situations of harm can differ per firm. This 
thesis puts forth that considerations like benefit, capacity, and vulnerability of the 
groups one is dealing with, are relevant in determining which actor is better (or best) 
placed to address a particular problem. Furthermore, in chapter 2 it is made clear 
that the scope of corporate political responsibility has certain limits, as it does not 
require firms to take up the role of the state. While taking political responsibility 
requires firms to push governments to remedy injustice and further the creation of 
such public institutions when they do not exist, it does not require firms to actually 
take over the role of the state. Coercive actions that are necessary to ensure freedom 
and fairness remain a central governmental responsibility.  
This still raises questions in situations where an overarching public authority 
is absent, like when dealing with global governance issues or when a company is 
operating in a failed state. In these cases it falls within the scope of the responsibility 
of corporate actors to see to it these public institutions come to be. But in the 
construction of this public authority, how is legitimacy assured? It seems that in 
these cases the issue of democratic legitimation that is raised by scholars of political 
CSR is still pressing. Notwithstanding these remaining questions, this thesis has 
gone some way towards enhancing our understanding of what political 
responsibility can entail for corporate actors, thereby furthering the debate on 
political corporate responsibility in global governance (Djelic & Etchanchu, 2017; 
Eberlein, 2019; Scherer et al., 2016; Schneider & Scherer, 2019). 
 
V. Discussion of assumptions and limitations; recommendations 
for future research  
While this thesis provides answers to the central research questions, several issues 
remain unaddressed. This section provides some broader insights on related 
questions that spring from the various topics addressed in this thesis, it highlights 
some omissions, and, on the basis of this, makes recommendations for future 
research.  
 
The value of (un)healthy food  
While this dissertation discusses the impact of unhealthy food, it does not fully deal 
with the ambiguity in food science on what can be understood as healthy and 
unhealthy food. There is considerable discussion among food scientists on what 
products or ingredients are seen as healthy and unhealthy. Ultimately one can 
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question whether there is such a thing as an unhealthy food product – it is the dose, 
or better: a person’s diet, that determines what is or what is not healthy. Yet even 
though the distinction between healthy and unhealthy foods is not clear-cut it is still 
possible to appeal to common knowledge or to nutrition science as a basis for 
deeming certain products – e.g. products that contain a relatively high level of sugar, 
fat or salt – to be unhealthy. A further complication might be that nutrition science 
is dynamic and that, what was once considered healthy and necessary for optimal 
human functioning, is now considered one of the causes of the obesity epidemic. 
Uncertainties about claims in nutrition science might make it harder to assess 
whether firms are engaging in behavior that can be seen as irresponsible. How firms 
should deal with uncertainties and changes in scientific knowledge, how these 
potential risks might be anticipated, and what this implies for corporate 
responsibility is something that deserves to be investigated in more detail.  
Furthermore, this thesis does not take into account the possible value of 
unhealthy eating. In this dissertation it has become clear that if we treasure our 
health, which – arguably – most people do, then diseases that spring from unhealthy 
eating can be problematic and need to be addressed. Yet, as pointed out in chapter 
4, unhealthy eating might not necessarily be directly harmful. And even if it is 
harmful to health, that does not mean it cannot be of value to our lives. We might 
simply enjoy the taste of candy corn Oreos, treasure a specific unhealthy apple pie 
recipe because it belonged to our late grandfather, or value the social elements of a 
meat-heavy BBQ with our friends from college. So, there can also be cultural and 
social value in unhealthy eating (cf. Barnhill et al., 2014; Conly, 2012). A certain 
degree of health is necessary to live a good life, yet this does not necessarily mean 
one should also live a healthy life. The good life and the healthy life are not the same, 
and some people might be willing to make a trade-off between their health and 
health-impeding activities that they nevertheless consider to be an intrinsic part of 
their conception of the good life.  
How considerations of pleasure, social and cultural value can inform the 
debate on corporate responsibility for health in the food and beverage industry, is 
not fully explored in this dissertation. Is there still a place for unhealthy ‘enjoyment’ 
products and the companies that produce them? In regard to these questions I often 
think of the Heart Attack Grill. This is a hospital themed fast food restaurant which 
has an ‘Octuple Bypass Burger’ on the menu which contains nearly 20,000 calories. 
Intuitively it seems to me there is something morally off with such a product, yet it 
is hard to pinpoint where the moral problem lies. Can there be something wrong 
when a company develops a food product of which one portion contains such an 
excessive amount of calories? Why could it be?  
The above questions show that a comprehensive understanding of corporate 
responsibility for food-related health harms cannot be decoupled from the 
discussion of responsible innovation in the food industry (Blok et al., 2017; Garst et 
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al., 2017). If we want to move towards a responsible food industry, then philosophical 
investigations should also take place on product level, by exploring both the ethical 
and conceptual philosophical issues in food innovation. This for instance means 
reflecting on our understanding of (un)healthy food, the meaning of innovation in 
food research as well as the value of healthy and unhealthy eating. It also creates 
room to investigate how food developers should weigh the value of unhealthy eating 
in relation to health risks and reflect upon whether certain product innovations 
could be seen as inherently irresponsible due to their unhealthy composition. It are 
these kinds of topics and issues that deserve to be taken up in future research on 
responsible innovation.  
 
The legitimacy of corporate involvement in politics and science  
While this thesis touches upon the positive role firms could play in politics, there is 
still ample room to reflect upon the role that food firms are allowed to play, or should 
play in politics and science. As pointed out in chapter 1 and chapter 4 food firms 
frequently engage in behaviour that affects public health policy making (Bateman-
House et al., 2017; Bødker et al., 2015; Kurzer & Cooper, 2013) and undertake actions 
that affects the conduct of research in food science (Kearns et al., 2017, 2018; Nestle, 
2015, 2018). However, it is not clear how this behaviour should be assed from a moral 
perspective.  
At the end of chapter 4 it is put forth how this behaviour could be seen as 
problematic as through these political activities firms undermine both citizen 
autonomy and fruitful public deliberation and policy-making, which in turn has 
harmful effects on public health. In addition, these activities can also be harmful in 
a broader sense, as this kind of political involvement can result in the corruption of 
public officials and scientists, reduce the quality of scientific research, and diminish 
the quality of the democratic system (cf. Alzola, 2013; Nestle, 2018) 
Yet, this argument would need to be worked out in more detail, especially 
since there is no consensus in the debate in political philosophy and business ethics 
on the role corporations ought to play in politics or science (cf. Claassen & 
Gerbrandy, 2018; Hussain & Moriarty, 2018; Tempels, Blok, et al., 2017; Wettstein & 
Baur, 2016). More research is necessary to specify what the boundaries of political 
corporate activity are, to what extent lobbying is legitimate, and how this relates to 
the political responsibilities of firms. Greater clarity on this can in turn inform what 
kind of involvement of food companies in science and politics would be permissible, 
laudable or objectionable.   
 
Corporate paternalism   
This thesis indicates various directions for firms to take action to contribute to 
public health, but one can nevertheless wonder whether such actions would amount 
to a form of corporate paternalism. While many actions by firms to stimulate healthy 
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eating might be morally praiseworthy from a public health perspective, they are not 
without controversy. For example, ‘Meatless Monday’ programs at universities have 
been criticized as anti-liberal paternalistic interventions that limit individual choice 
and consumer freedom (Peters, 2015). 
The same critique might also apply to other private efforts that contribute to 
public health, as they either limit choices or steer consumers into a specific direction 
of what the good life consist of. And while we have claimed in chapter 4 that steering 
people to a more healthy choice is, arguably, less objectionable than steering people 
towards an unhealthy choice, the problem of paternalism nevertheless deserves our 
attention. Now, one might argue that these corporate actions are not problematic, 
for most of us are living in a free market society. Hence, if people do not wish be 
confronted with corporate actors promoting health, they will just go to a different 
store, and it is likely that different companies will enter the market that will suit the 
needs of those consumers that want a less healthy product. However, we are often 
dealing with imperfect markets, where monopolies can arise and inter-firm 
cooperation can take place (cf. Norman 2011; Heath 2014). So the reality is that there 
are (small) communities where the choice of supermarket is very limited and 
competitors are unlikely to enter the market (think, for instance, of the so called 
‘Tesco-Towns’ in the UK or the earlier dominance of Wal-Mart in the rural areas in 
United States) (Martin, 2006). Arguably, food deserts are problematic, but what 
about ‘health deserts’? What if private corporate partnerships – in an effort to 
collectively improve public health – decide to remove certain sets of products from 
the market or raise the price of certain unhealthy products? Whether such actions 
are morally desirable and whether these kinds of initiatives are in need of additional 
democratic legitimation, is something that should be taken up in future research (cf. 
Claassen and Gerbrandy 2016, 2018; Humphreys et al. 2015).  
 
Food CSR: Corporate perception of responsibility 
This dissertation mainly focussed on the normative foundations of corporate 
responsibility, yet has said little about the perception of responsibility within the 
food and beverage industry. As such there remains a gap between normative theory 
and empirical practice that deserves to be explored. In future research it would be 
relevant to assess how corporate actors in the food and beverage industry view their 
responsibility for food-related health problems. Do managers think their firms have 
a responsibility for addressing these problems? What kind of activities would they 
(not) want to engage in? Do they see clear boundaries between corporate 
responsibility, consumer responsibility and governmental responsibility? Are there 
differences in perception of responsibility in different departments of the firm, per 
sector or per country? More empirical research could inform us about the barriers 
and challenges firms face when engaging in pro-health CSR activities (Blok et al., 
125
Ch
ap
te
r 6
126 
 
2017; Garst et al., 2017). Bringing together both normative considerations and 
empirical findings are crucial for allowing CSR to actually take shape in practice. 
 
Moral theory: the relation between moral wrongs and political responsibility 
Lastly, in this dissertation it is put forth that firms have a responsibility to adhere to 
the law, respect the basic moral principles that flow from ordinary morality, and also 
have political responsibility to address structural injustices. However, in the 
literature there remains an ongoing discussion on how political responsibility should 
be understood, and how it relates to certain moral wrongs (Barry & Ferracioli, 2013; 
Couto, 2018; McKeown, 2014, 2018; Owen, 2013) and this research project only 
partially addresses the interaction between these different kinds of responsibility. 
It is worthwhile to further explore whether morally blameworthy behavior 
might be an additional ground for discharging political responsibility. For example 
consider two food firms of similar capacity, that are dealing with the same consumer 
group that is vulnerable to health deprivation, and they are also benefitting equally 
from the products that they sell to these consumers. It seems that they have a similar 
responsibility to contribute to prevention of these health problems. Now, say that 
one of the companies has made use of child marketing to sell its products. Does this 
violation of ordinary morality provide an additional or maybe even a more pressing 
reason for this particular firm to act upon these issues? How do past wrongs affect 
corporate responsibility? And does it matter whether the wrong was committed two 
months ago, or twenty-five years ago? In other words, to what extent past and 
present moral wrongs should be taken into account as considerations for taking 
action against certain injustices needs to be taken up in future research (cf. Huseby, 
2015; Janssen, 2013; Miller, 2001; Schrempf-Stirling, Palazzo, & Phillips, 2015).  
 
VI. Practical recommendations for firms operating in the food 
and beverage industry 
If firms are serious about living up to their responsibilities for public health this has 
implications for how they can operate in the market and how they interact with 
society. Arguably, what firms must and can do will differ on the basis of the type of 
business they have, what their capacity is to promote health, and what their position 
in the market system is. Yet it is not difficult to suggest concrete examples of what 
changes can be made in corporate practice:  
 
• Food producers that develop new products should reconsider the 
development of products that in a single portion exceed the daily 
recommended intake (DRI) of particular ingredients. For instance, cheese 
slices that contain more that 100% of the DRI in salt, or candy bars or sugary 
beverages that in a single portion contain more sugar than one should 
consume on a daily basis.   
126
127 
 
• Food producers should continue to innovate and develop healthier food 
products. This not only entails reducing the level of potentially harmful 
ingredients, but also working towards ways that inhibit consumers from 
engaging in mindless eating. For example, potato chips producer Pringles for 
a long time used the slogan: “Once You Pop, You Can’t Stop”. Yet, the fact 
that Pringles might contribute to people mindlessly eating their potato chips 
is exactly the problem. In the case of Pringles this can for instance be 
remedied by introducing a single red potato chip after every portion. This can 
make the consumer aware that she is going to start eating a new portion.   
 
• Retailers should stop marketing unhealthy food and beverage products to 
children. This means child marketing, such as using popular cartoons, toys 
or gamification, ought to come to an end. This for instance means that 
McDonalds – for as long as the Happy Meal remains an unhealthy set of food 
products – should stop adding toys to the menu. Furthermore, firms should 
reconsider selling and marketing unhealthy products at high schools.  
 
• Firms can start nudging people towards healthier choices. This can for 
instance be realised by making sure the healthier choices are available at a 
lower price, only giving a discount on the healthier varieties of products (e.g. 
the sugar free version of a soft drink brand), altering the shopping 
environment (such as putting healthier products in the front of the store), 
and by setting up check-outs with healthy products, rather than unhealthy 
ones.   
 
• Firms should stop lobbying against public health policies that seek to address 
food-related public health problems. Rather they should call upon 
government to regulate the food market, address market failures and create 
rules that can enable a level-playing for all food and beverage firms.   
 
• Firms should cooperate in public-private partnerships that contribute to 
public health. This can consist of various activities, such as educating people 
about healthy eating, sponsoring activities that stimulate a more healthy 
lifestyle (provided that only company’s the healthier products are being 
marketed), and funding research projects that seek to assess the impact of 
particular products on public health.  
 
• Firms that partake in food science research should act with the same degree 
of scientific integrity as is expected of public research institutions. This 
means that they should communicate their findings to the public, regardless 
of whether these findings shed a positive or negative light on particular 
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ingredients or food and beverage products. The citizen-consumer needs to be 
informed about the risks of consuming particular products.  
 
Systematic reflection on the moral responsibility of food companies and retailers is 
not just a theoretical matter. Even though the grounds for responsibility are 
relatively general and abstract, it is certainly possible for leadership, professionals, 
and shareholders of food and beverage firms to consider concrete possibilities for 
taking responsibility for public health, and reflecting on what types of actions are 
reasonable, if not required. 
 
VII. Concluding remarks 
This thesis started out with an anecdote about me going around in the supermarket, 
wondering whether my unhealthy choices and eating patterns were solely my own 
responsibility. In this dissertation I have tried to make clear that this not the case. I 
show that if we assume that food-related health problems can be construed as public 
health issues, as they affect the entire population, then all societal actors that are 
connected to this have a shared responsibility address these problems. 
Responsibility for public health is not a pie. This means that individuals and 
governments have a responsibility for health, but it also draws private actors like 
food and beverage companies into the equation.  
I argue that corporate responsibility for companies in the food and beverage 
industry to address food-related health problems is grounded in considerations of 
non-maleficence, respect for autonomy, and justice. On the basis of this it is put 
forth what kind of behavior is morally blameworthy and what kind of actions would 
be morally laudable, and I provide possible directions that firms can take to address 
these problems.  
For the industry to take action on food-related public health harms and act 
in more responsible fashion will not be easy. In the title of this thesis I refer to the 
two contrasting faces the food industry seems to have, as many firms engage in 
morally ambivalent behavior when it comes to public health. I do not think this 
ambivalence can ever be truly solved or overcome (or at least not within the 
contemporary capitalist system). Within the current market system there will always 
be a tension between the economic responsibilities and the social and political 
responsibilities of firms. Living up to these responsibilities will be a balancing act.  
Nevertheless, what this thesis shows is that we can move towards a more 
responsible food and beverage industry, and that there are moral reasons to expect 
this change to also come from within the industry. Possible pathways for change 
have been laid out. It is up to firms to take up the gauntlet and develop new 
strategies and implement those policies that can contribute to a food and beverage 
industry where public health is no longer secondary consideration.  
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Summary 
 
Food-related non-communicable diseases (NCDs) such as obesity, type 2 diabetes 
and cardiovascular diseases are key threats to public health. Yet, the responsibility 
for food-related health harms is contested. While traditionally viewed as mainly an 
individual responsibility or a governmental responsibility, fingers are nowadays also 
pointed at the food and beverage industry, as many firms are producing and 
marketing unhealthy products that contribute to the rise of obesity and other food-
related NCDs. Yet, does the behaviour of the industry and the impact its products 
have on public health also give reason for moral concern? Are these firms doing 
anything wrong? Are there normative considerations on the basis of which it can be 
argued that food and beverage firms have a responsibility for public health? This 
dissertation explores the moral grounds for firms in the food and beverage industry 
to address food-related public health problems, and simultaneously reflects upon 
what taking responsibility for these problems could entail in practice. 
After an introduction in chapter 1 on the context of the study and the central 
research questions, the dissertation continues with a more general philosophical 
exploration of the notion of corporate responsibility in the second chapter. Chapter 
2 poses the question why corporate actors, such as firms in the food and beverage 
industry, would have a responsibility for the common good. Drawing on the debates 
in business ethics on corporate citizenship it is argued that firms do not only have 
economic responsibilities, but also social and political responsibilities. Two distinct 
approaches to corporate political responsibility are discussed, namely the political 
corporate social responsibility approach developed Scherer and Palazzo and the 
subsidiary approach of Assländer and Curbach. The chapter makes clear that there 
are various conceptual and empirical problems in both approaches, and 
subsequently shows how the ideas of the political philosopher Iris Marion Young 
can shed a new light on what political responsibility entails and what this 
responsibility could imply for corporate actors. On the basis of her ideas, it is argued 
that political responsibility should be viewed as a shared responsibility to address 
structural injustices and other societal problems, and that this political 
responsibility applies to both corporate and governmental actors. For firms, taking 
political responsibility entails engaging in private actions to remedy social harms, 
cooperating in public-private partnerships that have similar social goals, aiding 
governments in their efforts to remedy injustice, or – when governmental 
institutions are not present or failing – work towards bringing public institutions 
into existence.  
Chapter 3 focuses on how responsibility for public health can be understood 
in the context of the food industry. It discusses the kind of practices food and 
beverage firms engage in and shows the moral ambivalence within the industry, as 
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many firms engage in activities that both negatively and positively affect public 
health. Drawing on the debates in public health ethics and political philosophy it is 
proposed that responsibility for public health should be understood as a shared 
responsibility. The chapter then considers what responsibility for public health can 
entail for food and beverage firms and discusses what various types of companies 
can do to address food-related public health problems.  
The next two chapters further explore the moral responsibilities of food firms 
for public health and reflect upon what responsible and irresponsible behavior in 
the food and beverage industry can entail. Chapter 4 centres on corporate practices 
within the market context and addresses under what conditions the sales and 
marketing of unhealthy products gives reason for moral concern. On the basis of the 
works of Gert and Hsieh on ordinary morality, it is argued that companies have to 
adhere to the principles of nonmaleficience and respect for autonomy in both 
market and non-market environments. It is put forth that the main moral problem 
lies in the potential manipulation and deception of consumers in sales and 
marketing, which can impede autonomous decision-making and steer people 
towards (over)consumption of unhealthy products. The chapter proposes that food 
and beverage firms should take into account i) how manipulative their marketing 
techniques are, ii) the degree to which consumers can be aware of possible 
manipulation or are expecting it, and iii) the likely negative impact 
(over)consumption of their product(s) will have on public health. Not taking these 
considerations into account results in actions that are morally wrong and 
irresponsible. In order to refrain from engaging in irresponsible behaviour, the 
chapter proposes that firms should stop marketing unhealthy products to children 
and should reconsider the marketing of unhealthy products to adults.  
Chapter 5 zooms out and puts the rise of food-related NCDs in a broader 
societal perspective. It highlights the injustices in food-related public health 
problems and reflects upon the implications this has for the responsibilities of food 
firms. Drawing on the writings of Iris Marion Young on inequality and responsibility 
for justice, it is argued how food-related health problems can be seen as structural 
injustices, and that food firms – through their market and non-market activities – 
are sustaining and reinforcing these problems. This creates a social connection to 
health injustices, which provides a basis for a shared political responsibility to 
address these injustices. The chapter then discusses three criteria (capacity, benefit, 
and vulnerability) for attributing responsibility which enable further specification of 
what taking responsibility for food-related health problems can entail for food firms 
in their daily operations.  
The final chapter, chapter 6, presents answers to the central research 
questions and takes stock of the insights gained. It concludes that food and beverage 
firms have distinct responsibilities for food-related health problems, and that these 
responsibilities spring from considerations of non-maleficence, respect for autonomy 
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and justice. It subsequently outlines what taking responsibility could entail for 
various firms in the food and beverage industry (e.g. healthy innovation, pro-health 
marketing, and political lobbying for a level playing field) and makes 
recommendations on what kind of behaviour firms should no longer engage in (e.g. 
marketing unhealthy products to children and teenagers and lobbying against public 
health regulation). The chapter highlights the theoretical contributions of the thesis 
to the fields of public health ethics and business ethics, while also discussing the 
underlying assumptions and limitations of the research project. It touches upon the 
ambiguity in food science on how ‘(un)healthy food’ should be understood, 
addresses the potential value of unhealthy eating as part of the good life, while also 
reflecting on corporate paternalism and the legitimacy of corporate involvement in 
politics and science.  
In sum, the thesis shows that there are moral reasons for food and beverage 
firms to be concerned with food-related health problems. There is a corporate 
responsibility for public health and we can call upon the industry to take this 
responsibility and develop new products and strategies that strengthen, rather than 
hamper public health.  
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Samenvatting 
 
Voedingsgerelateerde ziekten zoals obesitas, diabetes type 2 en hart- en vaatziekten 
vormen belangrijke bedreigingen voor de volksgezondheid. Wie verantwoordelijk is 
voor voedingsgerelateerde gezondheidsschade blijft echter een onderwerp van 
discussie. Hoewel deze verantwoordelijkheid van oudsher altijd gezien werd als de 
verantwoordelijkheid van het individu of van de overheid, wordt er tegenwoordig 
steeds vaker gekeken naar de rol van voedingsindustrie, aangezien veel bedrijven 
door de productie en marketing van ongezonde producten bijdragen aan de 
toename van obesitas en andere niet-overdraagbare ziekten. Het is echter de vraag 
of het gedrag van de voedingsindustrie en de impact van haar producten op de 
volksgezondheid ook moreel problematisch zijn. Doen deze bedrijven iets verkeerd? 
Zijn er normatieve overwegingen op basis waarvan gesteld zou kunnen worden dat 
ook bedrijven een verantwoordelijkheid hebben voor de volksgezondheid? Dit 
proefschrift onderzoekt welke morele redenen er zijn voor bedrijven in de 
voedselindustrie om voedingsgerelateerde volksgezondheidsproblemen aan te 
pakken en wat het nemen van deze verantwoordelijkheid in de praktijk voor 
bedrijven zou kunnen betekenen. 
Hoofdstuk 1 begint met korte schets van de context van het onderzoek en hier 
worden vervolgens de centrale onderzoeksvragen geïntroduceerd. In hoofdstuk 2 
wordt overwogen waarom spelers in de markt, zoals bedrijven in de dranken- en 
levensmiddelenindustrie, een zekere mate van verantwoordelijkheid zouden 
kunnen dragen voor het algemeen belang. Binnen verschillende debatten in de 
bedrijfsethiek wordt geargumenteerd dat bedrijven niet alleen een economische 
verantwoordelijkheid, maar ook sociale en politieke verantwoordelijkheden hebben. 
Twee verschillende benaderingen – namelijk de political corporate social 
responsibility-benadering van Scherer en Palazzo en de subsidiariteitsbenadering 
van Assländer en Curbach – worden uiteengezet. In dit hoofdstuk wordt gesteld dat 
beide benaderingen tegen zowel conceptuele als empirische problemen aanlopen. 
Vervolgens wordt aangetoond op welke wijze de ideeën van politiek filosoof Iris 
Marion Young een nieuw licht kunnen laten schijnen op hoe politieke 
verantwoordelijkheid begrepen kan worden en wat dit betekent voor de 
verantwoordelijkheid van bedrijven. Op basis van haar ideeën wordt betoogd dat 
politieke verantwoordelijkheid gezien moet worden als een gedeelde 
verantwoordelijkheid voor structurele onrechtvaardigheden en andere sociale 
problemen, en dat zowel bedrijven als overheden deze verantwoordelijkheid dragen. 
Voor bedrijven betekent het nemen van deze politieke verantwoordelijkheid dat ze: 
individuele acties ontplooien om maatschappelijke problemen op te lossen; 
samenwerken in publiek-private partnerschappen die soortgelijke problemen 
adresseren, overheden ondersteunen in het tegengaan van maatschappelijke 
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onrechtvaardigheden, en – wanneer overheden hier niet in slagen of simpelweg 
afwezig zijn – actie ondernemen om publieke instituties tot stand te brengen.  
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt ingegaan op hoe verantwoordelijkheid voor de 
volksgezondheid begrepen kan worden in de context van de voedingsindustrie. Hier 
wordt aandacht besteed aan de activiteiten van de voedingsindustrie, en wordt de 
morele tweeslachtigheid van de industrie aangetoond; veel bedrijven ondernemen 
zowel acties die een positieve invloed hebben op de volksgezondheid als acties die 
een negatieve invloed hebben hierop. Aan de hand van debatten binnen public 
health ethics en de politieke filosofie wordt er voorgesteld dat de 
verantwoordelijkheid voor volksgezondheid als een gedeelde verantwoordelijkheid 
zou moeten worden gezien. Vervolgens wordt nagegaan wat een 
verantwoordelijkheid voor de volksgezondheid in zou kunnen houden voor 
bedrijven in de voedingsindustrie en wat verschillende soorten bedrijven zouden 
kunnen doen om voedingsgerelateerde gezondheidsproblemen aan te pakken.  
In de twee daaropvolgende hoofdstukken worden de morele 
verantwoordelijkheden van bedrijven in de voedingsindustrie met betrekking tot de 
volksgezondheid verkend, en wordt er gereflecteerd op wat verantwoordelijk en 
onverantwoordelijk gedrag in de voedingsindustrie zou kunnen betekenen. 
Hoofdstuk 4 focust op bedrijfspraktijken binnen de context van de markt en 
bespreekt onder welke omstandigheden de verkoop en marketing van ongezonde 
producten moreel problematisch is. Op basis van het werk van Gert en Hsieh met 
betrekking tot ordinary morality, wordt er beargumenteerd dat bedrijven zich – 
zowel binnen als buiten de markt - aan de principes van niet-schaden en respect 
voor autonomie moeten houden. Er wordt voorgesteld dat het voornaamste morele 
probleem in de mogelijke manipulatie en misleiding van consumenten door middel 
van verkoop- en marketingtechnieken ligt; deze kunnen een negatieve invloed 
hebben op de autonome besluitvorming en mensen richting (over)consumptie van 
ongezonde producten drijven. Vervolgens wordt gesteld dat bedrijven in de 
voedingsindustrie rekening zouden moeten houden met i) hoe manipulatief hun 
marketingtechnieken zijn, ii) de mate waarin consumenten bewust kunnen zijn van 
mogelijke manipulatie of het kunnen verwachten, en iii) in hoeverre het 
waarschijnlijk is dat (over)consumptie van hun product(en) een negatieve impact 
op de volksgezondheid heeft. Wanneer deze overwegingen niet in acht worden 
genomen, kan dit tot acties leiden die onverantwoordelijk en moreel verwerpelijk 
zijn. Om onverantwoordelijk gedrag tegen te gaan, wordt er in dit hoofdstuk 
voorgesteld dat bedrijven zouden moeten stoppen met de marketing van ongezonde 
producten richting kinderen en de manier van marketing van ongezonde producten 
richting volwassen consumenten zouden moeten heroverwegen.  
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt er van perspectief gewisseld en wordt de opkomst van 
voedingsgerelateerde niet-overdraagbare ziekten in een bredere maatschappelijke 
context geplaatst. Binnen dit hoofdstuk komen de onrechtvaardigheden die verband 
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houden met voedingsgerelateerde volksgezondheidsproblemen aan het licht en 
wordt er gereflecteerd op de mogelijke implicaties voor de verantwoordelijkheid van 
bedrijven in de voedingsindustrie. Aan de hand van het werk van Iris Marion Young 
over ongelijkheid en verantwoordelijkheid, wordt beargumenteerd dat sommige 
voedingsgerelateerde gezondheidsproblemen gezien kunnen worden als structurele 
onrechtvaardigheden en dat bedrijven in de voedingsindustrie – door middel van 
activiteiten binnen en buiten de markt – deze problemen in stand houden en zelfs 
versterken. Dit creëert een sociale verbinding met deze onrechtvaardigheden, wat 
een basis vormt voor een gedeelde politieke verantwoordelijkheid om deze 
onrechtvaardigheden aan te pakken. Vervolgens worden er drie criteria besproken 
voor het toekennen van verantwoordelijkheid (capaciteit, voordeel en 
kwetsbaarheid); deze maken de verdere specificering mogelijk van wat het nemen 
van verantwoordelijkheid voor voedingsgerelateerde gezondheidsproblemen voor 
voedingsmiddelenbedrijven kan inhouden in hun dagelijkse bedrijfsvoering.  
In het laatste hoofdstuk, hoofdstuk 6, worden de antwoorden op de centrale 
onderzoeksvragen gepresenteerd en worden de verworven inzichten 
geïnventariseerd. Er wordt geconcludeerd dat bedrijven in de voedingsindustrie 
specifieke verantwoordelijkheden hebben voor voedingsgerelateerde 
gezondheidsproblemen, en dat deze verantwoordelijkheden voortkomen uit 
overwegingen van niet-schaden, respect voor autonomie en rechtvaardigheid. 
Vervolgens wordt er een beeld geschetst van wat het nemen van 
verantwoordelijkheid zou kunnen inhouden voor verschillende bedrijven in de 
voedingsindustrie (bijv. innovatie van gezonde producten, marketing van 
gezondheidsbevorderende producten en politiek lobbyen ter bevordering van een 
gelijk speelveld in de markt). Daarnaast worden er aanbevelingen gedaan met 
betrekking tot het soort gedrag dat bedrijven zouden moeten vermijden (bijv. op 
kinderen en tieners gerichte marketing van ongezonde producten en het lobbyen 
tegen wetgeving die de volksgezondheid zou moeten versterken). In dit hoofdstuk 
worden de theoretische bijdragen van dit proefschrift op het gebied van public 
health ethics en de bedrijfsethiek benadrukt, en worden de onderliggende aannames 
en beperkingen van het onderzoeksproject besproken. Er wordt kort aandacht 
besteed aan de ambiguïteit binnen de voedingswetenschap over hoe (on)gezond 
eten begrepen zou moeten worden en wordt gekeken in hoeverre ongezond eten een 
rol speelt in het goede leven. Daarnaast wordt er gereflecteerd op mogelijk 
paternalisme vanuit de industrie en de legitimiteit van de inmenging en 
betrokkenheid van bedrijven in de politiek en wetenschap.  
Kortom: deze dissertatie laat zien dat er morele redenen zijn voor bedrijven 
in de voedingsindustrie om zich te bekommeren om voedingsgerelateerde 
gezondheidsproblemen. Ook bedrijven hebben een verantwoordelijkheid voor de 
volksgezondheid. Wij kunnen de voedingsindustrie aanspreken op deze 
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verantwoordelijkheid en er op aansturen om nieuwe producten en strategieën te 
ontwikkelen die de volksgezondheid ondersteunen in plaats van deze belemmeren.  
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